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LUXEMBOURG  1964 FOREWORD 
This  Study  on  the  Long-Term  Energy  Outlook  for  the  European  Com-
munity is  the  outcome of long  and  exacting labour  on  the  part  of various 
departments of the High  Authority in conjunction with  those  of the  E.E.C. 
and Eur~.tom. Various cool and oil experts were also consulted. 
In its present state it constitutes a working document of the Commumty 
services.  Its aims are  three-fold: 
1)  The  Outlooh  first  of  all  explains  the  basic  hypotheses  outlined  in  the 
Memorandum on Energy Policy submitted to the Special Council of Minis-
ters of the E.C.S.C.  on June 27, 1962. The Outlook is thus not a document 
uf economic policy but an objective attempt to assemble all the information 
necessary  for  surveying  the  field  and  estimating  the  effects  of possible 
policies.  It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  major  conclusion  arising 
from this Outlook is that existing hazards and margins of error in no wa;;r 
detract from the validity of the lines of economic policy proposed in the 
Memorandum.  This in  fact  reinforces  the independence and security  for 
political decisions. 
2)  The Outlook then goes on to provide answers to the main questions raised 
by the Council of Ministers as  regards the competitiveness of Community 
coalmining,  subsidy  mechanisms,  oil  supply  conditions,  nuclear  energy 
prospects, balance of payment problems and cyclical fluctuations. 
Once the Council of Ministers  has signified its agreement to  the general 
lines of the Memorandum,  these answers will enable methods of applying 
the chosen policy to be specified and their consequences assessed. 
3)  Finally,  the  Outlook  does  not prejudice  the  General  Objectives  for  coal 
us  envisaged by Article 46 of the Treaty of Paris but constitutes a neces-
sary preliminary thereto. 
3 To the Second Edition 
Prefaces 
by P.-O. LAPIE 
Member of  the  High  Authority, 
Chairman of the  lnter-Exe·cutive  Working Party 
on  Energy 
The "Study on the Long-Term Energy Outlook of the Community" aroused 
much interest on its original appearance in January 1963. It was dissected and 
discussed in detail in the Press and in specialized  publications~ and  debated 
in all sorts of circles. 
The  object  in  bringing  out  this  second  edition  is  twofold~ to  meet  the 
continuing steady demand for the work~ and, this time, also to make generally 
available  the  technical  Annexes 
1
)  explaining  more  fully  aspects  which  are 
dealt with in condensed form in the body of the overall Study. 
Readers may he somewhat surprised to find that we have neither sought 
to clarify certain disputed points nor updated the figures and findings in the 
light of the latest developments. We have not done so  for two reasons. 
Minor alterations would have  added little  to  the value  of the  work,  and 
might  have  wrongly  suggested  greater  reliability  or  the  need  to  view  the 
balance  and  general  conclusions  of  the  Study  differently. It was  therefore 
preferred to make none. 
On the other  hand~ we  should of course  have  felt  obliged to  recast  the 
entire Study had it been considered, on the strength either of new  develop-
ments  meantime  or  of  criticisms  voiced,  that  the  basic  approach  required 
alteration.  I  must  emphasize  that there  appears  to  he  at present no  reason 
to  do  anything  of the  kind :  on  the  contrary.  A  first  check  on  the  trends 
outlined in the Study was effected in connection with the annual scrutiny of 
the  Community's  energy  position. 
2
)  This  check,  which  will  he  repeated  at 
regular  intervals~  showed  that  the  long  winter  of  1962  and  the  unusually 
severe one of 1963 temporarily intensified, hut in no way deflected, the main 
trends  described  - growing  energy  requirements~  growing  proportional 
consumption  of  oil~  growing  dependence  on  imports,  hard  times  for  much 
of the Community's coal industry. 
-----
1)  These Annexes are not included in the English version. Rea•ders  wishing to consult them 
are referre·d to the editions published in the four official Community .languages  (French, 
German, Italian  and Dutch). 
2)  See  Conjoncture  energetique  dans  la  Communaute:  Situation a la  fin  de  1963,  Perspec-
tives 1964,  January 1964. 
5 Actually,  there  has  been  one  new  development,  the  reassessment  of the 
natural-gas  reserves  of  Groningen  discovered  in  1960.  When  the  Study was 
compiled  these  were  officially  put  at  400,000  million  cubic  metres :  since 
then,  however,  the  estimate  has  been raised to  1,100,000  cubic  metres.  The 
question  is  naturally  what  the  impact  is  likely  to  be  on  the  Community's 
energy supply pattern in the years immediately ahead. An E.E.C. Commission 
report now in preparation on natural gas is seeking to ascertain this. As thing'! 
now stand, it does  not look  as  if the new find  would invalidate  the  overall 
outlook  indicated  up  to  1970 :  for  a  variety  of  technical  and  economic 
reasons,  the  Groningen  gas  can  only - as  is  usual  in  such  cases  - come 
into  the  market  by  easy  stages,  so  that  natural-gas  availabilities  may  be 
expected  to  remain  within  the  range  suggested  in  the  Study  for  1965  and 
1970. The  effects  of the new  circumstances  can thus  be  adequately  allowed 
for simply by basing calculations on the upper-limit figures indicated. 
Policy-wise,  then,  there  is  at  present  no  change  in  the  basic  problem 
represented for the Community as a whole by the growth in imports of energv, 
and more especially in imports of oil. 
Doubtless because of its sheer size,  the discovery in the Netherlands has 
caused  a  general  rush  to  prospect  for  oil  everywh~re along  the  North  Sea 
coast. However, it is impossible to tell yet whether the results will be of local 
importance  only  or whether they  will  be  big  enough  and  numerous  enough 
really to  produce a  material change in the international oil market. We  can 
only accept the uncertainty, which is part and parcel of the outlook described 
- and which,  incidentally, further  confirms,  the  Study's  findings  as  to  the 
parlous position of Community coal. 
As  regards the adverse comment encountered in the  course  of the many 
consultations  which  followed  the  issue  of  the  provisional  version,  this  was 
of two quite distinct kinds. 
In  the  first  place,  it  was  complained  that  some  of  the  estimates  were 
highly debatable and embodied a  great many factors  of uncertainty.  On this 
point I  would simply repeat what I  said in my preface to the earlier edition, 
that we were not out to forecast  to  within half a  dollar or within  a  million 
tons here or there :  we were seeking to bring into  one  coherent picture the 
main  technical,  economic,  social  and  political  factors  governing  the  energy 
market. Since the aim was to  examine what was likely to  occur in different 
eventualities,  it was  only  intended  to  indicate  approximations  and  to  work 
out  roughly  the  benefits  and  costs  of  various  courses  of  economic  policy. 
From this  angle  we  consider  the  Study's  findings  entirely  cogent.  It  draws 
a  clear dividing-line between the economic and the political side; it indicates 
the links between the  two,  and in  so  doing  draws  attention to  the value  of 
fundamental  economic  studies  as  a  guide  for  purposes  of political  decision. 
6 To expect more of it is to mistake the ends, the means, the whole essence of 
forward  assessment.  To  reject it on such grounds  is  to  rule  out  all  analysis 
aimed at establishing the margin of choice and the alternatives actually open. 
The other main  criticism was  that we  did  not set our sights  on  a  suffi-
ciently distant target. Consequently, it was argued, we had failed to note that 
the  supply  of  oil  could  be  expected  to  reach  its  limits  from  round  about 
1975-80. In  view  of the  probable  turnround  at  that  juncture,  the  proper 
course  now  was  to  husband  the  resources  available,  and  on  no  account  to 
squander them by such  actions  as  (in particular)  ceasing  to  mine  European 
coal. 
This objection would have been fair  enough if the Study had  adopted a 
hard and fast line as to the future  and  called for the immediate and irrevo-
cable  closure  of  all  pits  rated,  merely  on  the  strength  of  their  individuaJ 
present costs, as uneconomic. But it did not. On the contrary, both the Study 
and  the  Memorandum  expressly  emphasize  the  unacceptable  economic  and 
social risk of leaving the coal industry defenceless. 
Yet they show,  too, that it would be rash and costly to  secure the  Com-
munity's long-term energy supply purely by keeping Community coal produc-
tion going at any price. A  balance  does  have  to  be  struck between  realistic 
appraisal  of  the  dangers  involved  and honest  estimation  of the  cost  of the 
proposed palliatives. Any but the most minor act of economic choice involves 
risks  - but they  have  to  be  calculated  risks,  properly  thought  out  in  full 
knowledge of the facts. It was for this purpose that the Study was compiled 
in the first  place,  and for  this  purpose we  are  republishing it to  all  intents 
and purposes as it stands. 
As  Chairman  of  the  Inter-Executive  Working  Party  on  Energy,  I  feel 
certain that it will remain the standard work of reference for the framing of 
a  European energy policy.  Now that the  dialogue between the  Governments 
and the Communities is  yielding the first practical decisions, it is  more vital 
than ever that informed and thinking people should have reference data also 
to  enable  them to  grasp  the  implications  of those  decisions  and  form  their 
opinion as to the line of thought and action adopted. 
Luxembourg, June 30, 1964. 
7 To the First Edition 
Here for the first time on a  European scale  is  an analysis  of the funda-
mental trends in energy,  co-ordinated in  terms  of  quantity,  cost  and  price. 
This represents the outcome of two  years' work on the part of our various 
departments. 
On  behalf of the  three  executives  of the  E.C.S.C.~ the  Common Market 
and Euratom,  I  am  glad to  be able  to  present this  joint Study, which  is  as 
important as it is original. 
From the inception of our work we were convinced that an energy policy 
would have to be based on a  precise analysis of fundamental long-term trends 
in the European energy market.  Surveys were therefore embarked upon for 
this purpose. 
By April 5,  at the meetings of Ministers in Rome, work was  sufficiently 
advanced for the Inter-Executive Working Party to commit itself to drafting 
energy policy proposals within two  months. It was  only material difficulties 
and the shortness of time available which prevented the present Study from 
being submitted on June 25  along with the Memorandum on Energy Policy. 
This Outlook ist not therefore designed as a sort of a posteriori justification 
of the Memorandum but as  an instrument of analysis intended to  introduce 
it.  Nor is  it a  political  document,  but  a  study intended  as  a  forerunner  to 
political action. The aim has been to inform rather than persuade. 
The  Study  aims  at  providing  guidance  for  political  action,  not  by  fore-
casting the future nor by offering recommended goals, but more modestly by 
suggesting prospects for its consideration. 
These are not forecasts. The Study does not claim to estimate coal produc-
tion or imports in 1970 or 1975, since we are fully aware that an attempt to 
do  so  would result in an underestimate not only of the uncertainties which 
bedevil calculations of this kind but, more important still, of the real weight 
of the political decisions whose aim it is  to enlighten. 
Nor do we propose aims to be achieved. In no way does the Study claim 
to recommend that coal production should be fixed at such and such a  level. 
In analysing the position in the Community in the event of the total absence 
of aid or protection for Community energy, this Study is emphasizing a  danger 
rather than suggesting a  goal. 
8 If  there  are  no  forecasts  and  no  aims,  what  then  does  the  Outlook 
consist of ? 
In Parts  One,  Two  and  Three  we  have  a  close  analysis  of  the  factors 
involved  in  the  energy  market.  Part  One  provides  a  convenient  means  of 
uniformly organizing and assembling the sum total of our knowledge of the 
general economic trends which govern the energy market. Supply and demand 
factors are then re-grouped and evaluated in Parts Two and Three. We thus 
have an analysis in terms of quantity, cost and price of the various  factors 
controlling energy market mechanisms. 
Part Four aims at achieving a  synthesis between supply and demand.  It 
starts by demarcating the genuine area of competition between different forms 
of  energy  and  thus  defines  the  limits  within  which  political  options  can 
properly be exercised. To each of the latter corresponds a  different balance 
between various forms of energy and in particular between Community energy 
and  imported  energy.  These  levels  are  reflected  in  the  overall  Community 
situations for 1970 and 1975. 
The  last  part  of  the  Study  aims  at  providing  a  means  of  assessing  as 
accurately as possible the advantages and disadvantages of any given measure 
of  economic  policy.  The  idea  is  not  to  urge  the  abstract  advantages  of  a 
particular free  or protected market policy but to  evaluate  the  effects  of  a 
given level of protection or assistance, and it is  in this spirit that Part Five 
should be approached. 
In preparing this  document we  have  aimed  at an  objective  analysis  and 
have  therefore  stressed  the  uncertainties  inherent  in  the  results  we  offer. 
For the same reason we have at no time offered these results as an argument 
in favour of a particular political measure. It may be asked whether we have 
not gone  too far in this direction and whether the neutral character of the 
analysis  does not constitute an obstacle to  its  efficiency and  a  limitation to 
its scope. 
I  do not think so, because a  number of considerations which emerge from 
this work remain valid despite the acknowledged margin of uncertainty which 
surrounds any proper energy policy. 
The first of these considerations involves the very existence of the Com-
mon  Market.  A  work  of  this  kind  shows  that  the  success  of  the  Common 
Market implies  the  creation  of a  common  energy  market. It is  difficult  to 
see  how, by 1970, energy alone  can constitute  a  factor  of distortion in  the 
economic area  of the  Common  Market in which  raw material prices,  wages 
and  fiscal  and  social  charges  have  been  harmonized.  If,  as  this  document 
shows,  different energy policies  are  really capable of producing  differences 
in energy prices amounting to  as  much as 40°/o,  energy must not be allowed 
to block the path towards integration. 
9 The second point is  that Europe must have  a  supply and import policy. 
The Study shows that imports can play an increasing and decisive role under 
all the circumstances envisaged. The problem of reliable  supplies must  thus 
count amongst the major preoccupations of a  European Energy Policy. 
Thirdly~ aid to  Community coal-mining is imposed on the Community by 
social  and  regional  considerations.  It would  seem  socially  and  politically 
dangerous to allow coal production to drop to barely half the present figure. 
This situation can only be avoided by establishing systems of aid and protec-
tion~ and procedures for  these  have  been carefully  described  and  evaluated 
in the body of this document. 
The last consideration concerns the role of nuclear energy.  Viewed from 
the points of view both of cheap energy and security of  supply~ the peaceful 
use of the atom can play  a  decisive  role  in  Europe~ although the  impact of 
nuclear energy will not make itself deeply felt until after 1975. Nevertheless 
the development of nuclear energy in the  Community must be  prepared for 
and organised now. Moreover Europe will undergo a  critical period~ to which 
we must start adapting ourselves  now~ until nuclear  energy  is  fully  capable 
of taking over from European coal. 
I  hope this Outlook will allay the anxieties and answer the questions which 
constantly  assail  governments,  parliamentarians,  producers~ workers  and  all 
concerned with energy  policy~ sometimes to  the point of desperation. At all 
events it will constitute an essential work of reference in formulating Euro-
pean energy policy. 
Luxembourg, December 1962. 
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15 INTRODUCTION 
This document offers the reader "outlooks" and in no way constitutes a 
programme. These "outlooks" are nevertheless intended to form the basis of 
an energy policy and as such entail our taking a long-term view which explores 
several possibilities. 
(a)  The long-term view 
Even  though  the  main  task  is  to  work out  decisions  to  he  taken  fairly 
soon,  we  must still look  to  a  fairly  distant future  if  we  wish  to  avoid  our 
immediate  policy  being  subject  to  wasteful  changes  in  direction.  Only  by 
thinking in terms of a sufficiently distant future date can we detect alterations 
and far-reaching  changes  too  slender to  be  readily perceptible in the  short-
term  view.  An  additional  factor  in  the  energy  sector  is  that  projects  are 
often very slow to come to fruition.  Ten years or more may elapse before a 
new  mine  starts  operating or the  results  of  oil  prospection  in  a  new  area 
become available, and a decade will he needed before nuclear energy can help 
appreciably in meeting the increased demand for energy. The  delays  are no 
less great amongst consumers, since it took at least fifteen years to complete 
the electrification and diesel conversion of the railways. 
We must accordingly look as  far ahead as  1975, which is,  moreover, the 
date selected in the report of the Energy Commission of the fourth  French 
plan and  in  the  German  energy  survey.  This  clearly  does  not preclude  the 
consideration  of intermediate  stages.  1970  is  an  obvious  choice  as  marking 
the end of the transition period for the Common Market. Basically the entire 
report will he built around the year 1970, but as  far  as  possible the  corres-
ponding figures will he given for 1965 and 1975. The figures for distant years 
must therefore he regarded  as  approximations  rather than rigidly inflexible 
data. 
Looking so  far ahead the uncertainties are obviously great. What will the 
state  of  technology  be  in  fifteen  years ?  Will  not  new  energy  production, 
conversion and utilisation processes have appeared ? What will the structure 
of the economy itself be ? 
Although these are major sources of uncertainty, two points can he made. 
Firstly, the future is not so entirely unknown as might be supposed. A  period 
of  some  years  usually  elapses  between  a  discovery  and  its  industrial 
17 application; because of the inertia inherent in existing equipment and mental 
attitudes  this  is  followed  by  a  lapse  of  time  between  the  initial  industrial 
application  and  the  generalization  of  the  process.  Most  of  the  techniques 
which will be in current use in ten or fifteen years' time have already been 
discovered  in  today's  laboratories;  the  problem  is  rather  that  of  detecting 
and selecting the laboratory results which have an industrial future, and the 
High Authority has  accordingly  entrusted this  type  of research  to  a  specia-
lized body. 
These  considerations  lead  us  on  to  our  second  and  more  fundamental 
point. The imponderables which weigh heavily on any attempt to discern the 
pattern of the future must not frighten us away from taking decisions which, 
at least in part, are bound to have long-term effects and thus condition this 
future pattern, although it would be a  serious mistake to  adopt them lightly 
without  endeavouring  to  foresee  their  effects  and  reach  a  conclusion  as  to 
whether  they  are  the  best  decisions  in  the  light  of our present  knowledge. 
It is  nevertheless important to remain aware of the uncertainties and  adopt 
a  strategy , which  allows  for  them  by  weighing  up  the  risks  involved.  This 
Study therefore  pays  great attention to  bringing  out the  factors  underlying 
the  uncertainties  which  affect  any  results  and,  at  least  approximately,  to 
assessing their effects.  Finally, in our major task of deciding whether these 
unknown quantities can substantially affect the general conclusions on which 
policy  decisions  are  based,  we  shall  find  that  their  influence  in  no  way 
detracts from the validity of the conclusions. 
(b)  Alternative possibilities 
In  order  to  facilitate  the  choice  of  an  energy  policy,  these  ''outlooks" 
require  to  be  worked  out  for  several  alternative  and  well  differentiated 
possibilities as regards the respective places to be allotted to Community and 
imported energies. We have thus calculated not only the Community produc-
tion level which will be competitive with imported energy in the light of the 
most likely price hypothesis for  the latter but also  the variations  this  level 
would undergo as the result of different price hypotheses and different forms 
of assistance for Community energy, particularly coal. 
Parts One to Three are devoted respectively to  a  survey of the economic 
development horizons which constitute the overall framework for our Study, 
to an assessment of global and sectoral energy requirements and to a definition 
of supply trends in different forms of energy (coal, petroleum, etc.). In Part 
Four we shall outline the probable breakdown of consumption amongst various 
energy  products  on  the  basis  of  comparative  costs  to  the  consumer  under 
alternative  policy hypotheses.  Finally, Part Five  will  review the  major  pro-
blems involved in be1lancing the energy positions thus arrived at. 
18 Part One 
The Overall Economic Context 
Chapter  1 
General economic outlook 
Forecasts of economic growth form the general framework within which 
future energy trends have to be estimated. Both demand and, in some respects, 
supply are governed by the level of economic activity, so that we have had to 
formulate  hypotheses  regarding  the  general  economic  trend in the  years  to 
come. 
This procedure has three consequences : 
1.  Energy forecasts  are  conditional,  i.e.  they  are  only valid  for  the  overall 
economic hypotheses selected. 
2.  Energy  forecasts  may  be  regarded  as  consistent  with  overall  economic 
growth. 
3.  Any differences between the energy forecasts in this report and the results 
of  other  studies  must  be  examined  in  the  light  of  the  general  growth 
hypotheses selected as a point of departure. 
Section l  - The economic outlook in the Community 
A - General remarks 
As regards economic growth in the Community countries, the E.E.C. Com-
mission has recently brought out a study entitled Rapport sur les perspectives 
de  developpement  economique  dans  la  C.E.E.  de  1960 a 1970  compiled  by 
experts belonging to the Working Party on Problems of Structure and Long-
Term Development. 
19 These growth forecasts form the basis of the estimates presented in this 
study. Everything in this chapter which deals with national product and popu-
lation trends for the period 1960-1970 is a  summary of this report, to which 
the reader is referred for further information. 
It has also been necessary to work out estimates for the period 1970-1975. 
These were extrapolated by High Authority departments on a basis similar to 
that  adopted  in  the  above-mentioned  report  in  order  to  ensure  coherence 
between the figures involved. In addition certain sectoral data, especially for 
general industrial activity and iron and steel industry activity, were needed to 
enable demand to be forecast in some sectors, and here the estimates were also 
made by High Authority departments. 
Before  passing  on  to  the  main  economic  growth  trends  which  may  he 
expected in the next fifteen years, it is worth-while pausing to examine briefly 
certain aspects of the forecasts adopted in the report referred to above. 
First of all it should be noted that two alternatives were postulated, alter-
native B  being considered by the experts as  the major growth hypothesis and 
alternative A as indicating the results of a slower rate of expansion. The overall 
hypotheses adopted for the energy forecasts are those of alternative B, which 
is considered to he the most likely possibility. 
Secondly, the forecasts are based on constant prices, with 1960 prices used 
as a reference index. They have been converted into dollar units of account at 
1960 exchange rates. 
Past economic development trends do not justify postulating an unchanged 
rate of growth  for  the future  or ascribing  a  change in this  tempo  to  1960. 
Nevertheless it is important to see whether these changes in tempo take place 
slowly over the years or whether they result from the sudden intervention of 
a determining factor. We have therefore brought out the rate of growth trend 
by selecting 1965 as an intermediate point. 
It should be noted that the figures given in this report represent average 
rates of growth and that the position in 1965, 1970 and 1975 could be markedly 
influenced by cyclical or accidental fluctuations.  Our forecasts  ignore  these 
factors and assume that business conditions are at an average level. 
Tables 1  and 2  summarise the main economic development data taken as 
a basis for the energy forecasts : 
Gross national product 
(i)  as  average  annual  rates  (Table  1  A); 
(ii)  as  indices  (Table  1  B). 
20 Industrial production 
(i)  as  average annual rates of growth (Table  2  A); 
(ii)  as  indices  (Table  2  B). 
The forecasts  form part of a  corpus of estimates  which,  in the experts' 
report, involve the following assessments for the Community as  a  whole and 
for each country : 
(i)  population trend; 
(ii)  growth in national product; 
(iii)  the trend in the components of the national product. 
The  main  results  are  summarized  in  the  following  paragraphs  and  are 
accompanied by a  brief outline of the development trends. 
Table 1  - Trend in Gross National Product 
A  - Average annual rate-s  of growth 
Country  1950-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970  1970-1975  1960-1970 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  7.4  I  4.4  4.0  4.2  4.2 
Belgium  2.7  3.8  3.9  3.9  3.9 
France  4.3  5.2  4.7  4.6  5.0 
Italy  5.9  5.95  5.75  5.3  5.8 
Netherlands  4.9  4.3  4.9  4.7  4.6 
Community  I  5.5  4.9 
I  4.6  4.6  4.7 
B  - Indices  by  comparison  with  1960 
Country  1965  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  124 
I 
151  186 
Belgium  121  145  177 
France  129  162  203 
Italy  133  176  227 
Netherlands  123  157  197 
Community  127  159  199 
Source:  Report by E.E.C.  experts. 
21 Table  2  - Trend in Industrial Production 
A  - Average annual rates of growth 
Country  1950-1960  1960-1965 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  9.1 
Belgium  3.0 
France  6.4 
Italy  8.1 
Luxembourg  -
Netherlands  5.8 
Community  7.5 
B  - Indices by comparison with 1960 
Country 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.) 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Community 
1965 
131 
126 
137 
152 
122 
130 
136 
5.5 
4.8 
6.5 
8.8 
4.0 
5.4 
6.3 
Source:  Estimates by High Authority departments. 
B - Population trends 
1965-1970  1970-1975  1960-1970 
5.0 
I 
5.0  5.3 
4.8  4.8  4.8 
5.9  5.5  6.2 
7.8  6.5  8.3 
4.0  4.0  4.0 
6.0  5.6  5.7 
5.9  5.5 
I  6.1 
1970  1975 
167  213 
159  202 
183  238 
221  303 
148  180 
174 
I  229 
181  1- 236 
Population trends constitute an important factor in economic growth. The 
estimates of total population trend  (Table 3  A)  have been used to  calculate 
the future growth in the working population on the basis of the anticipated 
total population structure and constant rates of activity, with corrections for 
children remaining at school,  women in employment,  age  of retirement and 
migration. The results are summarized in Table 3  B. 
These  estimates  form  the  basis  of the  forecast  of population  employed, 
which  takes  into  account  certain  unemployment  hypotheses  for  1960  and 
1970 (Table 3  C). 
This table reveals a  sharp decline in the labour force trend by comparison 
with the reference period. The  considerable increase both in working popu-
lation and population employed in Germany and Italy will not continue. 
In the former country the trend in recent years has been towards massive 
immigration and  a  heavy  call  on  labour  reserves.  These have  now  dropped 
to  a  very low level and the population structure is  developing unfavourably. 
22 Table  3  - Population Trend 1950-1975  (average annual  rate of growth) 
A  - Total population 
Country  1950-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970 
Germany (Fed. Rep.)  1.1  0.8  0.75 
Belgium  0.6  0.6  0.5 
France  0.9  0.7  0.95 
Italy  0.6  0.6  0.6 
Netherlands  1.3  1.1  1.1 
Community  0.9  0.75  0.75 
B  - Working population 
Country  1950-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  1.5  0.4  0.3 
Belgium  0.1  0.3  0.7 
France  0.4  0.7  0.8 
Italy  1.4  0.65  0.65 
Netherlands  1.2  1.5  1.2 
Community  1.1  0.65  0.6 
,-
C  - Population employed1) 
Country  1950-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  2.2  0.4  0.3 
Belgium  0.3  0.3  0.7 
France  0.4  0.7  0.8 
Italy  1.7  0.9  0.9 
Netherlands  1.3  1.4  1.2 
Community  1.4 
I  0.7  0.65 
Sources:  1950-1960:  O.E.C.D.,  Policies  for  Economic  Growth,  November  1962. 
1960-1970:  Report by E.E.C.  experts. 
1970-1975:  Estimates  by High Authority  departments. 
1970-1975 
0.8 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
1.0 
-
0.75 
1970-1975 
0.3 
0.7 
0.7 
0.65 
1.0 
0.6 
1970-1975 
I 
0.3 
0.7 
0.7 
0.9 
1.0 
0.6 
1)  The difference between working population and population employed consists of unemployed. 
23 Likewise in Italy the population structure and the continuous call on labour 
reserves are leading to  a  reduction in the  rate of growth in the  population 
employed, although to a lesser extent. 
In France and Belgium, on the other hand, the population trends suggest 
a  more rapid growth in the population employed, whilst in the  Netherlands 
the heavy increase over the past decade will only slacken to  a  slight extent. 
For the  Community  as  a  whole  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  labour  force 
during  the  next  fifteen  years  will  remain  below  half  the  reference  period 
figure. 
C - The trend in the gross national product 
The labour quantity factor will only play a  small part in the increase in 
gross national product. By comparison with the reference period its relative 
contribution will drop  from nearly 25%  to  as  little  as  15ro.  After a  period 
of sharp  rise in the population employed,  the  only important factor  in  the 
future  will  thus  be  the  trend  in  productivity  (gross  national  product  per 
person  employed  per  annum). 
Table  4  A  shows  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  gross  national  product  per 
person employed. It should be noted that the figures for some countries allow 
for  a  substantial reduction in  working  hours  during  the  next fifteen  years, 
entailing a more rapid rise in hourly than in annual wages. 
For Germany a  reduction of nearly 10% in working hours for the period 
1960-1970 has  been  assumed;  this  would  only  affect  the  national product 
by 8.5ro,  since  the  reduction  in  working hours  may  stimulate  productivity. 
Allowing  for  this  reduction,  the  productivity  forecasts  represent  a  slightly 
slower rate of advance than during the years 1950-1960, which was subject 
to recovery and reconstruction factors, particularly during the first five years. 
In  Belgium,  on  the  other  hand,  the  anticipated  growth  for  the  period 
1960-1965 is where recovery influences occur, which means that from 1965 
onwards  Belgium  will  have  overcome  the  consequences  of  the  1950-1960 
slump period and the resulting brake on expansion. For 1970  and 1975  the 
forecasts assume that the rate of recovery in the gross national product (3.9%) 
for the period 1960-1965 will have become  a  long-term structural feature. 
As regards France, the forecasts until 1965 agree with the estimate worked 
out under the  fourth  plan.  These  figures  also  show  an increase in the  rate 
of growth  in  the  gross  national  product  per person  employed.  One  of  the 
major objectives of the French Government's fourth  plan is  to  increase  the 
rate  of investment under  the  stimulus  of  public  investment.  For  the  long-
term view we have adopted the existing French forecasts for 1975, which are 
24 Table 4  - Per head  of population  Gross  National  Product  {annual  rate  of  growth} 
A  - Gross  national product per person  employed 
Country  1950-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970  1970-1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  5.2  4.0  I  3.7  3.9 
Belgium  2.4  3.5  3.2  3.2 
France  3.9  4.5  3.85  3.9 
Italy  4.2  5.0  4.8  4.4 
Netherlands  3.9  2.8  3.7  3.7 
Community  4.1  4.2  3.9  4.0 
B  - Gross  national product per inhabitant 
Country  l950-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970  1970-1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  6.3  3.6  I 
3.25  3.4 
Belgium  2.1  3.2  3.35  3.3 
France  3.4  4.5  3.7  3.7 
Italy  5.2  5.3  5.1  4.7 
Netherlands  3.8  3.2  3.8  3.7 
Community  4.6  4.1  3.8  3.8 
Sourm:  1950-1960:  Calculated from  the  data  given  in  the Bulletin statistique published  by the 
Statistical Office of the European  Communities,  by fitting  p  =  a  (I  + .rt)t, 
1960-1970:  Report by E.E.C. experts. 
1970-1975:  Estimates  by High Authority  departments. 
more  representative  of  long-term  economic  growth  trends  and  correspond 
to the rate achieved during the reference period. 
For Italy the Working Party report shows an average annual rate of growth 
of 4.9%  in overall productivity (1960-1970). In the next fifteen  years the 
expansion in productivity would thus be greater than previously on account 
of the trend of investment to move towards increased mechanisation and thus 
towards an increasing employment of capital assets. 
Economic  expansion  will,  moreover,  benefit  as  and  when  the  Italian 
Government  succeeds  in  solving  its  problems  of  regional  imbalance  and 
occupational training. The forecast  levels  are thus high by comparison with 
the other countries in the Community. In the long term, on the other hand, 
we can envisage a slackening in economic expansion, which to a certain extent 
is  already reflected in the estimates for 1975. 
25 Table  5  - Data in Terms of Value per Inhabitant at 1960 Prices  (units of account) 
A  - Gross national product 
Country  1960  1965 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  1,268  1,515 
Belgium  1,331  1,557 
France  1,276  1,587 
Italy  650  842 
Netherlands  975  1,140 
Community  1,074  1,315 
B  - Private consumption 
Country  1960  1965 
Germany  (Fe.d.  Rep.)  720  907 
Belgium  914  1,052 
France  829  1,039 
Italy  339  526 
Netherlands  550  661 
Community  655  828 
Sources:  1960,  1965  and 1970:  Report by E.E.C.  experts. 
1975:  Estimates by High Authority departments. 
Table  6  - National  Percentages  of  Community  Total  (0/o) 
A  - Gross national product 
Country  1960  1965 
rmany  (Fed.  Rep.)  37.3  36.5 
lgium  6.7  6.4 
ance  32.1  32.5 
ly  17.2  18.6 
Jtherlands  6.2  6.0 
Community  100  100 
B  - Industrial production 
Country  1960  1965 
Germany  (Fe·d.  Rep.)  39.6  38.1 
Belgium  6.6  6.1 
France  33.6  33.9 
Italy  15.0  16.9 
N.~therlands  5.1  4.9 
Community  100  100 
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1970  1975 
1,776  2,100 
1,835  2,160 
1,904  2,280 
1,080  1,360 
1,374  1,650 
1,585  1,910 
1970  1975 
1,079  1,280 
1,251  1,470 
1,283  1,540 
695  890 
I 
809  980 
1,022  1,170 
1970  1975 
35.5  34.9 
6.2  6.0 
32.6  32.7 
19.6  20.3 
6.1  6.1 
100  100 
1970  1975 
36.7  36.1 
5.8  5.6 
34.0  33.9 
18.5  19.4 
4.9  4.9 
100  100 In the Netherlands we  must allow for  a  reduction of nearly 5%  in total 
working hours for the period 1960-1965. The rate of increase in the  gross 
national product per person employed during this period will thus be relatively 
low. For the period 1965-1975 the rate adopted is  substantially that of the 
reference period. 
By  combining  the  population  employed  and  productivity  estimates  we 
obtain forecasts for the expansion in gross  national product per country and 
for the Community as  a  whole  (Table 1). The main fact to emerge from this 
table is that economic expansion in the Community will remain rapid, although 
on  a  lesser  scale  than the  range  of  growth  rates  in  the  different  countries 
tends  to  contract,  with  extremes  at  5.8%  (Italy)  and  3.9%  (Belgium)  per 
annum and an average of approximately 4.7% per annum. 
D - Implications of the anticipated growth in national product 
The E.E.C. report also includes the following data which we have utilized 
in working out the energy forecasts : 
(i)  gross national product per inhabitant (in units of account) 
(Table 5  A); 
(ii)  the relative  share  of each  country in the  gross  national product of 
the Community (Table 6  A); 
(iii)  private consumption per inhabitant (Table 5  B). 
As  regards product per inhabitant, the  gap  from  one country to  another 
will narrow, although it will still be running at a  fairly high level at the end 
of the  forecast  period. Despite  the  fact  that the  rate  of growth  in  Italy is 
much higher, the 1975 level will only slightly exceed that of Belgium in 1960. 
Allowing for  the total population trend, the  estimated  relative  shares  in 
the gross national product of the Community reflect the same tendencies :  a 
fairly  substantial decrease  on the part of Belgium and  Germany,  contrasted 
with a sharp rise in Italy and little change in France and the Netherlands. 
In  all  countries  private  consumption  per  inhabitant  is  expected  to  rise 
more rapidly than G.N.P.  per inhabitant. The share of private consumption 
in G.N.P. will thus rise slightly and the figure for the Community as  a  whole 
will be 63%. 
27 E  - The outlook in various sectors 
In order to  work out forecasts  for  the energy sector,  especially detailed 
estimates of demand, it has been necessary to supplement the forecasts in the 
Working Party's report with data on the prospects in industry as  a whole and 
the iron and steel industry in particular. 
As regards the latter, a large consumer of energy products, we have adopted 
forecasts  of steel  and  pig  iron  production  (Table  7).  The  steel  production 
figures for 1965 are the result of detailed work carried out under the General 
Objectives  for  Steel programme in  connection  with  estimating  internal  and 
external  requirements  and  production  potential. 
1
)  The  more  approximate 
estimates for 1970 and 1975 allow for a  slight reduction in the past elasticity 
observed between apparent steel consumption and industrial production and 
for  the  stabilisation of net exports from  the  Community to  the  rest of the 
world. 
As regards industrial production as  a  whole, an important factor in deter-
mining energy consumption in the industry sector, High Authority departments 
have worked out provisional hypotheses. This point is at present under detailed 
study by the Working Party referred to above. 
The  method  used  to  estimate  industrial  production  has  had  to  be  an 
approximate one for the time being. 
The  data  regarding  the  future  trend  of the  labour  force  in industry in 
the Community countries are fragmentary. The Working Party's report gave 
extrapolations up till 1970 for certain countries only. Under these conditions 
it has proved difficult to follow the procedure of estimating productivity and 
labour trends which was employed for gross national product. 
We have thus relied on the relationship between industrial production and 
gross  national  product  trends,  although  extrapolation  on  this  basis  raises 
certain problems.  For instance,  where  elasticities  are  very  high  during  the 
reference period, pure extrapolation implies a  sharp increase in the relative 
share of industry in the gross national product over the long ,term, whereas 
it is  highly  likely that the  growth  rate  of this  share  depends  on the  share 
already  achieved.  In Italy, for  example,  the  share  of industry in the  gross 
national product in 1950 was  still very low and as  a  result elasticity in the 
period 1950-1960 was  as  high  as  1.5.  Extrapolation  of the  same  elasticity 
figure up to 1975 would imply the highest share of industry in G.N.P. for all 
the countries in the Community in that year. It is  thus certain that the trend 
will be asymptotic, i.e. elasticity will decrease. 
1)  See  memorandum  on  the  definition  of  the  Community's  General  Objectives  for  Steel, 
Journal officiel des Communautes europeennes, April 5, 1962. 
28 Taking this fifteen year view, a slight reduction in elasticity by comparison 
with the period 1950-1960 will probably suffice. 
1
)  As  Table  8  shows,  the 
elasticity adopted for  the  Community countries from  1960 to  1975 is  fairly 
uniform (about 1.2), except for Italy, where it remains moderately high (1.4), 
although at a lower level than in the refrence period. 
Table  7  - Iron  and Steel Activity - Steel production  ('OOO,OOOm.t.) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed.  Rep.)  14.0  I  24.5  34.1  38.6  47.5  I  57.5 
Belgium  3.8  5.9  7.2  8.5  10.1  11.0 
France  8.7  12.6  17.3  21.7  26.9  31.5 
Italy  2.4  5.4  8.2  13.0  16.8  20.0 
Luxembourg  2.5  3.2  4.1  4.5  4.9  5.2 
Netherlands  0.5  1.0  1.9  2.7  3.8 
I 
4.8 
Community  31.9  52.6  72.8  89.0  110.0  130.0 
Source:  Estimates  by High Authority  departments. 
Table  8  - Industrial  Production 
National Product 
Rate  of  Growth  and  Elasticity  in  relation  to  Gross 
Country  1950-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970  1970-1975 
Germany  (Fed. R.)  9.1°/o  (1.23) 
I 
5.5°/o  (1.25)  5.()11/o  (1.23)  5.0°/o  (1.19) 
Belgium  3.0  (1.11)  4.8  (1.25)  4.8  (1.26)  4.8  (1.23) 
France  6.4  (1.49)  6.5  (1.24)  5.9  (1.25)  5.5  (1.20) 
Italy  8.1  (1.40)  8.8  (1.50)  7.8  (1.37)  6.5  (1.23) 
Luxembourg  (-)  4.0  (-)  4.0  (-)  4.0  (-) 
Netherlands  5.8  (1.18)  5.4  (1.25)  6.0  (1.24)  5.6  (1.20) 
Community  7.5  (1.36)  6.3  (1.29)  5.9  (1.28)  5.5  1  CL2o) 
(The  figures  in brackets represent elasticity  of industrial  production with  respect to  G.N.P.) 
Source: Estimates by High Authority departments. 
Table  6  B  summarizes  each  country's  share in the industrial production 
of the Community in 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975. 
1)  It  should  also  he  noted  that  the  index  of  industrial  production  corresponds  to  the 
current index of the O.E.C.D.,  which  generally  shows  a  higher rate  of growth than the 
index of value added at constant prices in industry. This is why the calculated elasticities 
to a  certain extent overestimate the increased share of industry in G.N.P. 
29 Section 2  - The world economic and political situation 
It is obvious that the outlook for economic growth in the Community will 
depend on the economic and political development of the rest of the world. 
In this  context the  forecasts  rest  on  the  primary  assumption  that  there 
will be no world war, but we cannot exclude the possibility of local conflicts 
and tension which may influence the conditions under which energy is supplied 
to  the  Community. 
From  the  economic  point  of  view,  foreign  trade,  which  often  expands 
more rapidly than G.N.P., always tends to strengthen links between national 
economies.  Economic  expansion  in  the  Community  will  thus  to  a  certain 
extent depend on development in a  number of other countries. We have not 
attempted an accurate  estimate of world  economic growth,  but the  rates  of 
growth adopted for the Community are based on the assumption that develop-
ment in the  Community  will  not be  restricted  by  foreign  trade,  which  is  a 
fairly realistic view. 
Data  on  economic  growth  in  other  industrialized  western  countries  arc 
to  be found in the work of the Economic Policy Committee of the  O.E.C.D. 
These studies, carried out by Working Party No.  2,  assume  a  growth figure 
of 50% from 1960 to 1970 and the implications at economic policy level are 
at present under discussion. 
The  estimated  growth  for  the  major  industrialized  countries  appears  to 
be in line with the outlook we have just sketched for the Community. 
Moreover it is  almost certain that during the next fifteen  years  the key 
problem in world economy will be the growth of  developing nations,  which 
to  a  large extent will be influenced by expansion in the industrialized coun-
tries. It seems that growth in the Community will determine the development 
of the emergent countries rather than the contrary. 
To sum up, the economic outlook foreshadowed for the Community in this 
report presupposes a  fair  degree of world political stability and fairly  rapid 
economic growth in the other industrialized countries. 
30 Part Two 
Future Energy Requirements 
Chapter  2 
General remarks on forecasting methods 
The  object of this  chapter is  to  describe  the  principal methods  used  m 
the demand forecasts which are the object of the following chapter. 
A  - Conditional outlooks 
The energy demand estimates given in this report are conditional outlooks 
worked out for the specific general economic outlook described in Part One. 
Consequently  if  this  general  outlook  does  not  materialise  the  energy  data 
will need to he revised,  and in Chapter 3, Section 3, we  shall deal with the 
uncertainty which can affect energy figures for this reason. 
In this connection it should be remembered that energy requirements are 
forecast on the assumption of average cyclical, climatic and rainfall conditions. 
B - Synthesis of economic results and direct information 
The general method of forecasting consists in a  synthesis of lessons drawn 
from  past  experience  of  the  relationship  between  energy  consumption  and 
economic development and of direct information, mainly of a technical origin, 
on certain specific consumption trends. 
There is an obvious temptation to  estimate consumption in each detailed 
category  of  consumers  systematically  and  thus  arrive  at  a  total  for  each 
country or for the Community as a whole. 
This method suffers not only from a  general impediment hut also, at the 
present time, from  additional difficulties;  we  have therefore had to  restrict 
ourselves to a  few major sectors. 
31 A substantial share of the market (more than 30o/o)  is accounted for by a 
very large number of consumers such as householders and vehicle users whose 
requirements cannot he  established separately.  Statistical analyses,  involving 
either retrospective data or new surveys, must therefore he made of consumer 
groups which are as homogeneous as  possible. 
At the present time we are also hampered by a dearth of information : 
(i)  only in limited cases - e.g.  the coke input at iron and steel plants. 
and  fuel  consumption  by  thermal  power  stations  - are  adequate 
technical  and  economic  surveys  available  to  enable  the  trend  in 
energy consumption per unit of production to he forecast.  On other 
points  the High Authority has  commissioned  surveys  from  research 
centres, hut the results will not he available for several months; 
(ii)  as  noted  above,  the  outlook  for  economic  expansion  can  only  he 
assessed on a  fairly global scale. No forecasts are at present available 
on  levels  of  activity  in  individual  branches  of  industry  (chemicals, 
cement, textiles etc.), nor do  we know the future pattern of income 
distribution,  which  will  affect  the  energy  consumption  of  different 
classes  of  households.  Here  again  studies  are  being  undertaken  by 
departments  of  the  European  Communities,  hut  we  cannot  count 
on having detailed results for many months yet. 
It has thus been necessary to  limit ourselves to  a  method which aims  at 
learning as much as possible from the past and at supplementing or correcting 
this knowledge with any information directly available. 
The  variables  adopted  to  represent  economic  development  are  gross 
national product and the index of industrial production. These have served as 
a  general economic background in sectors where information on consumption 
per unit of production is  available, whilst in other sectors retrospective data 
have  been  examined  in  order  to  establish  the  relationship  between  energy 
consumption  and  national  product  or  industrial  production.  The  forecasts 
are  based  on  this  relationship,  corrected  where  necessary  to  allow  for 
supplementary information. 
1
) 
1)  See Annex 1  to full Community-language edition, General remarks on energy requirement 
forecasting methods. 
32 C - Synthesis of overall analysis and sector-by-sector analysis 
Two  analyses  have  proceeded  side  by  side,  one  relating  to  the  energy 
consumption of the economy as a whole and the other to the major consumer 
sectors  taken  individually.  Successive  adjustments  have  then  been  made  to 
enable the results to be compared and a single forecast for overall consumption 
arrived at by giving preference to the sectoral approach. 
1
) 
D  - Assessment of primary energy-distinction between fuel and electricity 
The  juxtaposition  of  different  sources  of  energy  capable  of  rendering 
similar services and the conversion of certain forms of energy into others raise 
delicate problems which, although well known, are difficult to solve. 
One method of approach is based on the final consumer, with his require-
ments broken down into different forms of energy, and the activities of the 
various  converters  of  energy,  and  finally  primary  energy  requirements, 
deduced from  this.  Such  a  method  entails  an  immediate  comparison  of  the 
cost to  the consumer of the various forms  of energy;  this is  a  fundamental 
factor in establishing the requirement breakdown of each final consumer. 
We preferred to proceed in two stages and concentrate first of all on an 
overall study aimed at establishing  approximate consumption in the various 
sectors involved, followed by a  calculation of regional requirements, which is 
necessary for a  comparative cost study at consumer level. The breakdown of 
requirement  coverage  between  the  various  primary  sources  has  thus  been 
reserved for Part Four. 
At this point it becomes necessary to use a  common unit for the various 
forms  of energy.  We  have  worked  in  equivalent  of  primary  energy,  which 
means  that the figures  can be  added  together  subject  to  certain  small-scale 
statistical  adjustments 
2
)  and  that explanations  of all  conversion  stages  are 
unnecessary.  At  final  consumer  level,  however,  we  have  analysed  fuel  and 
electricity requirements separately. 
3
) 
1)  See Annex 1, section Ill, to fuH  Community-language edition. 
2)  See  Annex 1  to  full  Community-language  edition. 
3)  See  Annex  1  to  full  Community-language  edition,  regarding  t'he  somewhat  inaccurate 
nature of this  distinction. 
33 In all the following analyses have been carried out : 
1.  Final  consumption  by  sector  (iron  and  steel 
industry, other industrie.s, transport, domestic 
sector) 
2.  Consumption  by  primary  producers,  conver-
ters and distributors of energy1) 
3.  Total  electricity  requirements.  Comparison 
between L  and overall forecast  re·sults. 
4.  Power  stations  (production  L) 
a)  Primary  enrgy  requirements  correspond-
ing  to  hydro,  geothermal  and  nuclear 
generation  and  requirements  covere·d  by 
Fuel 
X1 
X  a 
foreign  trade  X  .. 
b)  Fuel requirements of conventional thermal 
power stations  Xs 
5.  Total internal requirements  of primary ener-
gy.  Comparison  between  E  and  overall  fore-
Motor  fuel 
cast results  E  =  Xt + X2 + Xa + X4 + Xs 
Electricity 
L  =  Yt + Y2 
These analyses are limited to a  study of internal requirements and exclude 
exports and bunkers. 
E  - Country-by-country assessment 
At this stage we were faced with a  choice between two courses of action : 
to  proceed  directly  at  Community  level  or  to  carry  out  country-by-country 
analyses.  The  latter  alternative  was  considered  advisable  for  three  main 
reasons : 
(i)  in later stages of the work it is necessary to forecast requirements on 
a  regional basis in order to estimate costs at consumer level and any 
information  which  enables  this  regional  approach  to  be  adopted  is 
therefore desirable; 
(ii)  the  economic structures  of the  various  countries  in the  Community 
are very different and will remain so for a  long time. 
2
)  There is thus 
every likelihood that the forecast will be improved if each country is 
examined  separately,  in  addition  to  which  comparisons  between 
different countries provide extremely interesting information; 
(iii)  experts  can  only  be  consulted  to  advantage  if  country-by-country 
figures are available. 
1)  A  strict  forecast  of  this  demand  cannot  be  made  until  the  breakdown  of  demand  into 
products is  known, but a  fairly  accurate approximation  can be  given. 
2)  A  particularly  clear  exampJe  is  afforded  by  the  iron  and  steel  industry  (see  Annex  3 
to full  Community-language edition). 
34 F - Assessment in physical units and not in terms of value 
In  accordance  with  current  practice,  requirements  have  been  estimated 
in  physical  units  (metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent),  which  facilitates  the 
interpretation  of  primary  requirements.  It is  also  likely  that  at  industrial 
(and  transport)  consumer  level  it  is  physical  consumption  which  is  closely 
linked  to  levels  of  activity  (owing  to  technical  limitations) 
1
),  whereas  at 
domestic consumer level it seems probable that energy expenditure is the factor 
to be investigated. 
G - Non-definitive nature of figures 
The figures which follow are not intended to be definitive, but are simply 
offered as  an indication of trends. The fact that the unit adopted is  millions 
of metric tons hard-coal equivalent and that all the results are given to  this 
degree  of accuracy  is  merely  a  convenient  aid  to  co-ordinating  the  various 
tables  according  to  how  detailed  the  particular stage  of the  analysis  is.  No 
claim  to  such  a  degree  of accuracy  is  implied.  Chapter  3  gives  a  thorough 
account  of  the  origin  and  extent  of  the  uncertainties  involved,  which  can 
only be reduced after further lengthy work. It is  nevertheless  true that the 
general  trends  which  emerge  during  the  course  of  this  work  correspond 
closely to what can in fact be forecast at the moment. The Study will  even-
tually make it clear that on most essential points its fundamental conclusions 
are not affected by uncertainties as to requirements. 
Chapter  3 
Overall energy requirements 
The figures given in this chapter are based on the methods of forecasting 
future requirement in terms of primary energy equivalent as briefly outlined 
in the foregoing chapter. We shall give the trend in overall requirements first 
of all, followed by that of the major sectors. 
1)  We must nevertheless hear in mind the possibility that the energy price level  in  relation 
to  general  price  levels  affects  the  energy  requirements  of industry  to  a  certain extent. 
This  extremely ticklish  and  little  understood  problem  will  he  dealt  with  in  Chapter 4. 
35 The  order  in  which  the  forecasts  have  hen  prepared  is  thus  partially 
reversed  for  reasons  of  presentation.  The  forecasts  in  fact  consisted  of  a 
series of independent estimates added together, rather than a  sector-by-sector 
breakdown  of  an  overall  quantity  determined  in  advance.  Our  account  is 
nevertheless  easier to  comprehend if we  take  an  overall view  as  our point 
of departure. 
Section 1 - Total internal requirements 
As  against  a  consumption  of  about  460  million  metric  tons  hard-coal 
equivalent  in  1960,  the  Community's  total  energy  requirements  may  he 
expected to rise to 700 million by 1970 and something like 850 in 1975  (see 
Table 9  A)  - an increase  of approximately  50%  over ten years  and  85% 
over fifteen. 
1
)
2
) 
Table  9  - Overall Primary Energy  Consumption 
A  - Absolute  figures  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
Country  1950  1955 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  129.0  180.9 
Belgium  28.4  33.5 
France  82.5  102.4 
Italy  26.2  43.0 
Luxembourg  3.0  4.0 
Netherlands  20.0  25.2 
Community1)  289  389 
B  - Annual  rates  of  growth 2) 
Country  1950-1955  1955-1960 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  7.0  2.7 
Belgium  3.4  0.3 
France  4.4  3.6 
Italy  10.4  8.8 
Luxembourg  3.9  2.8 
Netherlands  4.7  3.6 
Community  6.1  3.5 
1960  1965  1970  1975 
205.3  239  282  I  330 
33.9  37  42  48 
121.9  151  187  231 
65.6  99  137  176 
4.6  6.1  6.6  7.1 
30.1  38  46  55 
--
461  I  570  700  847 
1960-1965  1965-1970  1970-1975 
3.0  3.4  3.2 
1.8  2.7  2.5 
4.4  4.3  4.3 
8.6  6.6  5.2 
5.7  1.6  1.5 
4.9  3.8  3.8 
4.3  4.2  3.9 
1)  Rounded  figures,  which may  therefore  differ slightly  from  the  sum  of  the  individual  items 
(Community). 
2)  Calculated  on  the  basis  of  non-rounded  figures  by  comparing  the  two  end  years. 
1)  The country-by-country and sector-by-sector figures are detailed in Annex 2  to full Com-
munity-language  edition. 
2)  These  figures  exclude  bunkers  and  exports,  which  in  1960  represented  4°/o  and  5°/o 
respectively of internal requirements. 
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37 The Community average annual rate of growth in total energy consumption, 
which. was  4.8%  during  the  period  1950-1960,  would  thus  be  only  4.3% 
from 1960 to 1970.  This would reflect the  deceleration in general economic 
expansion, partly offset by a gradual increase in elasticity between consumption 
and gross national product (1950-60, 0.86; 1960-70, 0.91). 
The  differences  between  the  national  rates  of increase  were  due  in  the 
past to  differing tempos of economic expansion, to  differences in structural 
change (more intensive industrialization in Italy than elsewhere, for example) 
and  to  appreciably  dissimilar  rates  of  improvement  in  productivity.  With 
regard to the future, it has been assumed that technological progress will be 
roughly  the  same  from  one  country  to  another,  so  that  differences  in  the 
rate  of growth  of energy requirements  will  mainly be  due  to  the  first  two 
considerations. 
Community  consumption  of  energy  per  inhabitant  is  expected  to  grow 
by 40% over the ten years, allowing for the population increase, namely from 
2.7  metric tons H.C.E.  in 1960  to  3.8  in 1970  (with the  consumption  levels 
in the  various  member countries  drawing  closer  together - see  Table  10). 
Nevertheless the real value of this 1970 forecast is  only revealed when it is 
compared with figures  for other areas.  It is  well  below the  British  average 
for  today  (4.8  metric  tons  in  1960)  and  less  than  half  that  of  the  United 
States.  whilst  the  1970  Community  per  capita  national  product  works  out 
at about 60% of the present United States figure. 
Table  10  - Energy Consumption per Inhabitant  (kg H.C.E.) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  2,699  3,604  3,845  4,300  4,900  5.500 
Belgium  3,302  3,764  3,685  3,940  4.400  4.800 
France  1.978  2.365  2,679  3,200  3,800  4,500 
Italy  562  894  1,328  1,940  2.600  3,200 
Luxembourg  10,000  13,333  15,333  18,770  19,700  20,700 
Netherlands  1,980  2,333  2,617  3,150  3,600  4,100 
Community  1.863  2,410  2,726  3,250  3,800  4,500 
Great Britain  4,800 
I  United  States  8,200 
This  tendency  for  Community  consumption  per  inhabitant  to  level  out 
will have the further effect of appreciably altering the breakdown by countries 
of Community energy requirements  (see  Table  11).  To  cite  the  outstanding 
examples,  Italy's  share  of  total  energy  will  rise  from  147o  to  20%  and 
Germany's will-fall from 44% to 40% between 1960 and 1970. 
38 Table II - Breakdown  of  Overall  Community  Energy  Consumption  by  Countries  (0/o) 
- ~~--~~--~~~~~---, 
1955  1960  -1  1965  Country  1950  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  44.7 
I 
46.5  44.5  41.8  40.3  38.9 
Belgium  9.8  8.6  7.4  6.5  6.1  5.7 
France  28.5  26.3  26.4  26.5  26.6  27.2 
Italy  9.1  11.1  14.2  17.4  19.5  20.8 
Luxembourg  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1  0.9  0.8 
Netherlands  6.9  6.5  6.5  6.7  6.6  6.6 
Community  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Section 2 - Requirements of main consumer sectors 
This section deals with the energy requirements of individual sectors, the 
final  consumers  selected being the  iron and  steel industry, other industries, 
transport  and  the  domestic  sector.  Thermal  power  stations  will  be  treated 
separately,  so  that in order to  avoid  accounting for  consumption twice  over 
the requirements of the above four sectors will exclude electricity, which will 
be analysed on its  own. Last of all  we shall examine  energy producers'  and 
converters~ own consumption. 
A - I ron and steel industry 
The  energy  requirements  of  the  iron  and  steel  industry  are  directly 
related to the production of pig iron and steel. 
1
) 
As stated in Chapter 1  (Table 7), the figure for 1965 is put at 89 million 
metric tons, in line with the requirements indicated in the General Objectives 
for Steel, with further production levels of 110 million and 130 million tons 
for 1970 and 1975 respectively. 
It is further assumed that the pig iron input coefficient at steel works will 
drop a  little further for the Community as  a  whole  (although the movement 
will vary in Italy and, until 1965, in the  ~etherlands). 
Coke  consumption will  rise  far  less  r~pidly than pig iron production.  A 
sharp  drop  is  expected in the  blast furnace  coke input coefficient  (24%  in 
ten years)  due  to  load preparation, the growing  use  of high-grade  ores  and 
the injection of fuel  in liquid or gaseous  form.  This  tendency  will  only  be 
1)  See Annex  3  to  full  Community-language  edition :  The  energy  requirements  of the  iron 
and  steel  industry. 
39 partially offset by an increase in coke consumption at sintering plants. The 
forecasts adopted for the Community are shown in Table 12. 
1
) 
2
) 
Table  12  - Trend in Iron and Steel Industry Energy Consumption 
1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1.  Steel production 
('OOO,OOOm. t.)  31.8  52.6  72.8  89  no  130 
2.  Steelworks  pig  iron  input 
coefficient  (kg)  822  780  740  735  720  690 
3.  Pig  iron  production,  includ-
ing  foundry  iron  ('000,000 
m.t.)  26.1  41.0  54.0  66  79  90 
4.  Blast  furnace  coke  input 
coefficient  (kg)  947  970  883  750  670  640 
5.  Blast  furnace  coke  consump-
tion ('OOO,OOOm.t.  coke)  24.7  39.9  47.8  49.2  53.4  57.7 
6.  Blast  furnace  coke  consump-
tion  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.)  23.6  38.2  45.8  47.0  51.1  55.2 
\ 
7.  Solid  fuel  consumption  for 
)  sintering 
('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
' 
1.6  3.2  6.7  10.0  12.0 
I 
19.9 
8.  Other non-electrical energy 
1  requirements 
('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.)  I  25.1  29.0  34.3  39.9  43.3 
9.  Gross  energy  consumption of 
sector  (6+7+8) 
('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.)  43.5  64.9  78.0  88.0  101.0  110.5 
10.  Blast  furnace  gas  production 
('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.)  14.0  22.0  26.0  24.3  24.0  24.9 
11.  Net  energy  consumption  of 
sector  (9-10)  29.5  42.9  52.0  63.7  77.0  85.6 
1)  Country-by-country details are shown in Annex 3  to full  Community-language edition. 
2)  These figures are base·d on the assumption that advances will occur in blast furnace tech-
nology only and that there will be no  revolutionary changes or alterations in ore reduc-
tion  processes.  Should  the  natural  gas-·direct  re•duction  method  become  possible  for  in-
dustrial use, coke consumption could differ from the figures  given. This  is  not likely to 
happen  by  1965,  but  it  could  be  a  possibility  for  1970,  although  its  scope  would  be 
limited.  By  1975,  however,  it  could  make  a  substantial  differenc·e.  Thus  suppos~ng for 
example that the method is  develope1d  by 1965  and  is  used  in half the  new plants com-
missioned  between 1965  and  1975,  pig iron production  at blast  furnaces  by  1975  would 
he  65  +  1/2  (90-65)  =  78  million  metric  tons  instead  of  90;  this  would  reduce  coke 
requirements by 10  to 15'0/o. 
40 To  sum  up,  with  an  increase  in  industrial  production  of  81%  between 
1960 and 1970, the following growth rates are indicated : 
Steel production 
Pig iron production 
Blast furnace  coke  consumption 
B - Other industries 
51% 
47% 
12% 
Requirements in this sector are governed by its general level of activity, 
by  structural  changes  affecting  the  major  energy-consuming  industries  and 
by any improvements achieved in fuel efficiency. 
1
) 
The following results emerge from the studies it has been possible to carry 
out with existing information on the trend over the last ten years : 
(i)  structural  modifications  in  industry,  i.e.  the  relative  size  of  the 
various branches composing industry as a whole, have had little effect 
on energy consumption. Branches whose activity has expanded more 
rapidly than the average for industry as  a  whole turn out to include 
not  only  the  low-energy-consumption  mechanical  and  electrical 
engineering  industries  but  also  the  chemicals  industry,  which  is  a 
large consumer, whilst those branches with a  slower rate of expansion 
include  textiles,  the  food  industry  and  to  a  certain  extent  building 
materials; 
(ii)  the reduction in consumption per unit of production varies  conside-
rably from one country to  another,  and with the exception of Italy 
appears  to  have  been  most  marked  where  the  rate  of  growth  in 
industrial production was highest. This may be because rapid growth 
opens  up  the  possibility  of  utilising  the  latest  technical  advances 
quickly and on a large scale. The trend may also have been facilitated 
by the replacement of coal by fuel oil and gas. 
In  calculating  for  the  future,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  expected 
deceleration  in  expansion  would  produce  a  corresponding  deceleration  in 
fuel efficiency improvement, which is  expected to progress at only 2.4% per 
annum for  the  Community  as  a  whole,  as  against  3.1%  between  1950  and 
1960. In the absence of detailed information on the general economic outlook, 
it has  so  far been impossible  to  allow for  any modifications in  the  relative 
share of each branch of industry. 
To  sum  up,  we  have  assumed  that  the  fuel  requirements  of  the  other 
industries  sector will  rise  from  88  million  metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent 
in 1960 to 125 million in 1970 and 143 million in 1975. This gives an increase 
of 42%  from  1960 to  1970,  i.e.  an  annual  growth  rate  of  3.6%.  Since  the 
1)  See  Annex  4  to  full  Community-language  edition:  The  fuel  requirements  of  other 
industries. 
41 growth rate for industrial production in the Community has been estimated 
at  6.1 %,  we  thus  obtain  an  apparent  elasticity  of  0.6  (approximately  the 
same figure as between 1950 and 1960). 
1
) 
Table  13 - Fuel  Consumption  in  Industry  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed.  Re'P.) 
I  22.3  33.3  36.4  41.0  45.7  50.9 
Belgium  5.3  5.3  4.7  5.2  5.8  6.5 
France  15.9  18.5  23.4  27.7  32.0  36.4 
Italy  5.8  9.8  17.1  24.9  33.0  39.2 
Luxembourg  0.06  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.14  0.16 
Netherlands  3.6  4.5  5.8  6.9  8.4  10.0 
Community1)  53  72  88  106  125  143 
1) Rounded  figures. 
C  - Transport 
2
) 
The majority of the  energy used in  this  sector  is  already  accounted  for 
by road transport (more than 70% in 1960), and this trend will increase. 
In recent years the number of private cars in the Community has under-
gone  a  very rapid increase  and that of commercial vehicles  a  rather  slower 
hut sustained one. 
Motor vehicles in the Community  (in 1,000's of vehicles) 
Private  cars 
Commercial  vehicles 
1955 
6,181 
2,314 
1960 
12,984 
3,112 
1965 
23,500 
3,500 
From now until  1965  we  can  expect to  see  a  certain  slackening  in  the 
rate of growth in the number of motor vehicles on the road in most countries. 
This trend will he accentuated after 1965, and the forecast curves thus become 
logistic  in  shape.  They  obviously  have  a  considerable  effect  on  the  trend 
in motor fuel  demand, hut as  regards  the  individual  countries  in  the  Com-
munity we must hear in mind that the number of vehicles  on the road  still 
varies  considerably from  one  country  to  another  and  that  saturation  point 
1)  For details  on  this  point see Annex  1  to  full  Community-language  edition. 
2)  See  Annex  5  to  full  Community-language  edition.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Study,  the 
transport sector is taken  as  induding the energy consumption  of  agricultural machinery 
and of ·civil-engeneering equipment. Annex 5  is update'd to July 30, 1963, whence a  number 
of variations from the figures  given in this section :  the differences are significant, how-
ever,  only in respect  of the  estimate  for  1975,  which  has  been  lowered,  mainly in  con· 
sideration of a  reduction in the figure for diesel oil consumption in Germany (Fed. Rep.). 
42 will  probably  not  occur  simultaneously  and  with  the  same  intensity  m  all 
countries. 
In recent years  there has been  a  marked  reduction in unit consumption 
of  gasoline  in  most  Community  countries,  whereas  that  of  diesel  oil  has 
maintained a  much steadier level. 
This reduction is generally expected to continue, although in some  coun-
tries the process will he checked by the increase in average engine capacities. 
As  regards  railways,  the  chief  point  to  note  is  the  continuance  of  the 
process  of  diesel  conversion  and  electrification  of  a  large  number  of  lines. 
The forms of energy used are consequently changing and specific consumptions 
(per metric ton-kilometre or train-kilometre)  are falling  steeply. 
This leads to the conclusion that non-electrical energy requirements in the 
transport sector may be  expected to  rise  from  59 million metric  tons  hard-
coal equivalent in 1960 to 102 million in 1970 and 128 million in 1975. 
Table  14  - Non-electrical  Energy  Consumption  in  the  Transport  Sector 
('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  19651) 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  14.8  20.2  23.9  31 
Belgium  3.1  3.6  3.7  5 
France  13.3  15.4  17.2  22 
Italy  3.8  6.5  9.8  16 
Luxembourg  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.3 
Netherlands  2.4  2.9  4.1  6 
Community2)  38  49  59  80 
1)  Rounded figures  to the nearest million metric tons H.  C.  E. 
19701)  19751) 
38  46 
5  6 
26  33 
24  32 
0.3  0.4 
8  10 
102  128 
2)  Rounded figures,  which may therefore  differ slightly  from  the sum  of the individual items. 
D ·- The domestic sector 
1
) 
This is  a  non-uniform sector embracing households,  offices,  trade,  crafts 
and agricultural consumption, except that of tractors, which is included under 
transport. The sector is  variously demarcated from one country to another. A 
drawback  which  often  arises  in  interpreting  retrospective  data  is  that  the 
long-term  trend  is  hidden  by  fluctuations  due  to  temperature  and  stock 
variations. 
The  consumption  level  per  inhabitant  in  Community  countries  and  the 
ten-year trend are largely influenced by income and climatic conditions. 
1)  See Annex 6 to full Community-language edition : The non-electrical energy requirements 
of the domestic 'Sector. 
43 Table  15  - Non-electrical  Energy  Consumption  in  the  Domestic  Sector 
A  - Absolute figures  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  19651) 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  23.5  39.2  43.5  51 
Belgium  8.9  9.9  9.4  10 
France  18.5  23.2  26.0  32 
Italy  ;l.4  5.8  9.1  13 
Luxembourg  0.24  0.30  0.36  0.4 
Netherlands  6.7  7.7  8.3  9 
Community2)  61  86  97  116 
B  - Per inhabitant  (kg  H.C.E.) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1965 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  491  781  815  910 
Belgium  1.030  1,116  1,027  1,103 
France  443  536  571  674 
Italy  73  121  184  257 
Luxembourg  811  987  1,147  1,292 
Netherlands  662  716  723  760 
Community  394  533  570  658 
I 
1)  Rounded figures to the nearest million metric tons H.C.E. 
19701)  19751) 
56  I  60 
11  11 
38  45 
18  23 
0.5  0.5 
10  11 
133  151 
1970  1975 
970  1,000 
1,094  1,095 
764  864 
343  428 
1.463  1,507 
800  840 
729  794 
2)  Rounded figures,  which may therefore differ slightly from the sum of the individual items. 
Future demand has been estimated by linking consumption in this sector 
to an income indicator (gross national product) and a  trend factor. Although 
households  constitute  only  a  fraction  of  this  sector,  an  attempt  has  also 
been made to  forecast  demand on  the  basis  of anticipated  developments  in 
housing. 
The  estimates  show  a  rise  in  Community  consumption  from  97  million 
metric tons  H.C.E.  in 1960 to  133  in  1970  and  151  in  1975,  with  a  fairly 
high margin of uncertainty. During the period 1960-1970 consumption will 
therefore  rise  by about 38%  at  an  annual  rate  of  about  3.3%.  From  1950 
to  1960 the overall increase  was  58%,  representing  a  growth  rate  of  about 
4.7%  per annum.  The  deceleration  reveals  a  gradual saturation in  demand, 
with a  slower rate of increase not only in the number of dwellings hut also 
in consumption per dwelling. 
E  - Electricity requirements 
The  demand  for  electricity  in  each  country  has  been  estimated  overall 
and by sectors .in the same way as total energy requirements. 
1
) 
1)  See  Annex  7  to  full  Community-language  edition :  Ele.ctricity  requirements. 
44 It should, however, he noted that past figures show electricity consumption 
to he less closely linked than total energy consumption to the general economic 
indicators,  and  that it would  largely  appear  to  follow  a  trend  of its  own. 
This  is  a  help  in  forecasts  in  that  uncertainties  as  to  the  rate  of  general 
economic growth affect the calculations less, but at the same time a hindrance 
inasmuch as it cannot be known whether the independent trend in electricity 
consumption  will  continue  to  be  equally  marked  during  the  next  fifteen 
years. 
The figures finally adopted are shown in Table 16. Community consumption 
is  expected to  increase  from  285  TWh  in  1960 to  574 in  1970  and  790  in 
1975.  The  average  annual  rate  of  increase  from  1960  to  1970  is  put  at 
approximately 7 .2%, representing a  doubling in ten years. 
The rate of growth in electricity requirements is  thus appreciably higher 
than  in  total  energy  requirements,  as  it  has  been  for  a  good  many  years 
past.  This  means  a  steady  increase  in  the  proportion  of  primary  energy 
ultimately used in the form of electric current. 
Table  16 - Trend  in Electricity  Consumption 
A  - Absolute  figures  ('000,000,000  kWh,  gross) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  46.9  80.0  120.6  170  234  316 
Belgium  9.0  11.9  15.2  20  27  36 
France  34.8  51.5  74.8  108  155  218 
Italy  24.8  38.1  56.1  83  119  166 
Luxembourg  0.7  1.1  1.6  3.5  4.4  4.9 
Netherlands  7.4 
I 
11.4  16.5  24  34  49 
Community1)  124  194  285  409  574  789 
B  - Annual rates of growth2)  ({)/o) 
Country  1950-1955  1955-1960  1960-1965  1965-1970  1970-1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  11.3  9.5  7.1  6.6  6.2 
Belgium  5.7  5.0  5.8  6.0  5.7 
France  8.2  7.7  7.6  7.5  7.0 
Italy  9.0  8.0  8.2  7.5  6.8 
Luxembourg  9.5  7.8  17.5  4.4  2.3 
Nether  lands  9.0  7.6  7.5  7.6  7.2 
Community  9.4  9.4  7.5  I  7.0  6.5 
1)  Rounded figures,  which may therefore  differ slightly from  the sum of the individual items. 
2)  Calculations  based  on  non-rounded  figures  by  comparing  the  two  end  years. 
Consumption  per  inhabitant  {Table  17)  is  expected  to  rise  by  nearly 
87%  from  1960 to  1970, with the  differences  between  country and  country 
becoming  progressively  smaller.  Even  so,  the  forecast  of  3,100  kWh  per 
45 inhabitant for  1970  is  well below  the  present  figure  for  the  United  States 
(4,650 kWh in 1960). 
Table  17  - Apparent  Electricity  Consumption  per  Inhabitant  (kWh) 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  I  980  1,195  2,259  3,070  4,100  5,300 
Belgium 
I  1,042  1,341  1,660  2,140  2,800  3,600 
France  834  1.190  1,642  2,290  3,100  4,200 
Italy  532  793  1,137  1,640  2,300  3.100 
Luxembourg  2,365  3,618  5,095  10,830  13,000  14.200 
Netherlands  734  1.060  1,436  1,950  2,700  3,600 
Community  796  1,202  1,683  2,330  3,100  4,200 
--
N. B. These figures are obtained by dividing the gross overall consumption in each country by 
the  population.  Owing  to  production,  transmission  and  distribution  losses,  they  thus 
exceed  actual  consumption. 
F  - Fuel requirements for  thermal power stations 
Part of the demand for electricity will be covered by hydro,  geothermal 
and  nuclear power stations  and by  net imports.  The  output of  these  types 
of power stations, with net imports included,  was  106 TWh in 1960  and  is 
estimated  at 156 TWh in  1970 and  230  in  1975  (see  chapters  11  and  12), 
representing an increase of 47% over ten years. 
The  remaining  requirements  will  be  supplied  by  conventional  thermal 
power  stations 
1
),  whose  unit  consumption  should  continue  to  fall  owing 
to  improved  efficiency.  Table  18  shows  the  anticipated  trend  of  average 
unit consumption at public power stations in each of the  six countries.  The 
reduction  should  be  about  15ro  (approximately  l.6ro  per  annum)  between 
1960 and 1970. 
Assuming the  same  tempo  of  reduction  for  thermal power  stations  as  a 
whole,  we  can  thus  expect  a  demand  of  151  million  metric  tons  hard-coal 
equivalent in 1970 and 190 million in 1975, by comparison with 81  million 
in 1960. 
Table  18  - Forecast Trend in Average  Unit  Consumption  in  Public Power  Stations 
(in kcal/kWh,  gross) 
Country  1960  1965  1970  1975 
Germany  (Fed.  Rep.)  2,850  2,560  2,410 
I 
2,300 
Belgium  2,830  2,560  2,410  2,300 
France  2,600  2,420  2,280  2.200 
Italy  2,760  2,470  2,350 
I 
2.250 
Netherlands  2,830  2,560  2,410  2,300 
1)  See  Annex  8  to  fuH  Community-language  e1dition :  Fuel  requirements  in  conventional 
thermal power stations. 
46 G - Own  consumption  by energy producers  and  converters  and  losses 
This item includes all non-electrical energy consumed before reaching the 
final  consumption stage or being converted into  secondary energy.  It there-
for excludes electricity consumption and accounts for 13.2%  of total energy 
requirements in 1950 and 9.3% in 1960. 
At  this  stage  of the  analysis  it  is  impossible  to  predict  the  future  level 
of consumption with any accuracy, because it depends on the output of the 
various energy producers, which cannot be estimated until the total demand 
has been broken down not only into different forms  of energy but also  into 
internal production  and  imports. 
We  have  nevertheless  tried  to  produce  an  approximate  figure  by  extra-
polating  the  1950-1960  trend  and  correcting  it  to  allow  for  the  margins 
within which energy production levels may lie within the next ten to fifteen 
years. 
1
) 
The difference in the trend between one Community country and another 
mainly seems  to  depend on  the  volume  of refineries'  own  consumption  and 
losses  throughout the  sector. In Italy and  the  Netherlands,  where  this  item 
predominates,  the  overall  consumption  of  the  sector  will  increase  heavily 
owing to growing refinery capacity; at the same time there are no signs of a 
substantial reduction in unit consumption. 
In  Germany,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Belgium,  the  increase  in  refineries' 
own  consumption will partly be  offset by  stationary consumption  at  coking 
plants and a  lower rate of collieries' own consumption, at least for the first 
five  years.  It must be borne in mind  that  the  latter factor  is  due  not  only 
to  shrinking  coal  production  but  also  to  a  marked  drop  in  consumption 
per  unit  of  production,  which  in  the  past  has  mainly  been  due  to  the 
replacement of steam by electricity. It is  likely that the fall in consumption 
per unit of production will  continue  for  a  number  of  years,  although  at  a 
slower  rate. 
If we allow France an intermediate trend between that of Germany and 
Italy,  we  obtain  a  fairly  slow  rise  in  Community  consumption  throughout 
the  sector,  from  43  million  metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent in  1960  to  51 
million in 1970 and 58 million in 1975, representing an increase of 17% over 
ten years. Refineries' own consumption may vary between 21  and 24  million 
metric tons hard-coal equivalent in 1970  and between 28  and  32  million in 
1975, according to the output hypothesis adopted. Collieries' own consumption 
may be expected to lie between 3  and 8  million metric tons, with the latter 
figure more likely in 1970. 
1)  See Annex 2  Appendix l  to full  Community-language edition. 
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 H- Summary 
Table  19,  which  summanses  the  requirements  of  the  various  sectors, 
provides  an  overall  picture  of  the  structural  alterations  which  may  be 
expected in primary energy demand. 
1
) 
The major change  arises  from  the  fact  that electricity consumption  will 
rise much faster than that of other forms of energy and that hydro, geothermal 
and nuclear generation will only be able to meet a  very small portion of the 
increase in demand.  There will  thus  be  a  sharp  rise  in the  primary  energy 
requirements of conventional thermal power stations, whose share in primary 
energy requirements  as  a  whole  will  rise  from  17.5%  in  1960  to  21.5%  in 
1970 and 22.4% in 1975. 
Another important change  will  be  that  the  demand  for  motor  fuel  will 
raise the transport share from  12.8%  in 1960 to  14.5%  in 1970 and 15.1% 
in 1975. 
To offset the trend in thermal power station and transport requirements, 
the  share  of the  non-electrical  energy  requirements  of the  other  sectors  is 
expected  to  drop;  this  tendency  will  probably  be  most  marked  in  the 
domestic  sector  and  "other  industries",  where  the  possibilities  of  saving 
energy seem greatest. 
Table  19 - Breakdown of Total Community Primary Energy Requirements  by Sectors 
A  - Absolute figures  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
Sector  1950  1  1955  1  1960  1  1965  1  1970  1  1975 
Primary energy producers' own con-
sumption  and  conversion  and  di,s-
tribution losses  ( excl.  electricity)  38.2  44.3  43.0  46.7  50.6  57.6 
Iron  and  steel  industry 
( excl.  electricity)  29.5  42.9  52.0  63.7  77.0  85.6 
Other industries  (  excl.  electricity)  53.1  71.6  87.6  105.8  125.1  143.2 
Transport  ( excl.  electricity)  37.6  48.8  59.0  79.8  101.9  127.6 
Domestic sector (  excl. electricity)  61.1  86.1  96.5  115.5  133.0  150.5 
Power stations ( excl. electricity) 
a)  hydro, geothermal and nuclear  19.7  28.8  42.6  48.3  62.1  92.1 
b)  conventional  thermal  50.0  66.5  80.6  110.1  150.5  190.4 
Total  requirements  289 
I 
389  461  570  700  847 
(rounded  figures) 
1)  For the position by countries, see Annex 2  to  full  Community-language edition. 
49 Section 3 - Reasons and scope for uncertainty as to future 
requirements 
The consumption figures given above are subject to a  fairly large margin 
of inaccuracy due to two types of uncertainty : 
(i)  inadequate information from  the past: inaccuracy in certain figures 
and gaps in statistical data (particularly in stock fluctuations)  which 
impair the accuracy of statistical adjustments; 
(ii)  the much more important question of the  future  trend of the  main 
factors  determining  energy  consumption :  rhythm  of  economic 
expansion,  structural  distortions  in  the  economy,  rate  of  progress 
in the conversion and utilisation of energy and the influence of price 
on unit consumption. 
B  - Percentages of total 
Sector  1950  1  1955  1  1960  1  1965  1  1970  1  1975 
I 
Primary energy producers' own con-
sumption  and  conversion  and  dis-
tribu  tion losses  ( excl.  electricity)  13.2  11.4  9.3  8.2  7.2  6.8 
Iron and steel  industry 
( excl.  electricity)  10.2  11.0  11.3  11.2  11.0  10.1 
Other industries  (excl.  electricity)  18.4  18.4  19.0  18.6  17.9  16.9 
Transport  ( excl.  electricity)  13.0  12.6  12.8  14.0  14.5  15.1 
Domestic sector ( excl. electricity)  21.1  22.1  20.9  20.2  19.0  17.8 
Power stations  (excl. electricity) 
a)  hydro, geothermal and nuclear  6.8  7.4  9.2  8.5  8.9  10.9 
b)  conventional  thermal  17.3  17.1  17.5  19.3  21.5  22.4 
----
Total  requirements  100  100  100  100  100  100 
50 We  shall now  attempt  to  assess  the  effect of the  main  factors  referred 
to above, hut before doing so  it should be noted that not all the margins of 
inaccuracy deduced from these factors are necessarily cumulative. 
For instance, the margin of statistical error on either side of the central 
value  of  an  extrapolation  may  simply  result  from  gaps  in  the  basic  infor-
mation  (e.g.  the absence of data on stock variations or the  effect of tempe-
rature fluctuations).  But it may  also  reflect the  fact  that structural modifi-
cations have built up  at  the  end  of  the  reference  period,  thus  making  the 
average trend less  representative. In this case we must avoid  allowing twice 
over (type I  and type 2) for uncertainties due to structural changes. 
More important still is  the fact  that the  rates of technical progress  and 
economic growth seem to be linked, in that the former increases proportion-
ately to the latter. The high rate of growth is reflected in the yearly increas-
ing number of new plant installations, which enables technical improvements 
introduced by manufactures to he put into practice.  This  is  borne out by a 
comparison  between  the  six  Community  countries  during  the  last  decade. 
With  the  exception  of  Italy,  whose  rapid  industrialisation  places  her  in  a 
separate category, the reduction in consumption per unit of production during 
the period 1950-1960 has been greater in the countries in which  economic 
growth has been fastest 
1
). 
The following observations should he seen in this light. 
A  - Basic information on energy requirements 
The way in which the forecast hypotheses are obtained - by extrapolating 
relatively  short  chronological  series  and  using  basic  data  uncorrected  for 
stock and climatic fluctuations - leads to fairly ample margins of statistical 
error.  With the most representative  adjustment formulae  these  work out  at 
an  average  of  about  3%  on  either  side  of  the  central  value  for  the  total 
Community energy requirements  in 1965  and at about 4-5% for  the  1975 
estimates 
2
). 
Country 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.) 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Italy 
2)  This  allows  for  a  probability. 
Annual percentage increase 
in industrial production 
+ 9.1 
+ 6.4 
+ 5.8 
+ 3.0 
+ 8.1 
Annual percentage change 
in consumption per unit  of 
production 
-4.6 
-2.6 
- 1.8 
- 1.8 
+ 0.4 
51 As  already noted,  these margins of statistical error cannot automatically 
be added to the other uncertainties affecting the forecasts offered, which are 
the result of a  selection from  within  the  range  of figures  offered. For this 
purpose we have used all the information available and it is  only where the 
choice is influenced by a  trend line which is falsified by gaps in information 
and statistical methods that any additional uncertainty should be taken into 
account.  At the  total  consumption  stage  - this  is  no  longer  the  case  with 
sector  and  product  analyses  - these  distortions  should  not  be  too  great. 
B - Rate of growth 
It is  difficult  to  assess  the  uncertainty  which  affects  economic  rates  of 
growth. It is  largest  in  countries  which,  like  Italy,  still  have  a  substantial 
growth potential and where there  is  more room for  a  policy which  actually 
influences the growth rate. 
The uncertainty as  to  1965, which is  relatively close,  mainly arises from 
cyclical  fluctuations  around  the  average  trend;  the  effect  of  these  will  be 
dealt with later on. 
For  1975,  on  the  other  hand,  the  rate  of  growth  cannot  be  estimated 
accurately and it may be thought that the figure adopted is  on the high side 
by  comparison  with  what  was  actually  achieved  in  the  period  1950-1960. 
As  a  preliminary  hypothesis  for  1975~  we  can  adopt  extreme  levels  which 
are 5% higher and 10% lower than the figure given in this document. 
For a  number of reasons  the  variation in  industrial  production  may  be 
somewhat higher than this figure. 
Since the elasticity in energy consumption by comparison with the  gross 
national product is at present below unity for the Community as a  whole and 
will probably remain so  in the years to  come, the uncertainty as  to  the rate 
of growth is felt  less  than proportionately in energy consumption.  With the 
elasticities  of  about  0.9  adopted  in  the  present  study,  the  effect  of  the 
abovementioned  margins  on  energy  requirements  in  1975  would  be  about 
70 million metric tons less and 35 million more. 
C - Rate of technical progress 
Another  major  factor  making  for  uncertainty  is  the  rate  of  technical 
progress,  which  has  been  high  in  the  last  ten  years  (reduction  in  energy 
consumption to obtain the same degree of efficiency). 
52 It  is likely to fall in the future, especially owing to the reduction in growth 
rates. This has been allowed for in the calculations for Table 9, but a  certain 
amount of uncertainty remains  which  could  alter  the  total  consumption  of 
energy by about 10% by 1975. 
D  - Structures of the economies 
Assuming an equal working population and national product, energy con-
sumption differs  according to  the  structure  of the  economy  and  is  particu-
larly  dependent  on  the  volume  of  activity  in  the  iron  and  steel  industry, 
the share of industry in the economy and the relative importance of various 
industries.  Some  idea of this  may  be  gained  from  the  fact  that  the  energy 
consumption per  worker  per  annum  in  metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent  is 
about 120 in the iron and steel industry, from 2 to 20 in industry (Community 
average about 7) and less than 1 in tertiary activities. 
The uncertainty as  to pig iron production in the development hypotheses 
we have  adopted  is  low  in  1965  hut very  much  greater by  1975,  owing  to 
uncertainties  as  to  steel  outlets  and  technological  developments  in the  iron 
and  steel  industry  (pig  iron/  steel  ratio).  The  figure  may  be  estimated  at 
between 10%and 15%.  With  the  energy  consumption of the  iron  and  steel 
industry accounting for about 12% of the total, the uncertainty as to overall 
energy requirements drops to less than 2%. 
As  regards the "other industries" sector, the uncertainty as  to  the index 
of industrial  production  may  be  reckoned  at  a  maximum  of  10o/o  for  the 
Community  at  a  given  national  product  level  in  1975.  With  industry  using 
about 35% of final energy (including electricity), the uncertainty as  to  total 
requirements would be 3.5o/o. 
Lastly,  an  examination  of  the  past  decade  shows  that structural  change 
in  the  industrial  sector  (disparity  of  growth  rates  between  industries  with 
a  high  energy  consumption  per  unit  of  value  added  and  low-energy  con-
sumption industries) has not had much effect on energy consumption, although 
this may not apply in the future.  Nevertheless it can  be  reckoned  that the 
sensitivity  of  energy  consumption  to  this  factor  is  low  ( ±  5%  for  energy 
consumption in industry, making ± 2% for total energy consumption). 
To  sum  up,  since  it  is  unlikely  that  all  the  factors  referred  to  above 
will  act in the same  direction  to  make  the  forecasts  either  too  high  or too 
low,  the  uncertainty  they  represent  as  regards  total  energy  requirements 
should he about 5%. 
1
) 
1)  If final demand for national accounting purposes in France had shown the same structure 
in  1959  as  in  1950,  energy  consumption  would  only  have  been  6{)/o  less  than  it  ac-
tually  was. 
53 E  - Energy prices 
The  influence  of  energy  prices  on •the  rhythm  of  economic  expansion 
and on energy demand is studied in the following chapter, the main conclusion 
of which is  that our present knowledge is  insufficient to  enable us  to  state 
precisely what  energy  price  hypothesis  underlies  the  growth  rates  adopted, 
so if we provisionally accept these as  data for our energy studies, the effect 
of  changing  energy  prices  will  be  limited  to  the  structure  of  industrial 
production  and  the  intensity  of  energy  utilisation.  As  we  shall  see  in  the 
following  chapter,  total  energy  consumption  in  the  Community  does  not 
seem to be affected very much by price fluctuations of less  than an average 
of 10%. 
1
) 
F  - Overall uncertainty 
As already noted, certain factors making for uncertainty cannot be super-
imposed  on  each  other.  In  particular,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the  sum 
total  of uncertainty  as  to  technical  advances  can  be  added  to  that  arising 
from  doubts  as  to  the  rate  of  econ_omic  expansion,  and  the  other  factors 
may  operate  in  the  same  way.  The  overall  uncertainty  for  1975  could,  by 
reason  of  structural  elements,  amount  to  10-15%  less  and  about  10o/< 
more. 
2
) 
1)  This low  overall  elasticity  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  sectoral  or  regional  re-
percussions on a  much larger scale. 
2)  It  ~Bhoul,d be borne in mind that these  figures are based on  average business, climatic and 
rainfall conditions. The correction for  a  boom or  a  slump  may amount  to  about 5°/o  of 
overall consumption, but this need not be  taken into  account in  a  long-term study  (the 
effect of cyclical fluctuations  will be dealt  with in the last chapter of this report). 
54 Chapter 4 
Energy prices and requirements 
The  energy  requirement  forecasts  given  in  Chapter  3  do  not  allow  for 
the price of energy.  Insofar as  they  are  based  on  relationships  worked  out 
for  the  past  between  energy  consumption  and  various  economic  activity 
indicators,  they  imply  either  that  these  relationships  are  independent  of 
the  price  of  energy  or  that  the  price  of  energy  will  continue  to  move  in 
the same way as in the past in relation to general price levels.  Th~ fact that 
these  hypotheses  are  generally  assumed  in  any  study  on  demand  forecasts 
does not preclude our asking to what extent they are valid. 
The  relationship  between  energy  prices  and  demand  is  very  complex 
and  to  measure  it  would  mean  making  allowances  for  several  mechanisms 
which condition economic development; this is  difficult enough qualitatively, 
but even more so  quantitatively. We thus make no  claim to  have  solved the 
problem  and  shall  restrict  ourselves  to  giving  certain  information  on  the 
part  played  by  energy  expenditure  in  cost  formation,  followed  by  some 
remarks on the relationship between prices and demand. 
1
) 
Section 1 - Energy expenditure in cost formation 
The  share  represented  by  energy  expenditure  in  cost  formation  can  be 
estimated with the aid of national accounting figures and input-output tables. 
We shall give  an  overall view first  of all,  followed  by detailed  information 
on product categories. 
A  - Share of energy in the national product 
An  overall  assessment  of  the  share  of  national  or  regional  production 
factors devoted to providing the economy with its energy requirements may 
be made by comparing the  sum  of the  values  added by  the  various  energy 
sectors  and  of the  value  of net  energy  imports  with  the  national  product. 
1)  The E. E.C.  Commission  has  asked  a  group  of  independent  experts to  make  a  thorough 
study  of  the  economic  influence  of  energy  prices,  particularly  on  general  economic 
growth and the level of energy consumption. 
55 This  gives  us  figures  which  differ  only  slightly  from  one  country  to 
another and average about 97'o. 
This percentage includes not only energy used in production sectors but 
also  that consumed by  domestic  purchasers. If we  disregard  the  latter,  the 
figure  is  about 6%. 
A  somewhat  more  detailed  view  can  be  gained  from  the  relationship 
between energy purchases and value added in the major sectors : 
agriculture 
industry 
transport 
2- 4%; 
7-10%; 
about 15%  (including motor fuel tax). 
B - The share of energy expenditure in the cost of production 
Input-output tables can be used to  determine the share of energy expen-
diture in the production costs  of various  groups  of products;  this  can than 
be compared with otber cost elements, particularly labour costs  and  capital 
expenditure. The first  column in  Table  20  gives  the  overall  results  for  the 
Community and  Table  20  gives  the  overall  results  for  the  Community  and 
Table 21  gives more detailed results for France. 
As will be seen from Table 21, direct energy costs always work out below, 
and usually well below, labour costs, and in many cases even below depreciation 
on fixed  assets.  This  is  a  point of some  importance in  dealing with  factors 
affecting location of industrial activities. 
Table  20 - Share  of Energy  Costs  in  Total  Cost  of  Certain  Products  for  the  Community 
as  a  whole 
Sector 
Agricultural and food industries 
Building materials  and  glass 
Iron mines and iron and steel industry 
Non-ferrous  ore  and metals 
Mechanical and electrical engineering 
industries 
Chemicals 
Textiles, clothing, leather 
Miscellaneous  industries 
Building  and  civil  engineering 
Transport 
56 
Direct energy 
purchases  as  a 
percentage of 
product value 
1.4 
8.6 
20.8 
11.4 
1.5 
7.8 
2.8 
2.2 
0.9 
11.6 
Direct and indirect 
cumulative energy 
purchases  as  a 
percentage  of 
product value 
4.2 
ll.5 
24.3 
14.8 
8.2 
10.7 
5.9 
4.6 
5.4 
13.7 Table  21  - Shares  of Energy  Costs,  Labour  Costs  and  Depreciation in  Turnover  in  Major 
Sectors  - France  1956 
Sector 
Agriculture  and  fisheries 
Agricultural  and  food  industries 
Ore extraction, minerals 
Glass,  ceramics,  building  materials 
Chemical industries, rubber 
Metal  production 
Mechanical  engineering  industrie,s 
Electrical  engineering 
Cars, cycles 
Shipbuilding and aircraft 
Textile industries 
Clothing 
Leather and  skins 
Timber and furniture 
Paper and board 
Printing  and  publishing 
Miscellaneous industries 
Building and  public works 
Transport and telecommunications 
Miscellaneous trade 
Source: Les compter de Ia  nation, volume 1, Les comptes, Paris 1960. 
Energy 
costs  costs- Depreciation  Labour  I 
wagesl) 
as percentage of turnover 
(including tax) 
3.0 
2.1 
5.7 
13.0 
7.0 
19.4 
2.4 
2.1 
2.4 
1.8 
2.8 
1.0 
1.3 
2.6 
6.3 
0.9 
3.3 
2.8 
10.5 
3.7 
13 
11 
41 
28 
30 
30 
39 
34 
32 
40 
24 
13 
18 
23 
24 
35 
18 
29 
58 
24 
7 
2 
15 
5 
6 
12 
5 
3 
5 
4 
4 
1 
1 
2 
5 
3 
2 
2 
17 
4 
1)  This figure  does not include the income of individual proprietors,  so  that it appears  abnor-
mally  low  in  sectors. 
These  figures  only  give  a  partial view of the  phenomena,  however,  and 
they are totally incapable of disclosing the effect of an alteration in energy 
prices on the cost of production of any given product, because they do  not 
allow for all the energy ultimately included in a  particular product. 
Energy can play three different parts in the cost of a  given product, for 
example an agricultural tractor : 
(a) the manufacturer of the product incurs certain energy expenditure, which 
figures  expressly  in  this  turnover.  This  is  direct  energy,  the  volume  of 
which depends on the degree of integration of the undertakings involved. 
In 1951  direct  energy  in  France  reprented  1.9%  of  the  ex-words  value 
of agricultural machinery; 
(b) the  manufacturer  uses  raw  materials  and  semi-finished  products  and 
incurs  costs.  The  total  energy  embodied  in  these  products  and  services 
constitutes  the  indirect  energy.  This  represents  7 .I  o/o  for  agricultural 
machinery; 
57 (c)  finally,  operating costs include depreciation,  roughly approximate to  the 
services rendered by the capital assets, which, being the result of building 
or civil engineering work and  the  installation of machinery,  incorporate 
energy. The share of energy included in the cost of the product manufac-
tured by the services rendered by the capital assets can be calculated, and 
we shall term it "depreciation energy" (0.3o/o  for agricultural machinery). 
The sum of these three items - direct, indirect and depreciation energy 
- may be  regarded  as  representing  the  share  of energy  costs  in  the  value 
of  the  manufactured  product.  In  the  case  of  agricultural  machinery,  this 
share amounts to 9.3%. 
The second column in Table 20  gives  fairly  overall results for  the  Com-
munity; Table 22  shows more detailed results for France in 1951. 
The  ratio  between  indirect  and  direct  energy  increases  as  the  products 
move forward  in the process  of industrial conversion.  Looking at the  total, 
products can be divided into three major groups : 
- the  first  group  comprises  basic  intermediate  products,  for  which  the 
percentage is 15%  or over; iron and  steel products  (20-25o/o  ),  primary 
steel  conversion  products,  cement,  plaster,  stoneware,  ceramics,  glass, 
chemical products (average 15%  ), paper pulp and transport; 
in the second group the percentage is about 10%; this comprise~ mechanical 
and electrical engineering industry products and paper; 
with  other  manufactured  products  and  food  products  the  percentage 
seldom exceeds 5% and may be considerably less. 
It is  notable  that  the  more  finished  the  product  the  lower  the  energy 
costs. This applies for the other countries  also,  though the percentages may 
vary within a  certain range. 
58 Table  22  - Share of Energy Costs in Total Cost·s  of Certain Products in France in 1951 
Description  of product 
I  - Intermediate  products 
Iron and steel product•s 
Primary  steel  conversion  products 
Non-ferrous  metals 
Castings 
Chemical product·s 
Artificial and synthetic fibres 
Bricks  and  tiles 
Cement, plaster 
Paper pulp 
II - Transport 
Internal transport of passengers and goods 
Postal- and telecommunications 
III - Food  products 
Flour,  se:t;nolina,  groats 
Brea·d, macaroni products 
Fish 
Preserves 
Dairy products 
Wines and spirits 
Sugar and sugar products 
IV - Finished  products 
Semi-finished metalworking products, 
metal  articles 
Agricultural machinery 
Industrial machinery 
Aircraft equipment 
Cars, motor-cycles, cycles 
Electrical machinery and equipment 
Pharmaceutical products 
Tyres, rubber articles 
Textiles 
Clothing products 
Tanner leather 
Footwear 
Glass 
Stoneware, ceramics 
Furniture  and  bedding 
Paper and board 
Newspapers, books and printed items 
Building 
Direct 
energy 
19.0 
5.1 
8.8 
2.9 
10.4 
5.8 
15.8 
15.5 
13.6 
15.4 
2.9 
0.8 
1.1 
14.2 
0.9 
0.4 
2.3 
4.6 
0.8 
1.9 
0.8 
1.8 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0 
1.7 
1.3 
1.2 
1.4 
0.2 
12.4 
14.7 
1.0 
5.1 
0.1 
0.8 
Indirect 
energy 
2.1 
14.5 
4.4 
6.4 
4.9 
3.4 
0.9 
2.0 
6.6 
0.8 
1.4 
0.5 
0.3 
0.1 
0.6 
0.3 
0.6 
1.0 
7.8 
7.1 
6.0 
3.9 
7.0 
4.3 
6.3 
1.7 
1.5 
1.4 
2.0 
1.7 
1.9 
1.3 
1.6 
6.8 
4.1 
4.5 
Depre-
ciation 
energy 
0.8 
0.6 
0.3 
0.2 
0.4 
0.2 
0.5 
0.3 
1.5 
0.8 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.7 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
Total 
21.9 
20.2 
13.5 
9.5 
15.7 
9.4 
17.2 
17.8 
20.2 
17.7 
5.1 
1.3 
1.6 
14.4 
1.7 
0.8 
3.0 
5.9 
8.9 
9.3 
7.2 
6.2 
8.7 
5.9 
7.7 
3.6 
3.1 
2.6 
3.4 
1.9 
14.7 
16.7 
2.8 
11.9 
4.4 
5.5 
N. B. The  direct energy figures  may  differ from  those  given  in  Table  21,  which relate  to  1956 
and  are  more  accurate. 
59 Section 2 - The influence of energy cost and prices 
on requirements 
The  effect  of  a  change  in  energy  cost  and  price  levels  on  the  volume 
of demand is  extremely  complex.  Some  idea  of the  problem can  he  gained 
from a  step-by-step examination of the following : 
(i)  overall effect on the rate of economic growth; 
(ii)  influence on national production structure, i.e. on the relative share 
of various activities; 
(iii)  influence on unit consumption. 
These three factors are obviously not independent of each other and there 
are clear links between the  rate of economic  growth  and  the  relative  share 
of each activity in national production. At the same time the rate of growth 
controls  wage  and  salary  trends,  which  are  not unconnected  with  the  level 
of  unit  consumption  (especially  as  regards  electricity,  the  consumption  of 
which  depends  on  the  degree  of  mechanisation).  Nevertheless  our  present 
knowledge is insufficient to provide us with an overall answer to the question 
and  all  we  can  do  is  to  give  certain  indications  regarding  the  factors 
enumerated above. 
A - Overall effect on the rate of economic growth 
This  is  an  extremely  difficult  problem,  because  the  facts  do  not  offer 
a  clear and unambiguous  answer.  For the  time  being  we  shall  confine  our-
selves to  a  theoretical analysis  of the  question. 
It seems possible to distinguish two methods whereby fluctuations in energy 
cost or prices are reflected in the rate of growth : 
1
) 
(i)  firstly,  physically or mechanically :  any  alteration in  the  volume  of 
production  factors  (labour  and  capital)  devoted  to  the  supply  of 
energy is reflected in the volume of such factors  available for other 
activities.  The  important  element  is  then  the  actual  cost  of  the 
energy to  the economy; 
(ii)  secondly, psychologically : an alteration in energy prices (price to the 
consumer)  may  influence  the  behaviour  of  economic  operators, 
particularly  heads  of  business,  to  an  extent  which  considerably 
exceeds  the  field  of  strict  repercussions  on  the  cost  of  production 
1)  To avoid any ambiguity it should be noted that the present analysis relates solely to the 
influence  of  energy  prices  on  the  overall  requirements  of  an  entire  country  {or  larger 
area).  Regional  effects,  particularly  the  stimulus  which  a  region  with  several  underem· 
ploye·d  production factors  gains from  the existence of cheaper or more  abundant energy 
than other regions, will not be touched  on here. 
60 and  the  choice  of production  techniques.  A  reduction  in  price,  for 
example,  could set off  a  substantial investment movement  or, more 
generally, lead to  a  more intensive  employment of available  factors 
(particularly labour in  certain  areas). It is  likely that  these  effects 
cannot  be  assessed  until  the  fluctuation  exceeds  certain  limits  and 
that  they  only  make  themselves  felt  after  a  certain  lapse  of  time. 
(a)  Mechanical  repercussions 
An attempt may be made to  estimate these with the aid of an extremely 
overall model. 
To say that the cost of energy drops, means that a  lesser fraction of the 
country's production factors needs to be devoted to its supply. 
1
) 
2
) 
The effect on the rate of growth of a  fall in energy costs  will  obviously 
vary  according  to  whether  the  resulting  growth  in  the  national  product 
occurs  entirely in  consumption,  entirely in  investment  or simultaneously  in 
both. Let us examine two typical cases. 
If  the increase in national product affects both consumption and investment 
equally in relative value, in other words if investment continues to represent 
the same percentage of the national product, the rate of economic growth will 
remain practically the same. Consumption rises at the same speed, but every 
year remains higher than what it would be with a  higher energy cost. If the 
cost fluctuation is 10% and if the energy cost represents 10% of the G.N.P., 
the  increase  in  G.N.P.,  consumption  and  standard  of  living  is  about  1%. 
It is  worthwhile  examining the  effect of another extreme hypothesis,  in 
which the increase in the national product takes  place  solely in investment 
and the consumption trend remains the same. 
The  crux of the  problem  lies  in  determining  the  effect  on  the  rate  of 
growth  of  an  increase  in  the  volume  of  investment  (and  of  the  rate  of 
investment).  This  increase  starts  off  modestly  with  a  price  fluctuation  of 
10% in an economy in which energy cost represents 10% of G.N.P., reflected 
by an increase of 1% in G.N.P. (at general constant price level); if  consumption 
remains  unchanged,  investment  rises  to  approximately  20-21%  of  G.N.P. 
Over the long term, however, there is a  cumulative effect. Calculations on an 
extremely  global  model  suggest  that  ultimately  the  repercussion  on  the 
1)  It must  be  emphasize.d  that  we  are  talking  here  of  the  cost  of  energy  to  the  economy. 
Actual price alterations caused by taxation or subsidies need not have  any noticeable  ef-
fect  on the global level  (although they  may  of course influence  the  level  of  activity in 
certain industries; cf. infra). 
2)  It seems more realistic to discuss the problem in terms of a  fall rather tlhan  a  rise, since 
existing  protection  against  importe'd  energy  is  fairly  substantial  in  many  countries  and 
the question  arises  as  to  whether and to  what extent this  protection should be lowered. 
61 national  product  would  be  about  2.5-3%,  i.e.  a  drop  of  10%  in  the 
cost of energy would advance economic growth by a  few months at the outset 
and nearly a year at the end of 15 to 20 years. 
1
) 
The above calculation ignores the international context. If we  now work 
on the  basis  of  an  economy  trading  regularly  with  countries  in  which  the 
price of energy remains unchanged, either an increase in wages  or a  fall in 
domestic prices  and  an  alteration in  the  rate  of  exchange  must  take  place 
when  the  cost  drops.  This,  however~ is  a  non-recurring  phenomenon;  sub-
sequently there is no a priori reason why the rate of exchange should alter. :!) 
Nevertheless  there  may be  repercussions  on  the  level of activity  in  certain 
sectors, a  phenomenon which will be  dealt with under B  below. 
(b)  Psychological  repercussions 
This is a  problem which cannot be treated theoretically, since it presents 
itself  in  very  different  terms  from  one  country  to  another  and  probably 
even from one region to another. Probably the only way to  achieve a  better 
understanding  of  the  scope  and  mechanisms  of  such  repercussions  is  by 
concrete analyses of past trends and present situations, possibly supplemented 
by motivational research. 
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B - Influence  on the  structure of national production 
The  price  of  energy  influences  the  structure  of  national  production  in 
two different ways : 
(i)  since  the share of energy expenditure varies  considerably  according 
to the finished product, an alteration in energy prices entails different 
alterations  in  the  prices  of  various  finished  products,  and  this 
alteration in relative  prices may be  accompanied  by changes  in the 
final demand structure, particularly from households; 
(ii)  the  comparative  price  of  energy  inside  a  country  and  abroad 
influences the  competitiveness  of various  national  activities  abroad. 
1)  The global result may conceal wi,der variations at sectoral and regional levels. 
2)  This is  a  specific example  of  a  wider problem:  can the  rate  of exchange  remain  stable 
between two economies in which the general level of domestic 'prices is constant but the 
growth  rate  different? It is  very  difficult  to  give  a  theoretical  reply  and  for  the  time 
being  all  we  can  do  is  to  observe  the  coexistence  of  economies  with  very  different 
growth rates and unahered rates of exchange. 
3)  This problem will shortly be embarked upon by  a  speciaUy  appointed group  of experts. 
62 As  long  as  price  fluctuations  do  not  exceed  l5-209'o,  the  first  effect 
will probably not he very great, since the corresponding alterations in relative 
prices will lie between l%  and 3%,  which is  a  very much lower level than 
the price differences practised under commercial distribution methods. 
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The second effect, on the other hand, may he of far-reaching importance 
in certain activities, particularly those  situated at the  beginning of the  con-
version process,  in which  energy  costs  represent  an  appreciable  proportion 
of their production costs. 
It is  extremely difficult to  assess  the alteration in competitiveness which 
would arise from a change in energy prices, since the exact level of production 
costs in various countries is not known.  Nevertheless the following  fragmen-
tary indications may he given. 
Competition between  two  factories  is  measured  at  consumer  level.  This 
means  that a  drop  in an industry's  costs  results  in  a  shift in  the  consumer 
price-indifference line {ligne  d'equiprix). 
3
)  Table 23  shows the approximate 
extent to which this line shifts for certain products with a  variation of 10% 
in energy prices. The degree of shift is  proportionate to the share of energy 
expenditure  in  production  costs  and  inversely  proportionate  to  the  value 
per  ton  of  manufactured  product;  it  thus  varies  considerably  from  one 
product to another. 
Table 23  - Shift  in  Price-Indifference  Lines  (lignes  d'equiprix)  produced  hy  a  100fo 
Energy Price  Variation 
Share  of  Effect of  100fo  Transport 
Cost per  energy  increase  in  costs  in  Shift  in  price-
expen- cost  of energy  cents per  indifference  metric  ton  diture  metric  lines 
Products  in dollars  in costs 
I 
ton- in  kilometres 
in  Ofo  in  Ofo  in  $  kilometre 
1  I 
2  I  14: col. 1xcol. 31  3: col. 2x0.1  100  5  16:  col. 4 
~x0.5x100 
Steel  100  25  2.5  2.50  1.2  100 
i 
Cement  12  25  2.5  0.30  0.8  18 
Aluminium  500  17  1.7  8.50  1.2  350 
Woollen yarn  3,200  3  0.3  9.60  1.6  300 
Cotton  yarn  1,000  3  0.3  3.00  1.6  95 
Paper pulp  120  14  1.4  1.70  1.2  70 
Nitrogenous 
fertilisers  155  30  3.0  5.00  1.0  250 
per unit 
Cars  2,000  5  0.5  10.00  12  40 
1)  With  an  aheration of 20°/o  in  energy  prices,  the  mechanical  repercussions  are  0.5°/o  in 
the price of clothing and 3°/o  on glassware. The  difference in relative  prices  is 250fo. 
2)  This conclusion does not apply to household energy consumption. The influence of price 
fluctuations  on this  consumption is  very difficult to  assess,  since  care must he  taken to 
distinguish it from the effect of income; moreover it is  to  a  certain  extent linked with 
the  purchase of new  appliances. 
3)  The price-indifference line  is  the locus  of the points  at which the cost to the consumer 
is the same irrespective of the factory  from  which he  obtains his  supplies. 
63 C - Influence on unit consumption 
A  drop in the price of energy would probably entail an increase in unit 
consumption by encouraging industrialists where possible to adopt production 
techniques  which  make  a  greater  call  on  energy  (more  intensive  mechani· 
sation, new processes) and possibly by lessening the incentive to achieve fuel 
economies at all stages. 
Nevertheless it is  extremely  difficult  to  advance  a  figure.  We  can  only 
assume  that  heavy  consumers  of  energy  have  already  made  considerable 
efforts to  reduce their unit consumption and that light consumers find  that 
the moderate place occupied by energy expenditure in their production costs 
leads them to concentrate on improving efficiency in other cost fields. It is 
therefore  likely  that  the  effect  on  unit  consumption  of  a  not  very  high 
fluctuation in energy prices will be fairly slight. 
1
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D  - General conclusions 
The above observations are inadequate to  enable accurate conclusions  to 
be  drawn  about  the  sensitivity  of  energy  requirements  to  fluctuations  in 
energy cost and prices, and all we can say is the following : 
{i)  our  knowledge  of  the  processes  of  economic  growth  is  not  yet 
sufficiently  complete  to  enable  us  to  state  the  energy  cost  level 
corresponding to the rates of growth adopted in Chapter l. For the 
time being it is  therefore necessary to  proceed as  if the rates  were 
independent of the cost of energy, bearing in mind that this is  only 
an approximation; 
(ii)  although working  on the basis  of  a  single  growth  rate,  there  is  no 
doubt that an alteration in the price of energy can effect the  level 
of activity of certain consumers  and the  level of unit consumption. 
These two effects both operate in the same direction; a  fall in prices 
tends to raise the level of activity of heavy consumers and increase 
unit consumptions, whereas  a  moderate fluctuation probably affects 
only a  few industrial consumers; 
(iii)  to  sum  up,  it  is  highly  probable  that  an  alteration  in  the  cost  of 
energy affects energy consumption, but at the present time we lack 
sufficient information to enable the effect to be calculated in terms 
1)  It should  be  borne  in mind  that  this  applies  to  overall  energy  cons.umption,  where  as 
there is  no doubt that the breakdown between various forms  of energy is highly suscep-
tible  to  alterations in their prices. 
64 of  figures.  All  we  know  is  that  an  alteration  in  the  cost  tends  to 
produce an alteration in demand in the opposite direction, and when 
the  fluctuation  in  cost does  not exceed 10-15% it seems  that the 
alteration in  demand,  without being  negligible,  is  less  marked than 
when influenced by the other uncertainties affecting energy demand 
dealt with in the previous chapter. 
65 Part Three 
Developments Affecting Supply 
Chapter  5 
General remarks 
There are two  aspects from which  developments  affecting supply can be 
examined - available  quantities  and  costs.  Both are  closely  linked,  in that 
often  production  costs  are  only  valid  for  a  given  quantity  when  rising  or 
decreasing  returns - a  frequent  phenomenon  in  mining  operations  - has 
to  be  allowed  for.  Moreover estimates  of  reserves  depend  at any  particular 
moment on technical and economic operating conditions, and we are therefore 
led  to  speak of the  volume  of  reserves  which  can be  extracted  under  such 
conditions without exceeding a  certain cost of production. 
In  the  remarks  which  follow  we  shall  therefore  concentrate  on  giving 
the available information on costs, although we cannot go far in this direction 
in our present state of knowledge.  Nevertheless it is  possible  to  give certain 
indications  and  approximations,  and  the  object of  this  part of  the  study  is 
to  recapitulate  the  information  at  present  available  on  Community  coal, 
imported coal, brown coal, petroleum, natural gas,  hydro-power and nuclear 
energy. 
In  this  introductory  chapter  we  shall  describe  the  spirit  in  which  the 
trend  of  economic  conditions  affecting  supply  has  been  forecast  and  the 
basic  hypotheses  assumed  in  doing  so.  The  general  principle  has  been  to 
adopt the economic growth hypotheses noted earlier, to  assume  that growth 
will  be  regular  (i.e.  to  ignore  cyclical  fluctuations),  to  work  on  a  general 
constant price level  and  to  allow  for  the most  likely  technological  develop-
ments.  These  points  will  now  be  briefly  reviewed,  followed  by  a  closing 
section on differences between costs and prices. 
A  - Economic growth  prospects 
The  outlook  adopted  for  Community  countries  is  as  described  in  Part 
One, namely fairly rapid expansion. 
67 B  - General constant price level 
We have entirely disregarded inflation phenomena, i.e.  we  have  assumed 
that  the  general  price  level  will  be  the  same  as  in  the  reference  period 
(usually  1960).  This  assumption  implies  no  particular  view  on  the  actual 
trend of general price levels in particular countries but is  simply an aid  to 
calculation which enables exchange rate fluctuations to be ignored. The latter 
fluctuations will in fact offset any disparity in general price level trends in 
individual countries. The object of this chapter is  thus to establish the trend 
in  costs  and  prices  of  different  sources  of  energy  by  comparison  with  the 
general  constant price  level,  using  present  exchange  rates  as  the  basis  for 
comparisons between countries. 
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The assumption of a  general constant price level in no  way implies that 
all prices will remain constant. Technological progress and thus productivity 
varies from one sector to  another and some  prices  will therefore  fall  while 
others rise. All we assume is  that the weighted average will remain constant. 
The analysis itself provides an example of such a  movement,  since we  shall 
see  later on that the  cost  of  Community  coal  seems  likely  to  rise  by  com-
parison with the general price level. 
In addition the rise in per capita national product implies that per capita 
income will increase at approximately the same rate.  In the cost calculation 
we shall be more precise in assuming an increase in wages which on average 
will equal that of the national income per head of working population. 
C  - Regular growth 
All our calculations will be based on a steady growth in the economy. This 
means,  at least at this  stage,  that we  shall deliberately ignore  the  influence 
of  cyclical  fluctuations  (these  will  be  dealt  with  in  a  separate  chapter  in 
Part Five). 
We  shall  therefore  assume  full  employment  of  production  capacity  and 
make  our  cost  calculations  accordingly.  To  give  an  example,  in  the  past 
cyclical fluctuations  have  produced  very  substantial fluctuations  in  demand 
for  shipping  space  and  consequently  in  freight  levels,  which  over  a  short 
period of years have  varied up  to  threefold.  Whereas  the bottom level has 
1)  An  enquiry is  in progress  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  growth  rate disparities  he-
tween  individual  countries  are  capable  of  altering  rates  of  exchange  so  as  to  stabilize 
foreign  trade  balances. 
68 not always covered normal depreciation, the top level has provided substantial 
profits. The coherent method used in the following calculations is  to  assume 
that the  vessels  whose  costs  will be  calculated  will  be  regularly  traded  not 
only throughout the year but also throughout their lifetime. 
The  concept  of full  employment  of  production capacity  must  obviously 
be viewed in the light of demand conditions and anticipated working hours. 
We shall assume, for example, that nuclear power stations will be employed 
to cover the base of the load curve, which corresponds to about 6,500-7,000 
load hours per annum (80% annual load factor), at least until 1975. Likewise 
we shall allow for probable trends in colliery working hours, and in addition 
all normal maintenance shut-downs will be taken into consideration. 
D  - Probable  technological developments 
Technological  progress,  although  very  difficult  to  forecast,  has  been 
allowed for in working  out future  costs.  In certain  cases  we  already  know 
possible lines of advance in fair detail, but generally speaking such informa-
tion  is  only  valid  for  the  next  few  years.  For  a  more  long-term  view  our 
assumptions  are  based  on  what  seems  possible,  especially  after  consulting 
various experts, bearing in mind that the fairly  high  economic growth  rates 
adopted  imply  continued  technological  progress  throughout  the  economy. 
We  have,  however,  deliberately  avoided  assumptions  implying  revolutionary 
changes  about which  no  information  is  yet  available.  In the  coalmines,  for 
instance, we have assumed a  fairly steep rise in the underground output per 
manshift  but  have  not  departed  from  present  technological  conditions  in 
the European coal industry. This does not mean that we reject the possibility 
of very  different  methods  being  employed  eventually,  for  example,  highly 
intensive  robbing  of  seams;  although  research  by  some  engineers  suggests 
that these methods are possible it is too early as yet to have any serious idea 
as  to  what  the  effect might  be  on  costs.  In the  same  way  the  calculations 
ignore the possibility of transporting  coal  by pipeline  and  are based  solely 
on conventional methods. 
E  - Costs and prices 
All  the  information  to  be  given  in  this  part  of  the  Study  relates  to 
production costs,  and care must therefore be  taken when turning from  this 
concept to  that of prices.  We  know that the  energy sector  is  characterized 
by the production of linked  products  and b,  the  existence  of "diminishing 
69 returns"  phenomena  in  the  primary  energy  field.  The  result  is  that  prices 
depend  on  producers'  selling  strategy.  This  applies  to  refined  petroleum 
products  for  example,  where  to  a  certain  extent  refining  and  distribution 
costs can, particularly over a short period, be loaded on to one product rather 
than another in the light of market conditions, particularly elasticity between 
demand and prices. Oil companies also prospect in various parts of the world 
where  prospection and production  costs  vary  considerably  and  to  a  certain 
extent they can even these up.  In the same way, colliery undertakings often 
own several pits producing the same grade of coal at a  different cost, which 
means that they can sell either at marginal pit cost or at average production 
cost. The same dual strategy can be employed at coalfield level, particularly 
when  there  are  selling  agencies  or  the  undertaking  is  the  only  one  in  the 
field. 
Chapter  6 
Community coal 
A  series  of  studies  has  been  carried  out  in  an  attempt  to  establish  the 
conditions under which coal can be mined in  Community coalfields  in 1965 
and 1975. 
A  tentative cost curve has been worked out for each coalfield, indicating 
the tonnage produced in relation to the production costs of the marginal pit 
- in other words, the tonnage which can be produced at each cost level  so 
that the production costs of the highest-cost pit work out precisely equal to 
such level. 
Plotting these  curves  raises  a  number  of  problems,  especially  as  regards 
cost  component  trends,  types  of  coal  and  the  items  comprising  costs  (total 
cost, ''regression" cost). The cost curves can then be linked to various supply 
curves, depending on whether sales are at marginal or average cost. All these 
points will be examined below. 
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1)  For further  details  see  Annex  9  to  fuU  Community-language  edition :  The  Community 
coal production cost,s. 
70 A  - Cost  component trends 
Coal production costs comprise three ma1n items : 
(i)  labour  costs; 
(ii)  materials; 
(iii)  depreciation  and  financial  charges. 
The  fHctors  making  for  uncertainty  in  cost  forecasts  are  such  that  we 
must avoid excessive detail and concentrate on the more important of them. 
Table  24,  which  shows  the  cost  breakdown  between  the  three  main  items 
in various Community coalfields, demonstrates that the main factor is labour 
costs,  the movement of which  depends  on wage  levels  and  output per man-
shift. 
(a)  Movement in labour costs 
The  movement  of  colliery  wages  and  salaries  (including  social  security 
charges) is closely related to that of national income per worker. 
For the period up to  1965, the following forecasts  as  to  wages  are based 
on the  trend which  the  experts  consulted  considered  to  be  the most likely; 
beyond that  date  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  wages  in  question  will  rise 
at  the  same  rate  as  national  income  per  worker.  The  forecast  rates  are  as 
follows : 
Country  1960-1965  1965-1970  1970-1975 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.)  4.2  3.7  3.9 
Belgium  3.2  3.2  3.2 
France  4.0  3.85  3.9 
Nether  lands  2.8  3.7  3.7 
Roughly speaking,  these  rates indicate that the relative  difference which 
existed in 1960 between miners' pay and the average for other workers will 
remain unchanged. These figures should he taken as minima. 
As regards social security charges, it is  assumed that contributions under 
this head will rise at about the same rate as wages, so that the ratio between 
the two will remain as before. 
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1)  This in fact  involves  the  further  assumption  that  any  additional  burden  resulting  from 
a  higher  ratio  of  retire,d  miners  and  other pensioners  to  miners  in  active  employment, 
due to reductions in the labour force, will  not have to be borne by the collieries. 
71 Table  24  - Coal Production Cost  Structure in Various  Community Coalfields in 1960  (0/o) 
coalfield 
Aachen, Ruhr 
Saar 
Cam  pine 
Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais 
Lorraine 
Dutch Limburg 
Labour 
costs 
53 
54 
53 
63 
56 
61 
(h)  Movement of productivity 
Materials 
34 
36 
28 
19 
23 
21 
Depreciation 
and financial 
charges 
13 
10 
19 
18 
21 
18 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Following  discussions  with  various  Community experts,  hypotheses  have 
been adopted as to the trend in productivity in each coalfield. 
As regards  1965,  a  very thorough  study  has  been  made  by  the  experts, 
account  being  taken  of  the  special  features  of  each  pit.  Rates  of  increase 
forecast vary 11ppreciably from one pit to another. Given a production volume 
approximately equal to that of today (allowing for closures and improvements 
in capacity utilisation), the  O.M.S.  improvements and other relevant figures 
work out as  shown in Table  25.  (The very  low  rate of increase for  France 
allows  for  a  large  amount  of  preparatory  work  which  will  not  hear  fruit 
until after 1965). 
Table  25  - Trend  in  Average  Coalfield  Underground 0. M.S.  between  now  and  1965 
Index  Average  O.M.S. in kilograms!) 
annual  rate  ton for ton)  Coalfield  of  increase 
1960 
I 
1965  1960 
I 
1965 
1  2  3  4  5 
Ruhr  and Aachen  100  123  4.3  2,185  2,700 
Saar  100  131  5.6  2,055  2,700 
Cam  pine  100  131  5.5  1,790  2,350 
S.  Belgium  100  121  4.1  1,450  1,760 
Nord  and Pas-de-Calais  100  108  1.5  1,560  1,680 
Lorraine  100  llO  2.0  2,580  2,850 
Dutch  Limburg  100  122  4.1  1.830  2.240 
1) Assuming there is  no change in the number of shifts worked per year. 
For  the period  from  1965  to  1975,  the  rate  of increase  in productivity 
is  assumed  to  be  the  same  for  all  pits  in  a  given  coalfield.  This  of  course 
is  an  over-simplification  not  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  facts,  hut  it 
has not been possible on the basis of the data available to indicate separate 
figures  for  individual  pits.  The  output  figures  arrived  at  are  shown  in 
column  3  of Table  26. 
72 With  production  volumes  (exclusive  of  anthracite)  in  keeping  with  the 
fully utilized production capacity forecast by the experts for 1965, the average 
underground  O.M.S.  for  the  different  coalfields  would  be  as  shown  in 
column 5. 
Closures  after  that  date  would  of  course  send  the  averages  up,  owing 
to  the  elimination of pits  with  the  lowest  O.M.S.  The  rise  in  such  cases  is 
not so  great as is  sometimes supposed, however :  individual pit output rates 
may  range  from  35%  below  to  30%  above  the  coalfield  average,  with  the 
result  that  the  closure  of  10%  of  the  capacity  may  raise  that  average  by 
only 2-3%. 
Table  26  - Trend in  Average  Coalfiel-d  Underground 0. M.S.  between  1965  an-d  1975 
Index  O.M.S.  in  kilograms 
Annual  under production 
Coalfield  rate  of  conditions  assumed 
1965  1975  growth  by  experts for  19652) 
1965 
I 
1975 
1  2  3  4  5 
Ruhr and  Aachen 
I 
100  137  3.2 
I 
2,700  3,7501} 
Saar  100  137  3.2  2.700  3,700 
Campine  100  136  3.2  2,350  3,200 
S. Belgium  100  136  3.2  1,760  2,390 
Nord  and Pas-de-Calais  100  148  4.0  1,680  2.490 
Lorraine  100  148  4.0  2,850  4,220 
Dutch Limburg  100  144  3.7  2,240  3,230 
1)  This figure  allows for  increased utilization of capacity  between  1965  and  1975. 
2)  Excluding  anthracite. 
In  the  case  of  surface  labour,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  increased 
output would  equal  the  increased  average  productivity  for  the  economy  as 
a  whole (see Table 4). 
(c)  Other production  cost  items 
It has  been  assumed  that the  materials  cost per ton  will  remain  at the 
same  absolute  level  as  in  the  reference  year.  This  does  not  preclude  the 
possibility that the  prices  of certain materials  and  equipment  will  move  in 
different  directions  or that the  future  materials  expenditure  structure  will 
alter from that of 1960 owing to changes in both volume of consumption and 
relative  prices  (we  can thus  expect  a  higher  electricity consumption in the 
future  owing  to  the  change-over  from  compressed  air).  We  have  neverthe-
less assumed that these alterations will cancel each other out. This is doubtless 
73 a  fairly  favourable  assumption,  since  the  forecast  heavy  increase  in  pro-
ductivity  is  likely  to  lead  to  increased  consumption  of materials  and  spare 
parts per ton of output. 
As  regards  depreciation  and  financial  charges,  it has  been  assumed  that 
these  will  remain the  same  per ton of capacity,  resulting in  a  decrease  per 
ton produced. The cost calculations relate to pits operating at full production 
capacity in 1970 and 1975, unlike the present situation where only a  fraction 
of  the  capacity  is  used  in  many  pits,  even  by  1965  the  hypothesis  of  full 
employment will  not he  entirely  horne  out by  all  Community  coalfields. 
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This  assumption  that  charges  will  remain  the  same  per  ton  of  capacity  is 
probably  somewhat  optimistic,  since  increased  productivity  will  doubtless 
he  accompanied by intensified mechanisation and we  cannot he certain that 
this will he offset by reductions in the relative prices of equipment. 
The combined effect of the above two hypotheses and of the more rapid 
rise in wages than productivity will distort the production cost structure and 
the share of labour costs will tend to increase. 
B  - Types of coal 
Both  production  costs  and  outlets  differ  very  greatly  according  to  the 
type of coal,  hut it is  difficult to  take  the  classification very far  because  a 
given pit often produces two or more types and there is considerable latitude 
in the treatment of the coal after it has been mined {washing, screening etc.). 
We  have  therefore  restricted  ourselves  to  three  main  types,  namely  anthra-
cite~ coking coal and steam coal. 
At  this  early  stage  of  the  work  we  have  ignored  anthracite  (which 
represented  about  9%  of  total  Community  production  in  1960)  and  have 
plotted only  two  cost  curves,  one  for  coking  coal  and  the  other  for  steam 
coal,  for  all  fields  except  Campine  and  Dutch  Limburg,  for  which  only  a 
coking coal curve has been prepared. 
2
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It is  not always easy to distinguish between different types of coal and a 
given  pit  producing  both  coking  and  steam  coals  may  he  unable  to  allot 
its costs accurately between the two types. In some cases we have endeavoured 
1)  At  a  pit where  depreciation  and  financial  charges  represent  20tl/o  of  the  cost,  the  tran-
sition from 80°/o  to 95'0/o  utilization of capacity  results  in  a  cost  re,duction  of about 36/o. 
2)  The  distinction  between  coking  coal  and  steam  coal  lies  in  the  nature  of the  coal,  but 
·does not affect its actual utilization.  As  we shall see in Part Four, the latter depends on 
outlets, and in certain cases coking coal has to be sold on the steam coal market because 
coking outlets are restricted. 
74 to get round the difficulty by allocating each pit to  one group or the other 
according to the type it mainly produces. 
The  rough  classification  adopted  makes  it  impossible  to  allow  for  all 
differences in grades  and  qualities~  and  it may  also  distort  competitiveness~ 
since  a  pit producing at  a  lower  rate  of productivity  and  higher  cost  than 
another may eventually be in a  better competitive position if the difference 
in the market value of their outputs is  greater than the  difference  in costs. 
We have endeavoured to correct for these differences in grades and qualities 
on the basis of present valuation differences. 
With steam coal we have  assumed that the  degree of preparation in the 
future will be similar to that practised at present. If preparation were limited 
to  rough hand-cleaning without  any  subsequent treatment the  coal  obtained 
would  only  be  usable  at  power  stations~  but  the  production  cost  by  com-
parison  with  present  washed  coal  would  be  about  $  1.00-1.50  lower  per 
metric ton hard-coal equivalent to  7~000 calories. 
1
) 
C - Results at present available 
It  has  been  possible  to  carry  out  a  fairly  detailed  analysis  of  the 
cost  curves  for  coking  and  steam  coals  in  the  major  Community  coal- , 
fields  in  1965. 
The  studies  are  less  complete  for  1975  and  the  results  less  accurate~ 
owing to the greater uncertainty about the trend in productivity. 
For  reasons  of industrial  secrecy  it is  impossible  to  reproduce  detailed 
results~ but we  can  give  some  idea  of  the  general  shape  of  the  curves  and 
the main trends. 
The  curve  costs  are  shown  in  the  following  graph~  which  covers  all 
Community  coalfields. 
2
)  The  slope  of the  marginal  cost  curve  varies  with 
the  coalfield~ but the  following  phenomenon  is  fairly  general :  to  the  left~ 
1)  The  actual  weight  of  these  7,000  calories  would  then  be  increased  by  15  to  20°/o  and 
the cost of using thi'S  coal at power stations would  be increased  (especially owing to  ash 
extraction)  by  an  estimated  $ 0,40  per metric ton hard·coal  equivalent.  All  these  points 
require further investigation. 
2)  This  curve  is  given  solely  for purposes  of  illustration.  No  conclusions  can  be  drawn  as 
to the level of competitiveness of Community coal; studies are needed for each coalfield, 
with  requirements regionalized  (see  Part Four). 
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 several  low-cost pits;  then the  main  body  o£  pits  with  fairly  similar  costs; 
lastly,  to  the  right,  marginal  pits  with  high  costs.  The  same  phenomenon 
can  he  expressed  by  stating  that  average  coalfield  cost  only  moves  slowly 
in relation to the reduction in output. 
1
) 
We  must  nevertheless  guard  carefully  against  inferring  from  this  that 
even a  substantial reduction in production will only have  a  slight effect on 
the competitiveness of a  given coalfield against imported energy, since such 
a  reduction not only leads to  lower average  costs hut, more important still, 
enables  outlets  further  away  from  the  mine  to  he  abandoned  and  those 
closest  to  it  to  he  concentrated  on,  with  a  consequent  saving  in  transport 
costs  (which may amount to  25%  or more  of the pithead price). The  com-
bined effect of these two factors will he analysed in Part Four. 
As regards the trend in time, it may he noted that the largest Community 
coalfields  tend  to  show  a  more  rapid  rise  in  wages  than  in  productivity; 
hence an increase of nearly 10% in coalfield costs as  a  whole between 1965 
and 1975. 
To he more specific, in the period 1960-1965 : 
(i)  the  Ruhr,  Aachen,  Saar  and  Dutch  Limburg  coalfields  can  expect 
more or less constant costs; 
(ii)  in the Campine coalfield costs will probably drop; 
(iii)  the  French  coalfields  in  Lorraine  and  Nord-Pas-de-Calais  must 
expect increased costs,  since  the  anticipated increase  in output per 
man-shift will not suffice to offset the rise expected in wages. 
During the period 1965-1975, the possible increase in productivity in all 
coalfields  will not suffice  to  offset  the  increase in wages,  hut the  resulting 
rise in overall costs  will he less  noticeable in French than in German coal-
fields.  In order to  resolve  any  ambiguity,  it  should  he  stressed  that  these 
indications  offer  no  conclusions  as  to  the  comparative  competitiveness  of 
various  coalfields,  which  can  only he  deduced  from  analyses  based  on  the 
geographical location of each field. 
1)  It should be borne in mind that the costs  relate to pits working to full capacity. 
77 D  - Accuracy of  foregoing  results 
The two main sources of inaccuracy have already been mentioned : 
(i)  uncertainties about wage trends in European mines due to uncertainty 
as  to  rates  of  economic  growth,  working  hours  and  miners'  wages 
by comparison with those of industrial workers; 
(ii)  uncertainty about the productivity trend in European mines. 
Even  assuming  the  rate  of  economic  growth,  it  is  virtually  certain  that 
the wage increase  rate  adopted in the  calculations  is  a  minimum  figure.  In 
addition  the  position  of  the  miner  by  comparison  with  other  industrial 
workers  may  have  to  be  raised  in  order  to  obtain  the  required  number  of 
qualified workers  in  1970  and  1975. 
As regards productivity, it is more difficult to state the direction in which 
the  inaccuracy  operates.  Certainly  the  growth  rates  adopted  for  the  period 
between  now  and  1975  are  high~ since  they  are  average  figures  maintained 
over a  long period. The experts  consulted nevertheless  think them possible. 
Moreover  we  cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  of  a  technological  revolution, 
although  this  may  not  produce  a  more  rapid  rise  in  productivity  unless 
more intensive mechanisation is adopted, which would raise depreciation and 
financial charges  (and perhaps expenditure on materials). Lastly, it must be 
borne  in  mind  that  so  far  attempts  to  improve  productivity  have  concen-
trated  mainly  on  coal-cutting,  which  occupies  less  than  40%  of  the  total 
underground  and  surface  labour.  Further  efficiency  drives  at  other  stages 
might  perhaps  have  a  considerable  effect,  but  would  not  bear  fruit  until 
alterations, doubtless major ones, had taken place in the organisation of coal 
undertakings, and thus after a very considerable lapse of time. 
Chapter  7 
Imported coal 
We  shall  only  deal  with  American  coal,  since  no  other  source  seems 
capable of regularly supplying an annual tonnage proportionate to  Europe's 
supplementary coal requirements over the next fifteen years. 
1
) 
1)  Eastern European  coal has  not been taken  into  account,  since  it  is  felt  that  as  regards 
both volume  and price it would  not really be  suitable  for  regular supplies  to  the  Com-
munity  as  a  whole. 
78 In  the  reference  year  1960  the  cost  breakdown  of  American  coal  was 
roughly  as  follows : 
1960  cost  of  American  coal  ($/m. t.) 
Pithead price  I 
Carriage to Hampton Roads 
Transatlantic freight 
Total 
Steam  coal 
4.40 
4.50 
3.50 
12.40 
Pocahontas 
coking  coal 
6.50 
4.50 
3.50 
14.50 
1)  50°/o  low-V.M.  Pocahontas-type  coal and  500fo  high-V.M.  coal. 
Coking coal 
mixturet) 
5.25 
4.50 
3.50 
13.25 
The  main factors  of uncertaintv in the  future  are  the  pithead  cost  and 
transatlantic freight rates. 
1
)  • 
A  - Pithead cost 
Output per man-shift, which varied only slightly between 1930 and 1940, 
rose  by about  30%  between  1940  and  1950  and  then  more  rapidly  still  by 
80%  between  1950  and  1959,  due  to  two  factors : 
(i)  increased  efficiency  in  all  types  of  mines  owing  to  mechanisation 
and the introduction of new methods such as the "continuous miner" 
in underground mines; 
(ii)  an  increased  share  accounted  for  by  output  from  opencast  mines, 
in which productivity is two  to three times as  high  as  in deep mines 
(the share rose from 9% in 1940 to 24o/o  in 1950 and 30% in 1959). 
In the future these two factors are likely to continue to play an important 
part. Wage increases may he more than offset by rising productivity with an 
unchanged production level. There is, however, every reason to suppose that 
the  United  States'  own  coal  requirements  will  increase  sharply  in  coming 
1)  For a  more  detaile~d account  see  Annex 10  to  full  Community-language  edition. 
79 years; the increase has been estimated at 67o/o  from 1955  to  1975,  gtvtng  a 
consumption  of  745  million  short  tons  in  1975.  Prices  are  unlikely  to  he 
effected  h~ this in the period immediately ahead,  and for 1965  it has been 
assumed that pithead export prices  will  he  in  line  with  the  slightly  higher 
price  for  the  home  market.  After  1965,  on  the  other  hand,  costs  may  he 
expected to rise quite considerably, especially in the case of coking coal, most 
of which is deep-mined and therefore costs more. 
The  increase  may  he  smaller  for  steam  grades,  a  larger  proportion  of 
which comes from thicker seams or opencast workings. To sum up, the pithead 
price per metric ton could therefore rise as follows : 
(i)  for  Pocahontas coking coal, from  $  6.50  in 1960 to  $  7.00  in 1965 
and$ 7.70 in 1970; 
(ii)  for Pocahontas-Clintwood mixture, from $ 5.25 in 1960 and 1965  to 
$ 5.75 in 1970; 
(iii)  for steam coal, from $ 4.40 in 1960 to $ 4.65 in 1965 and 1970. 
B  - Internal transport and transhipment in the United States 
Certain factors, such as  the use of block trains of 240  eighty-ton wagons 
suggest that present rates may fall,  but the extent of the reductions  cannot 
be  estimated  at  the  present  time.  Long-term  c.i.f.  price  forecasts  are  not 
likely to be seriously affected. 
If coal situated further west has  to  be called on,  transport  to  the  coast 
will  be  more  costly,  but  the  coal  itself  will  probably  he  produced  more 
cheaply. 
C - Transatlantic  freight  rates 
The huge fluctuations in freight rates during recent years  ($  2.90 in June 
1959, $ 10.00 at the beginning of 1956 and $ 15.00 in December 1956) suggest 
that serious estimates are impossible, but these fluctuations  relate to  a  very 
irregular  volume  of  traffic  intended  to  meet  occasional  requirements  and 
arising  from  political  or  cyclical  disturbances  of  an  essentially  transitory 
nature.  Here,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  seeking  the  cost  of  regularly 
transporting  substantial  tonnages,  which  would  thus  he  carried  by  large-
capacity colliers plying regularly throughout their lifetime. 
We should thus look for the operating costs of vessels of this kind built 
during  the  coming  years.  This  gives  an  estimated rate  of  $  3.50-5.00 per 
80 metric  ton  Hampton Roads-Rotterdam  according  to  the  size  of  the  collier; 
the freight rate may differ considerably for other Community ports. 
D - c.i.f. cost of steam coal 
The foregoing  data give  us  the following  estimates in dollars per metric 
ton for 1970 : 
Pithead cost 
Transport to  Hampton Roads  and  handling 
Transatlantic freight 
c. i. f.  cost 
4.50- 5.00 
4.20- 4.70 
3.50- 5.00 
12.20-14.70 
We can thus take $ 13.00-13.50 as  the central value. 
E - c.i.f. cost of coking coal 
For coking coal from  the United States there could  be  a  wide  range  of 
prices  according  to  the  type  of  coal.  The  dearest  would  he  low-V.M. 
Pocahontas-type  supplementary  coal  for  mixing  with  high-V.M.  European 
coal. In 1970  the price of this  coal would be  about  $  16.50  per metric  ton 
c.i.f.  North  Sea  Port.  The  cheaper  coal  would  he  merchants'  mixtures 
of low and high-V. M. coals, the price of which would be about $ 14.50. 
Chapter 8 
Brown coal 
Since  about 94%  of the  Community's brown coal  is  mined  in  Germany, 
the present position and future outlook for this item in the E.C.S.C.  depends 
on  operating  conditions  in  the  Federal  Republic.  Since  the  problem  has 
already  been  dealt  with  in  the  Germany  energy  survey,  we  shall  confine 
ourselves to summarising the main findings of the latter document. 
1
) 
Depending on calorific value,  a  rough distinction can he drawn between 
recent brown coal and old brown coal. Since the entire Community production 
1)  See  Untersuchung  uber  die  Entwicklung  der  gegenwiirtigen  und  zukun/tigen  Struktur 
von Angebot und Nachfrage in der Energiewirtschaft der Bundesrepublik unter besonderer 
Berucksichtigung des Steinkohlenbergbaus, Berlin 1962. 
81 in 1960 was approximately 98 million metric tons of recent brown coal and 
only  3  million  metric  tons  of  old  brown  coal,  the  analysis  will  mainly  be 
devoted  to  the  recent  variety. 
A  - Reserves 
Brown coal reserves ready for cutting by present methods are estimated at 
about 9,000 million tons or 2,500 million tons hard-coal equivalent. 
1
) 
B  - Movement of costs 
(a)  Recent brown  coal 
In 1959 the average production costs in the Rhineland field, which contains 
the major pits, were $  2.00 per metric ton of brown coal or $ 7.60 per metric 
ton hard-coal equivalent. The breakdown into major items of expenditure is 
as  follows : 
Operating  cost'S 
Depreciation  and interest 
Other expenditure 
$/m. t.  0/o 
0.60 
0.70 
0.70 
31 
35 
34 
2.00  100 
More  than  half  the  operating  costs  are  accounted  for  by  removal  of 
overburden; the remainder are mainly due to compensation for mining damage 
and the cost of crop  reinstatement as  laid down by law.  In other producing 
areas  in Germany, the  cost of cutting varies between $  2.20 per metric ton 
(Bavaria)  and  $  5.70  per metric  ton  (Hessen),  the  difference  being  mainly 
due to the depth of the deposits. 
Outlook  for  1965-1975. - Assuming an annual wage  increase of about 
5%,  a  reduction to  a  40-hour week from  1963 onwards and the  generalized 
use  of  heavy  mining  machinery,  the  production  costs  of  Rhineland  brown 
coal will probably rise by 30% by 1975. 
1)  Hard-coal equivalent to 7,000  kcal/kg. 
82 Operating  costs.  - The  trend  in  operating  costs  will  reflect  the 
deterioration  in  geological  conditions.  In  the  Rhineland  field,  one  quarter 
of the  present  production  of  brown  coal  comes  from  the  southern  region, 
where  there  is  usually  only  half  a  cubic  metre  of  overburden  per  metric 
ton. As reserves in this area gradually become worked out (present reserves 
are estimated to  last until 1970), it will be  necessary to  work  the  northern 
deposits,  where  the  average  overburden/  coal  ratio  is  3  : I.  Full  transition 
to  large-scale  mechanized  operation  will  not  offset  this  deterioration,  and 
even at 1959  wage  rates  we  must expect  a  rise  of $  0.25  per metric  ton  in 
operating costs. 
Depreciation  and  interest.  - The  deterioration  in  the  overburden/  coal 
ratio will entail an increase in capital expenditure on heavy machinery. Even 
assuming  a  longer  life  for  the  new  installations  and  the  maintenance  of 
existing  wages,  interest  and  depreciation  are  expected  to  rise  from  $  0.70 
per metric ton in 1959 to  $  1.10 per metric ton in 1975. 
Total  costs.  - The fact  that Rhineland total production  costs  will  only 
increase by $  0.60  per metric ton is  due  to  a  substantial reduction  in  com-
pensation  and  crop  reinstatement  costs  offsetting  two-thirds  of  the  rise  in 
operating  expenditure. 
In other German fields the rise in total costs is expected to vary between 
nearly  $  1.00  per  metric  ton  and  $  2.10  per  metric  ton  of  brown  coal 
produced. 
(b)  Old brown coal 
The  survey  of Bavarian  old  brown  coal  shows  that  production  costs  of 
pech-coal were  $  20.00 per metric ton hard-coal equivalent in 1959.  A  price 
increase of at least $  6.00  is expected by 1975. 
(c)  Summary 
Allowing for  the  calorific value  of different types  of coal and  assuming 
a  5%  wage  rise per annum,  we  can expect the  average  price  of Rhineland 
brown coal to be a  maximum of $  10.00 per metric ton hard-coal equivalent 
by 1975. 
C - Movement of production 
The  German  brown  coal  mines  appear  to  have  based  their  operating 
programmes on the following trend (recent brown coal in millions of metric 
tons) : 
1960 
1975 
Rhineland 
81.4 
95.0 
Other areas 
14.7 
15.5 
Fed.  Rep.  total 
96.1 
110.5 
The main expansion will therefore take place in the Rhineland field. 
83 Assuming  that  the  production  of  old  brown  coal  in  German)  and  the 
total  production  of  brown  coal  in  the  other  Community  countries  remains 
approximately  stationary,  i.e.  at  the  1961  level,  we  obtain  a  ton-per-ton 
production  figure  of  117  million  metric  tons  in  1975,  i.e.  approximately 
34  million metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent  by  comparison  with  29  million 
metric tons hard-coal equivalent in 1960. 
The increase is expected to be due solely to  riSing power-station require-
ments. The production of brown coal briquettes will probably drop  to about 
8 million metric tons or 5 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent as  against 
in  1961. 
Chapter  9 
Petroleum products 
To  form  an  idea  of  the  trend  in  the  supply  of  petroleum  products  in 
the  Community  it  is  essential  to  study  the  world  oil  market,  owing  not 
only  to  the  geographical  distribution  of  crude  oil  production  but  also  to 
the  structure  of the  industry. 
Only  two  countries  in  the  world  are  both  large-scale  producers  and 
consumers - the U.S.A.  and the U.S.S.R.  Other major production areas  are 
in  low-consumption  countries  with  little  industry;  conversely  the  highly 
industrialised countries of Western Europe and the  Far East have  a  totally 
inadequate local  output. 
These circumstances, arising from natural conditions, 
1
)  are accompanied 
by  the  predominance  in  most  markets,  apart  from  that  of  the  U.S.A.,  of 
companies  which  produce,  refine  and  distribute  oil  in  nearly  all  countries. 
This  vertical  and  international  integration  explains  the  links  between  the 
outlets  of the  major  oil producing  centres,  which  export  to  all  Continents. 
For the last forty years world oil consumption has  doubled nearly every 
ten  years.  Estimates  suggest  that  total  consumption,  with  the  exception 
of  that  of  the  U.S.S.R.,  Eastern  Europe  and  China,  may  double  between 
1)  Or rather from our present knowledge of them and from  current technological advances. 
84 1960 and 1975. U.S.A.  requirements are expected to increase by about  50%~ 
those of Europe to  be approximately two-and-a-half times  greater and those 
of other countries  two-and-a-half to  three  times  greater.  The  latter include 
a  large  number  of  developing  countries  whose  rate  of  economic  growth  is 
especially  difficult  to  forecast  and  for  which  the  above  figures  may  be 
s~mewhat on the low side,  although  this  is  not  likely  to  affect the  total  to 
any great extent. World demand exclusive of the Eastern countries is  likelv 
to be approximately 2,000 million tons per year by 1975. 
To this figure must be added consumption by Eastern European countries~ 
the  U.S.S.R.  and  China.  Only  very  global  retrospective  data  are  available 
on  consumption  in  these  countries,  but  we  do  know  that  hydrocarbons 
(petroleum and  natural  gas)  will  occupy  a  rapidly  growing  position  in  the 
energy  supplies  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and  Eastern  Europe.  After  allowing  for 
trade between these countries, they are at present left with an export surplus 
to the rest of the world and it seems reasonable to assume that this situation 
will continue; 
1
)  the level of supply will nevertheless depend on prospection 
results  and  the  availability  of  oilfield  and  transportation  equipment.  In 
addition  exports  from  these  countries  are  covered  by  bilateral  agreementE 
and  the  quantities  involved  depend  strictly  upon  the  trading  policy  of  the 
purchasing  countries.  We  have  therefore  worked  on  the  basis  that  the 
probable export surplus range will increase substantially in the future. 
Two  questions  arise  in  the  light  of  the  above  remarks.  The  first  is 
whether  the  physical  amounts  of  crude  oil  available  will  suffice  to  meet 
the increase in world demand. This will be dealt with in Section l. 
The  second  problem  concerns  the  cost  and  price  conditions  at  which 
this demand could be met. Section 2  will deal with the development of price 
formation  mechanisms  and  illustrate  the  doubtful  nature  of  the  present 
system of posted prices  and rebates.  Since the uncertainties  regarding price 
data prevent us  from  determining long-term  trends,  Section  3  will  examine 
objective  elements,  i.e.  costs.  The  latter  will  then  he  used  to  outline  the 
prospects for heavy fuel oil prices in Europe in Section 4. 
1)  The production outlook in the Soviet Union,  base·d  on  the  potential of her sedimentary 
deposits,  should be 240m.  tons  per annum in  1965,  350m.  in  1970  and  a  pos,sible  700m. 
in  1980.  No  figure  can  be  given  at  present  for  China,  although  the  Govermment  is 
trying  to  develop  domestic  oil  production  in  view  of  the  apparently  favourable 
geological  condition~. 
85 Section 1 - Amounts involved 
Proved recoverable reserves  are at present put at 41,000  million tons, 
1
) 
representing  nearly  forty  years'  production  at  current  operating  rates.  • 
These,  however,  form  only  part  of  the  total  world  potential,  i.e.  the 
output which  can  be  expected  from  oilfields  already  discovered  plus  those 
yet to be discovered. A  figure of 240,000 million tons has been suggested for 
the  quantities  capable of being extracted economically by present methods. 
although  there  are  those  who  think  that  this  estimate  errs  too  much  on 
the  side  of  caution.  The  fact  remains  that  even  if these  figures  are  not 
high  enough to  enable  us  to  conclude  that oil  reserves  are  unlimited,  they 
at least point to the conclusion that from the purely quantitative standpoint 
and  given  normal  circumstances  it  should  be  possible  to  keep  the  world 
supplied without serious difficulty for the next twenty  to  twenty-five  years. 
At  the  same  time  these  figures  are  a  measure  of  the  volume  of 
prospection which must be  carried  out in  the  near future.  Even if we  are 
content with a  stock of proved reserves amounting to only twenty-five years' 
current production by 1975, it will still be necessary to  discover 25-30,000 
million tons of fresh  reserves by that date.  This means that efforts must be 
concentrated along three lines : 
(i)  a  survey  of  the  extent  of recently  discovered  deposits  which  have 
been  inadequately  surveyed  and  may  therefore  be  underestimated; 
(ii)  discovery of new deposits; 
(iii)  the  improvement  and  application  of  techniques  enabling  final 
recovery to be increased. 
2
) 
In order to gain an objective idea of the present situation and the outlook 
for the future, these global estimates require to be supplemented by a  study 
of the present geographical distribution of reserves. The breakdown is  given 
in Table 27,  which shows the following : 
(i)  the  heavy  concentration  of  reserves  in  three  major  areas,  namely 
the  U.S.A.,  Venezuela  and  the Middle East,  which  together  contain 
88% of world reserves; 
3
) 
1)  Including Eastern Europe,  the  U.S.S.R.  and  China  (accounting  in  all  for  slightly under 
5,000  million  tons). 
2)  Proved  re,serves  in  the  Middle  East  are  estimated  today  at  about  25,000  million  tons, 
whilst  on  the  basis  of  deposits  discovered  so  far  probable  reserves  may  amount  to 
approximately  40,000  million  tons. 
3)  Percentage of total reserves,  excluding those in the U.S.S.R.,  Eastern Europe and  China. 
86 (ii)  the marked predominance of the Middle East, which has about 67% 
of the world's proved reserves; 
(iii)  the  low  share  of  Western  Europe  in  the  world  total,  namely  less 
than ] %; 
1
) 
(iv)  the as yet slender volume of proved reserves in North Africa, namely 
less than 3%; 
1
) 
(  v)  the  traditional  importance  of  the  U.S.S.R.,  whose  recoverable 
reserves  were  estimated at approximately 4,500  million  tons  at  the 
end of 1960, namely 11% of the world total. 
2
) 
Table  27  - Estimated  Present Proved  Oil  Reserves 
1960  reserves  1960  production  1960 ratio 
between 
•ooo,ooom.t. I  •ooo,ooom.t. I 
reserves 
0/o  Ofo  and 
production 
Middle East  24,570  67.2  259  28.0  95 
U.S.A.  4,980  13.7  388  41.9  13 
Venezuela  2,650  7.2  148  16.0  18 
Indonesia  1,270  3.5  21  2.3  61 
Arica  (including Egypt)  1,155  3.2  17  1.8  68 
North America 
(excluding U.S.A.)  860  2.4  40  4.3  21 
Caribbean and South America 
(excluding Venezuela)  600  1.6  31  3.4  19 
Western Europe  240  0.7  15  1.65  16 
Far East 
(excluding Indonesia)  185  0.5  6  0.65  31 
Total  36,510  100.0  925  100.0  40 
U.S.S.R.  - Eastern bloc  4,500  167  27 
Grand  total  41,010  1,092  38 
--~-----
Section 2 - Development of price formation mechanisms 
A  - Crude  oil 
For a  long time the U.S.A.  was the biggest producer and exporter of oil. 
This is why American prices were universally recognised for very many years; 
those  of  American  exporters'  competitors  aligned  themselves  on  American 
1)  Percentage of total reserves, excluding those  in the U.S.S.R.,  Eastern Europe and  China. 
2)  This  seems  a  cautious  estimate,  hut  it  is  difficult  to  judge  the  published  information 
in  the  absence  of  precise  details  on  discovere-d  deposit'S  and  the  methods  adopted  in 
the U.S.S.R.  to  estimate  reserves,  especially  as  regards  the  recovery  factor. 
87 oil prices at any given point of consumption, irrespective of the production 
area.  This  was  particularly  true  of  Middle  East  oil,  for  which  the  system 
adopted until after the  second World War meant that  f.o.b.  prices  differed 
according  to  destination.  At  the  instigation  of  the  Economic  Co-operation 
Administration the multiple price system was  replaced by a  single  quotati~m 
at each loading port. Initially these quotations were calculated so  that Middle 
East crude  could  compete  with  that  of  Venezuela  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
Subsequently  the  north-east  coast  of  the  United  States  took  the  place  of 
the Channel ports as the zone of c.i.f. price parity. 
The  system  of  posted  prices  reflected  actual  market  conditions  fairly 
closely  for  a  decade  or  so,  but  as  soon  as  the  U.S.A.  introduced  import 
controls  in  1958,  the  Middle  East  posted  prices  plus  transatlantic  freight 
became  appreciably  lower  than  American  domestic  prices.  These  circumst-
ances,  combined with  the  increasing pressure  of supply,  gradually  led  to  a 
situation  in  which  some  oil  was  sold  on  the  international  market  at  less 
than  posted  prices.  This  was  particularly  true  of Middle  East  oil  but  also 
applied  to  Venezuelan  and  other  origins.  Under  these  circumstances  there 
might perhaps have been some justification for a  greater reduction in posted 
prices  than actually took place,  but governments  in  the  producer  countries 
induced the companies not to alter the posted prices. The level of the latter 
has  become  common  practice  to  allow  rebates,  the  extent  of  which  is  not 
fully known. 
Generally speaking posted prices are still the rule for internal accounting 
purposes within the big groups, but since they serve as a basis for the payment 
of  royalties  and  taxes  in  producer  countries  they  are  subject  to  political 
pressure and - at least a priori - cannot possibly correspond to the average 
prices  actually  charged by producing companies.  Individual  rebates,  on the 
other hand, only relate  to  that portion of their crude which the companies 
sell to independent buyers, and these sales only represent a  marginal fraction 
of the  market,  which  is  also  subject  to  pressure  from  Russian  supplies. It 
is  thus impossible to assess  the price of crude by simply extrapolating these 
rebates  to  the  market  as  a  whole.  and  in  any  case  the  rebates  vary  for 
each sale. 
Lastly,  the  average  price  actually  charged  for  crude  is  no  longer  a 
straightforward item because the predominance of vertical integration tends 
to make it depend on a valuation based on the selling prices of refined products 
in major consuming areas. 
B  - Refined products 
The  story  here  is  much  the  same  as  with  crude.  For  a  long  time  the 
princip]e  of parity with  American  prices  at  all  points  prevailed,  but  again 
88 the  system  was  modified  as  a  result  of  official  action :  a  desire  expressed 
by the British Admiralty during the  second World War led to  Persian Gulf 
refineries  replacing  multiple  prices  by  f.o.h.  quotations  approximately 
equalling those of the United States and the Caribbean. Known as  the basing 
point system, this meant that refined product prices in Western Europe were 
fixed at an ex-Caribbean or ex-Gulf of Mexico import parity, although local 
circumstances,  price  controls,  special  refining  industry  structures,  etc., 
affected the  application of the  rule  to  varying  degrees.  Generally  speaking, 
however, the product price structure in Western Europe was widely influenced 
by that of the  United  States.  This  method  of  price-fixing,  which  continues 
to  he  used  as  a  basis  for  the  tariffs  published by the  major  companies,  no 
longer reflects actual conditions on all European markets. This is particularlv 
true  of heavy fuel  oil,  for  which  rebates  are  frequent,  and  since  1958  the 
uctual prices of products on European markets have moved swiftly. 
Generally  speaking  the  fall  in  prices  has  been  less  marked  with  white 
products (especially gasoline) than with black (heavy fuel oil). This is mainly 
because  the  major  companies  continue  to  control  the  gasoline  market, 
whereas competition is  much more  lively in  fuel  oil owing to  the  existence 
of several  independent  importers,  some  of whom  buy  cheaply,  particularly 
from  the  U.S.S.R. 
Such market behaviour is  easily explained by the fact that the establish-
ment  of  a  gasoline  distribution  network  entails  a  much  more  complex 
organisation and much higher capital costs than selling fuel oil. 
The  fall  in prices,  by profoundly affecting  the  competitive  structure  of 
the  European  energy  market,  has  produced  varying  reactions  from  thf 
authorities, such as  taxation of liquid fuel,  restrictions on tariff rebates and 
compulsory limits on gasoline prices. This has led to considerable differences 
in taxed prices according to the country of destination, partly as a  result of 
tax  discrimination,  regulations,  trading  policies,  etc. 
The trend in European product prices  has  provoked  a  large  number  of 
often contradictory analyses. The major surveys centre on price relationships 
between  individual  products  and  are  usually  based  on  the  idea  that  it  is 
impossible  to  allocate  costs  to  individual  products  because  they  arise  from 
joint production. 
Details  on  these  various  points,  together  with  a  historical  analysis  of 
prices, will he found in the section devoted to prices in Annex II. 
1
) 
In  any  event  the  complexity  of  the  situation  means  that  investigations 
of future market trends must entail a  study of production cost elements  at 
each stage, including prospection and extraction. 
1)  See Annex II, Section IV, to  full  Community-language  edition. 
89 Section 3 - Costs 
A  - Crude oil cost elements 
The  costs  in  question  are  long-term  costs,  i.e.  they  include  expenditure 
on  prospection,  opening-up  (or  development)  and  operation  and  allow  for 
the  often  considerable  time  which  elapses  between  the  outlay  and  the 
extraction and marketing of the crude. 
As  thus  defined,  development  costs  are  exceptionally  difficult  to  assess 
in  the  case  of  oil  owing  to  two  considerations  peculiar  to  the  petroleum 
industry, namely the uncertainty inherent in prospection and the considerable 
dispersion of extraction  costs  resulting from natural conditions.  This  means 
that it is impossible to calculate either the cost of replacing proved reserves 
or that of operating undiscovered deposits except by statistical extrapolation, 
which  is  only  valid  if  based  on  a  sufficiently  long  period  of  experience 
covering a  wide enough area and enough deposits for significant averages to 
he worked out. This is  why it is  usually limited  to  a  study of conditions in 
the U.S.A., where  such extrapolation is  not regarded  as  indicating  anything 
more than a  trend. 
Everywhere  else  speculations  of  this  kind  are  likely  to  have  very 
unreliable results and for major producing areas outside the U.S.A. it is  only 
possible to give representative information on costs  on the basis  of deposits 
so  far  discovered,  with  any  expenditure  already  incurred  on  surveying 
allowed for. These are not therefore development costs in the strict sense of 
the term, but "present costs".  This restricts the value of the figures  worked 
out  for  areas  such  as  Venezuela  or North  Africa,  although  for  the  Middle 
East the proved  reserves  are  so  enormous that  average  "present"  costs  are 
still  valid  for  at  least  double  and  probably  treble  the  output  of  1960,  i.e. 
approximately throughout the period under review. 
The details given in Annex 11 to full Community-language edition  analys~ 
the three main economic elements entering into the price of crude : 
(i)  local technical extraction costs  (including prospection  costs); 
(ii)  royalties and taxes 
1
)  paid to governments; 
1)  Royalties  and  taxes must  be  considered  as  costs,  except  that  the  tax paid  by  producer 
companies in the country of origin may be  reduce·d by concessions. 
90 (iii)  a margin varying from time to time and differing from one company 
to  another,  and  including  both  profit  and  provision  for  overheads 
which  are  common  to  all  the  activities  of  the  group  in  question, 
including  compensation  for  capital  losses  incurred  on  prospection 
campaigns in other areas. 
(a)  Local technical costs 
The  average  technical  extraction  costs  for  crude  are  about  seven  times 
as  high in the United States and nearly three times  as  high in Venezuela  as 
in the Middle East (see Table 28). The latter region today contains the largest 
oilfields in the world; it covers very wide tracts of territory with deposits in 
a variety of geological formations, many of which have not been surveyed. In 
short, it holds more  oil than has ever been discovered anywhere  else in the 
world. 
Table  28 - Estimated  Average  Crude  Oil  Production  Costs  in  Four  Major  Areas1) 
(current position) 
Zone  Prospection 
United  States  7.00-8.00 
Venezuela  1.50-2.00 
Middle  East  0.30-0.50 
Sahara and Libya  2.00 
t) United States,  at well; 
Venezuela,  f.o.b.  port of shipment; 
Middle East,  f.o.b.  Persian Gulf; 
Development 
9.00-10.00 
4.00- 5.50 
1.50 
4.00- 5.00 
Sahara and Libya,  f.o.b.  Mediterranean  Coast. 
2)  Included  in  development. 
3)  Including  transport  to  coast. 
($ m. t.) 
Total 
Operation  excluding 
royalties 
2.00-3.00  18.00-21.00 
2)  5.50- 7.50 
0.50  2.30- 2.50 
3.00-4.003)  9.00-11.00 
91 Table  29  - Approximate  c.i.f.  Cost  of Crude  of Varying  Origins  at  Different Ports 
($  m.  t.) 
Destination  Persian  Gulf  Sahara  Venezuela 
Origin  A  B  c  A  B  c  A  B  c 
Freight  rates  l. Excluding royalties and taxes 
Scale flat  (freight 
average  for 
1959-1960)  8.50  10.50  12.00  11.50  13.00  14.50  12.00  11.50  9.50 
Scale  - 20  (freight 
average  over  several 
years)  7.50  9.00  10.00  11.00  12.50  13.50  11.00  10.50  9.00 
Scale  - 30  (long-term 
13.00 110.50 I  trend)  7.00  8.50  9.50  11.00  12.00  10.00  8.50 
2.  Including  current  royalties and  taxes 
Scale flat  13.50  15.50  17.00  19.00 118.501)  16.50 
Scale  - 20  12.50  14.00  15.00  18.00 117.50
1
)  16.00 
Scale  - 30  12.00  13.50  14.50  17.50  17.001)  15.50 
N .B.  Destinations A: Genoa. 
B: Rotterdam. 
C: U.S.N.H.  (North-east coast u.s.A.). 
1)  With  average  royalty. 
(b)  Royalties 
The  term "royalties"  is  used  here  in  its  widest  sense  and  includes  not 
only royalties proper but also profits taxes levied by governments in producer 
countries. 
There  are  a  large  number  of  tax  systems  in  operation  throughout  the 
world  and  in  order  to  assess  their  effect  and  the  competitive  position  of 
each  region  the  mechanisms  adopted  must  be  analysed  in  detail.  To  take 
only Venezuela and the Middle East, the main distinctions are as  follows : 
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(i)  in Venezuela  the royalty is  l/6th and  in the Middle East l/8th of 
the selling price; 
(ii)  local profits tax (i.e. including the "margin", the third cost element 
listed above)  is  such that,  after including royalties,  the  government 
ultimately  receives  more  than  two  thirds  of  these  "local  profits" 
in Venezuela and about half in the Middle East; 
(iii)  in  Venezuela  the  turnover  adopted  in  the  calculations  is  generally 
based  on  actual  selling  prices,  subject  to  controls  and  restrictions by  the  fiscal  authorities,  whereas  in  the  Middle  East  calculations 
are based on posted prices. 
Average royalties and taxes today are approximately as  follows : 
Venezuela,  $  7.00 per metric ton; 
1
) 
Middle  East,  $ 5.00-6.00 per  metric  ton  according  to  grade  and 
country. 
Obviously  this  is  more  often  a  political  than  an  economic  problem, 
although  it  does  depend  on  whether  supplies  are  long  or  short  in  relation 
to  demand. 
(c)  Provision for expenses and profit 
The  third  element  is  made  up  of  various  miscellaneous  expenses  and 
equalisation  charges  affecting  deposits  operated  in  different  countries  with 
different  productivity  ratings.  At  the  most  these  equalisation  charges  are 
purely and simply to offset losses on unsuccessful prospection campaigns. 
Oil companies re-invest most of the apparent profits of their Middle East 
extraction in  a  complex of operations.  A  priori it is  difficult  to  assess  the 
exact proportion of actual profit comprised in this item for  the  reasons set 
forth above concerning the uncertain cost of replacing reserves. In any event 
this  margin  may  vary  according  to  both  the  prospection  expenditure  of  a 
given company and its financial  policy. If, for  example, an attempt is  made 
to  diversify  capacity  geographically,  the  financial  resources  arising  from 
apparent Middle  East profits  must  he  raised.  In the  immediate  future  this 
possibility  is  counteracted by  competition between the  companies,  which  is 
likely to  carry on for  some  years  as  long  as  on  a  net basis  supply  exceeds 
demand. 
2
) 
B - Freight  rates 
Rather than  forecasting  freight  rates  the  aim  is  to  determine  the  trend 
in  the  cost  of  shipping  oil  regularly  from  overseas  production  sources  to 
Community ports on the basis of the existence and growth of a  tanker fleet 
consisting of vessels of different sizes and characteristics. 
The details given in the Annex to full Community-language edition enable 
us to assume the following approximate average costs in dollars per metric ton: 
1)  As  calculations  are  based  as  far  as  possible  on  real  prices,  the  actual  charge  may  he 
appreciably less on tonnages shipped to markets in which Venezuelan crude and products 
have to be sold at a  substantial rebate. 
2)  Our earlier remarks on available  quantities show that the surpluses position may persist 
for  some years yet unless  serious  political  disturbances  occur. 
93 today 
Rotterdam 
in  a  few 
years  today 
Genoa 
in  a  few 
years 
Persian  Gul£1)  6.70 
3.10 
4.40 
5.00-5.70 
about  2.50 
about  3.20 
5.20 
1.80 
4.20 
4:.00-4.40 
about  1.40 
about  3.40 
Eastern  Mediterranean 
Caribbean 
1)  Assuming  approximately  constant  Suez  canal  dues. 
Assuming  that  surplus  tanker  tonnage  will  have  disappeared  in  a  few 
years'  time,  the  currently  well  below  average  spot  rates  should  fluctuate 
around these average levels in a  few years' time. 
This gives us the approximate c.i.f. costs in Table 29. 
C -Refining 
Refining  costs  vary  according  to  the  type  of  crude,  the  respective 
proportions of the resulting products and certain requirements as  to  quality. 
On straight refining the cost in Europe today is  $  5.00-6.00 per metric ton 
of crude. 
Since the refining process  yields various  linked  products,  cost  allocation 
involves a  number of difficult theoretical problems : 
(i)  working  on  a  short-term  basis  and  assuming  constant  refinery 
facilities,  a  satisfactory  allocation  of  costs  is  difficult  because  the 
marginal  costs  for  each  product vary  considerably  according  to  the 
conditions of origin and the processes used in developing production 
of a  particular product, etc.; 
(ii)  in the long-term, however, increased supply of a  product presupposes 
an  extension  of  refinery  facilities,  in  which  case  the  product  in 
question must normally bear the corresponding charges. 
The refining costs attributable to heavy fuel  oil will thus include  expen-
diture  not  only  on  crude  reception,  storage  and  distillation  facilities  and 
product storage but also  on fuel  and miscellaneous handling.  These  costs  at 
present amount to approximately $ 1.50 per metric ton. 
1
) 
1)  To the costs analysed  above must be  a·dded  overheads  and  re,serve  storage  costs, making 
a  total of approximately $  1.00 per metric ton. 
94 Section 4- Long-term price trends 
On  the  basis  of  the  above  remarks  we  can  now  attempt  to  establish 
landmarks  which  will  enable  us  to  plot  the  long-term  trend  of  heavy  fuel 
oil  prices  in  Europe.  This  can  be  done  in  two  different  ways :  firstly  by 
starting  with  crude  oil  prices  and  examining  the  cost  elements  throughout 
the  entire  production-consumption  chain  and  secondly  by  analysing  North 
Atlantic  market  conditions. 
A  - Crude  price 
To  confine  ourselves  to  the  Middle  East,  which  accounts  for  more  than 
80% of Europe's present supplies, the posted price is about $  1.80 per barrel, 
i.e.  about $  12.60 per metric ton.  Companies grant  rebates  of  up  to  $  0.30 
per barrel on these prices to independent buyers, corresponding to  an f.o.b. 
price of $  1.50 per barrel or $  10.50 per metric ton. 
1
)  These  prices include 
royalties  of  about  $  5.00  per  metric  ton  to  governments  in  the  producer 
countries. 
In the long term two main factors may tend to force oil prices upwards : 
(i)  increased prospecting and operating costs; 
(ii)  pressure by producer countries to increase their oil income. 
Apart from the possible effect of stipulations by producer countries, the 
trend towards higher prices may nevertheless be counteracted by competition 
between  the  oil  companies,  which  may  persist  as  long  as  supply  exceeds 
demand. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  most  likely  assumption  is  that  for  some 
years prices will remain more or less where they are now,  i.e.  including the 
rebates allowed on the posted prices. 
Looking further ahead and allowing for a reasonable margin of uncertainty, 
we can assume that they will tend to harden around the present posted level 
with no  rebate'. 
1)  This  concerns  the  relatively  small  proportion  of  Middle  East  output  sold  under  fixed-
term contracts to non-integrated buyers. 
95 B - Fuel oil price trend 
The 1975 estimates show that fuel  oil  consumption is  very likely to  rise 
more  rapidly  than  that  of  gasoline  and  other  refined  products.  We  can 
imagine that this trend might induce the oil companies to look for a  higher 
profit on fuel  oil.  Taking  a  long-term  view  and  ignoring  purely temporary 
factors, fuel oil should, generally speaking, bear the costs represented by the 
facilities  involved  in its  manufacture  if  its  production  is  to  continue  to  be 
justified economically. 
Nevertheless the price of fuel  oil cannot much exceed that of crude for 
long,  otherwise  consumers  will  start  looking  for  methods  of  burning  crude 
direct in boilers. The maximum price difference will be the cost of the plant 
necessary to ensure that consumers' apparatus can operate reliably. 
On the basis of the above  assumptions on crude prices and freight  rates 
we can thus adopt a fuel oil price of about $17.00-19.00 per metric ton c.i.f. 
Channel port (f.o.b. crude price $10.50-12.50; freight $5.00; refining $1.50) 
and  $16.00-18.00  c.i.f.  Mediterranean  port  (f.o.b.  $10.50-12.50;  freight 
$4.00; refining $1.50). 
This result is  corroborated by the cost element analysis undertaken above 
over the entire integrated system from extraction to refining. 
1
) 
C - The North Atlantic heavy fuel oil market 
Another factor to be borne in mind is  the pressure exerted by American 
coal on energy prices in the huge consumption area constitued by the north-
east coast of the  U.S.A.  This means  that Caribbean f.o.b.  prices  have to  be 
adjusted so that heavy fuel oil from this region can compete on the American 
market, which is its major outlet. 
At the present time the lowest price in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, 
etc., is $ 2.25-2.30 per barrel, i.e. approximately $ 15.00-16.00 per metric 
ton, as  against a  coal price  of about $14.00  per metric ton of fuel  oil equi-
valent; 
2
)  the  difference  signifies  that  the  fuel  oil  prices  incorporate  an 
estimated 10-15% advantage to consumers of using the latter product. Thi5 
c.i.f. Atlantic coast U.S.A. price corresponds to the present Caribbean posted 
price of $2.00 per barrel, equivalent to $13.30 per metric ton. 
Another point is  that the distance between American coal shipment ports 
and Caribbean port refineries on the one hand and Northern Europe on the 
1)  See Annex 11  to full Community-language edition. 
2)  $  10.00 per metric ton of steam coal  (see Chapter 7). 
96 other are very similar,  whereas the  cost per calorie of transporting fuel  oil 
is less than that of coal: the long-term (lower limit)  Atlantic freight rate for 
American coal has thus been estimated at about $5.- per metric ton of fuel 
oil equivalent 
1
)  as against about $4.40  now and $3.20  ultimately for heavy 
fuel oil from the Caribbean. This means that the latter would cost $18.00 per 
metric ton now and $  17.00 per metric ton ultimately c.i.f.  North European 
ports. 
These  c.i.f.  prices must be  compared with the  estimate  of $13.00-13.50 
per  metric  ton  for  imported  American  steam  coal  (i.e.  $17.50-19.00  per 
metric ton fuel oil equivalent); they constitute a  theoretical ceiling for fuel 
oil prices (excluding discharging and distribution costs)  in the Channel-North 
Sea  area, but this  is  only  valid  as  long  as  present fuel  oil-coal  competition 
conditions persist in the United States. 
2
) 
Generally speaking, therefore, heavy fuel  oil from  the  Caribbean should 
remain  at a  premium over  American  steam  coal  imported  into  Europe,  all 
the more so if we bear in mind its advantages to the consumer. 
Our analysis  therefore  points  to  long-term fuel  oil  prices  tending  to  lie 
within the $17.00-19.00 per metric ton range c.i.f. North Sea. 
3
) 
It should be noted that in some markets fuel oil is being currently quoted 
very much lower,  the  lowest  offers  recorded  in  1960  and  early  1961  being 
about $12.50 c.i.f.  Channel port. These prices, so  markedly below the lowest 
long-term production costs, in point of fact represent the cost per additional 
ton ex-Middle East shipped at spot rates and do  not cover refining costs -
in  other words,  they  are  surplus-production  prices  which  are  not  expected 
to yield normal return upon the capital invested in the whole supply system. 
In certain markets  prices  are  nevertheless  observed  to  be  hardening;  in 
Northern Europe,  as  a  result  of the  various  factors  mentioned  above,  they 
have risen to about $14.00  and even $15.00  per metric ton.  Obviously,  even 
though  they may be  expected  to  remain  at this  level  for  a  while,  there  is 
always  the possibility of a  further  rise,  so  that it would  be  absurd  to  base 
energy  policy  on  the  lowest  quotations  recorded.  The  level  just  indicated, 
$17.00-19.00 per metric ton, can therefore be adopted as a basis of calculation 
for  Part  Four  of  the  report.  This  price  is  obviously  not  a  forecast,  but 
represents a  number of coherent working hypotheses which  aim  at  allowing 
as  fully  as  possible  for  the  various  uncertainties  involved,  including  the 
following: 
1)  See Chapter 7, pp. 80 and 81. 
2)  i.e.  as  long  as  the  demand  for  American  coal,  both  in  the  U.S.A.  and  for  export  (par· 
ticularly to Europe)  is covered by supply at present costs. 
3)  Total price, including storage,  discharging  etc.  costs  hut  excluding taxes. 
97 ( i)  the unforeseen element in oil prospection and the possibility of fresh 
major discoveries; 
(ii)  the  amount  of  natural  gas  which  may  become  available  to  the 
European  consumer; 
(iii)  producer countries' efforts to increase their oil income; 
(iv)  the United States government's oil import policy; 
(v)  the U.S.S.R.'s policy to expand exports of crude and products; 
(vi)  the energy policy to be adopted by the Community and the machinery 
set up to supervise the market; 
(vii)  lastly,  the  pace  and  scope  of  developments  in  atomic  energy  (this 
factor will become especially important after 1970). 
The  price  we  have  adopted  is  a  trend  price  and  is  noticeably  higher 
than  current  prices  and  lower  than  the  level  which  might  develop  in  the 
absence  of  any  stabilisation  policy.  As  such  it  reflects  the  cost  of  such  a 
policy whilst at the same time anticipating its success. 
Chapter  10 
Natural gas 
Section 1 - Community deposits 
A  - Reserves 
Prospection  for  hydrocarbons,  stimulated  by  favourable  organisational 
conditions, has intensified in a  number of Community countries in an effort 
to meet increasing demands for energy and to  supply consumers with forms 
of energy which are especially suited to their needs. 
This  conjunction  of  circumstances  has  resulted  in  the  disc()very  of  a 
number  of  new  deposits,  some  of  very  considerable  proportions.  Table  30 
shows the proved reserves situation in the Community countries. 
98 Table  30 - Estimated  Proved  Natural  Gas  Reserves1)  ('000,000,000cu.m.)2) 
Proved  reserves3) 
Country 
Lower  estimate  Upper estimate 
Germany  (Fed.  Rep.) 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Community 
1)  Excluding production linked to extraction of crude oil. 
25 
130 
105 
300 
560 
2)  Conversion factor  one  cu.m.  =  1.29  kg.  hard-coal equivalent. 
42 
255 
160 
400 
857 
J)  In view of continual prospecting operations and, still more important, the technical nature of 
the work involved in determining the workable extent of new deposits, we give two separate 
sets  of  figures. 
The location of natural gas deposits and pipelines, the only possible means 
of bulk transport, constitutes a  notably inflexible complex which substantially 
affects the economics of this form of energy. It is therefore worthwhile giving 
figures for smaller areas than a  whole country. 
Present known reserves are distributed as  follows: 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Nether  lands 
north 80%; south 20%; 
100% south-west; 
75% Po valley (north) and 25% south and Sicily; 
100% north-east. 
The locations and lengths of the pipelines at present in operation depend 
on national or regional economic objectives which at the same time allow for 
market requirements, including those of the competing energy market. 
We thus find the following: 
(i)  in Germany 
the main network is  concentrated in the north with less  than 1,000 
kilometres of pipeline. Alongside this Germany has a  huge coke-oven 
gas network linking the main industrial centres (14,000 kilometres of 
pipeline); 
(ii)  France 
has made a big effort to reach areas situated a long way from deposits 
and several thousa.nd kilometres of major pipeline now  enable  38% 
of the present production to be marketed in the north-west,  27%  in 
99 the  Lyons-Dijon  area,  24%  1n  the  Paris  region  and  11 o/o  in  the 
N  antes-Angouli'~me area; 
(iii)  in  Italy 
nearly all the 5,000 kilometres or so  of pipeline are in the north, in 
the south and in Sicily;new pipelines are under construction, particu-
larly to Rome and Terni; 
(iv)  in the Netherlands 
the  extent  of  the  gas  network  still  reflects  the  situation  prior  to 
recent discoveries and some 1,500 kilometres of pipeline are supple-
mented by approximately the same quantity for piped coke-oven gas. 
B - Production potential 
Since 1953  Community production has  more than quadrupled.  Owing  to 
the technical benefits which natural gas provides in several major consumption 
sectors,  no  difficulties  have  been  found  in  marketing  the  quantities  which 
have gradually become available. In 1962 more than one fifth of the Commu-
nity's total gas  production was  in the form  of natural gas;  this  represented 
70%  of  the  total  in  Italy,  30o/o  in  France,  15o/o  in  the  Netherlands  and 
4o/o  in Germany. 
Any indication as  to production prospects must naturally be based on the 
anticipated relationship between natural gas  prices and those of other forms 
of energy capable of giving equal service to the consumer. 
Whilst recognising that price formation involves a large number of factors, 
including the relative location of production and consumption points, demand 
characteristics  (nature,  volume  and  dispersion),  transport  systems  and  their 
flexibility  etc., it is  none  the  less  true that the point of departure  remains 
production costs. 
Not  only  is  a  substantial  proportion  of  these  costs  accounted  for  by 
prospecting, owing to  the uncertainties  involved in the latter, but also  they 
often relate to the joint production of gas, oil and sometimes non-hydrocarbon 
products. 
Under these conditions it is often difficult : 
(i)  to allocate prospecting costs when they cover a  much larger area and 
longer period of time than the specific case in question; 
(ii)  to  make  an  objective  distinction  between  natural  gas  and  other 
associated products, which sometimes determine the conditions under 
which the former is produced.  · 
100 Consequently the cost of producing gas from a  given deposit often prima-
rily reflects direct development and operating costs, to which must be added 
prospecting costs for replacement of worked-out reserves. 
In the light of the foregoing,  the figures  most commonly put forward in 
the  Community cover a  fairly  wide  range  from  0.08  to  0.20  U.S.  cents  per 
1,000 kcal. (The profitability of gas at such varying costs depends directly on 
the considerations advanced at the beginning of this sub-section.) 
On the basis of present reserves we can reasonably assume that minimum 
production  from  Community  deposits  over  the  period  1960-1975  will  be 
as  shown in Table 31  (for 1975  it is  advisable  to  adopt two  sets  of figures, 
particularly for the Netherlands). 
Table 31  - Natural  Gas  Production  {'OOO,OOO,OOOcu.m.) 
Country 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.) 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Community 
Do.  ('000,000 m. t.  H.C.E.) 
1960  1965 
0.7  1.7 
0.1  0.1 
3.1  5.5 
6.5  7.5 
0.3  2.0 
10.7  16.8 
13.8  21.7 
1970  I  •• , 
Low  High 
hypothesis I  hypothesis 
2.5  3.0  4.5 
0.1  0.1  0.1 
6.0  7.5  7.5 
8.6  10.0  10.0 
7.0-10.0  12.0  20.0 
24.2-27.2  32.6  42.1 
31.9-35.0  42.0  54.3 
101 Section 2 -Possible imports of natural gas 
Non-European reserves are very high : 
North-Africa  (mainly  Sahara)  800,000-1,400,000  million  cubic  metres 
Iran  1,800,000 
"  "  "  Iraq  650,000 
"  "  "  Kuwait  900,000 
"  "  "  Saudi Arabia  1,300,000 
"  "  " 
(The U.S.S.R. also has very substantial reserves.) 
The  regular  consumption  of these  volumes  away  from  production  areas 
mainly depends on an economic solution to the technical problem of transport, 
because  the  cost  of imported  gas  to  the  consumer  is  largely  influenced  by 
transport costs. 
1
) 
On  the  basis  of  existing  technical  data  on  submarine  pipelines,  we  can 
estimate  that by  1970  the  cost  to  a  consumer  on  the  Mediterranean  coast 
may be about $  2.00 per million kilocalories  (i.e.  approximately $  14.00 per 
metric ton hard-coal equivalent). This represents the price of the natural gas 
(20-35%)  at point of extraction plus  the  cost  of piping from  the  deposit 
to the Mediterranean coast of Europe ( 45-50%) plus storage and distribution 
charges  (about 30%  ).  In more  remote  areas,  e.g.  the  Ruhr,  the  cost  would 
be about $ 3.00 (i.e. $ 21.00 per metric ton hard-coal equivalent). 
Transport  by  methane  tanker  seems  more  costly  and  will  probably  be 
confined to meeting peak requirements. 
The price of natural gas to consumers near the North Sea coast would be 
approximately $3.20 per million kilocalories ($23.00 per metric ton hard-coal 
equivalent). 
2
) 
As regards the amount of imported gas which can be marketed throughout 
Europe, the Economic Commission for Europe has recently given an estimate 
of some 22,000 million cubic metres with a selling price of about $16.00-17.00 
per metric  ton  hard-coal  equivalent. If the  price  were  lower  this  quantity 
would rise. 
1)  Recent studies on the shipment of African gas to Europe refer to an inclusive expenditure 
of some $ 1,000 million per 12,000 million cubic metres  =  15  million metric tons  har·d-
coal  equivalent).  Financially  this  amount  should  be  compared  with  the  expenditure  of 
$  6,000  million  per  annum  which  the  Robinson  report  states  will  be  neede-d  to  meet 
Western European energy requirements  in  the  period 1955-1965. 
2)  With a  35,000-ton tanker carrying 25,000 cubic metres thirty times per year from Algeria 
to Great Britain, making a total of 420 million cubic metres of gas per annum. 
102 On the basis of these hypotheses it seems that the Community can envisage 
importing from 6,000 to 9,000 million cubic metres (8-12 million metric tons 
hard-coal  equivalent)  in  1970  and  15,000-20,000 million  cubic  metres  (20 
to 26  million metric tons hard-coal equivalent)  in 1975. 
In  all  the  amount  of natural  gas  available  in  the  Community  would  be 
between 31,000 and 37,000 million cubic metres  (40--48 million metric tons 
hard-coal  equivalent)  in  1970  and between 48,000  and 62,000  million  cubic 
metres (62-80 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent) in 1975. 
Chapter  11 
Hydro power and geothermal energy 
The  amount  of  electricity  generated  from  water  power  and  geothermal 
sources 
1
)  and  its  relative  share  in  the  total  electricity  resources  of  each 
Community  country  differ  considerably  according  to  local  orographical, 
hydrological, economic and other conditions. 
The future trend seems to depend on the following factors : 
(a) the reserves of water power which can be developed economically on the 
basis  of present constructional  techniques  are  already  largely  harnessed, 
particularly  in  Italy  and  Germany.  In  France,  however,  about  40%  of 
the country's water power remains to be developed  (50% if we allow for 
tidal energy). 
(h) From an economic point of view, hydroelectric production must be divided 
into  base-load  energy  (run-of-river  plants)  and  peak-load  energy  which 
deals with regular or occasional load fluctuations, either daily, weekly or 
seasonal (pumped storage, pondage and reservoir plants). The engineering 
involved differs in each case. 
Such a  classification, based on the average producibility for the year, gave 
the following percentages for 1960 : 
1)  Geothermal production only  exi·sts  in  Italy where  its  contribution  to  national  output  is 
minimaL  In  the  pre·sent  chapter  geothe·rmal  production  is  included  under hydro  power 
since both are primary forms  of energy. 
103 Germany  France  Italy 
1.  Base-load  energy  (run-of-river  plants)  83  52  62 
2.  Peak-load  energy  (pumped  storage, 
pondage and reservoir plants)  17  48  38 
(c)  In  view  of  the  growing  demand  for  electricity,  its  fluctuation  over  a 
period of time and the need to  satisfy it mainly by thermal output from 
the  principal  base-load  stations  (initially  conventional,  subsequently 
nuclear),  the  peak-load  output of  reservoir  and  similar  plants  (pondage 
and pumped storage plants) will be called upon to play an increasing part 
unless there are striking developments in the use of high-capacity turbines. 
This is why we can already discern a tendency to build reservoirs upstream 
offering the maximum possible storage and to provide them with substan-
tial installed capacity which can go  into operating quickly and on a  large 
scale, basically to meet peak loads. 
Such  developments, by storing summer energy in the form  of water for 
use  in  the  winter,  also  contribute  to  the  producibility  of  all  the  plants 
downstream. 
(d) Peak-load  output  will  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  development  of  inter-
connecting  networks  between  individual  regions  in  the  same  country. 
Interconnections  will  also  enable  hydro-thermal  exchange  systems  to  be 
operated  with  countries  bordering  on  the  Community,  particularly 
Switzerland  and  Austria  and  later  on  Scandinavia.  Circumstances  may 
encourage the building of pumped storage plants, of which the Vianden 
plant  in  Luxembourg  is  an  example,  again  for  the  purpose  of  load 
balancing. 
Subject  to  our  earlier  reservations  on  the  significance  of  an  over-rigid 
classification of hydro power stations, we can accordingly put forward certain 
estimates regarding the trend in peak energy between now and 1975. 
Share of Peak Energy in Total Hydroelectric Production  (0/o) 
1960 
1975 
Germany 
17 
20/25 
France 
48 
55/60 
Italy 
38 
50/60 
In view of the foregoing,  the production of hydro power and geothermal 
energy per country is expected to be as shown in Table 32. 
104 Table  32  - Trend in Hydro and  Geothermal E-lectricity  Generation 
A  - Gross  output in TWh per country 
Country  1950  1955  1960  1965 
Germany  (Fed.  Rep.)  8.6  12.0  13.0  15.0 
Belgium  - 0.1  0.2  0.3 
France  16.4  26.0  40.9  43.5 
Italy  22.7  32.6  48.2  51.0 
Luxembourg  0  0  0  1.1 
Netherlands  - - - -
Community  47.7  70.7  102.3  110.9 
Do.  ('000,000  m.  t. 
I 
H.C.E.)l)  19.1  28.3  41.0  I  44.4 
1970 
19.5 
0.3 
51.0 
57.5 
1.4 
-
129.7 
51.9 
B  - Percentage in relation to country's total gross electricity output2} 
Country 
Germany  (Fed.  Rep.) 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Community 
1950 
18.7 
0 
47.5 
91.9 
0 
-
39.0 
1955 
15.2 
1.0 
S0.5 
85.6 
0 
-
36.7 
1960  1965 
11.1  9.1 
1.3·  1.5 
54.9  40.7 
85.8  61.4 
0  37.9 
- -
36.5  27.8 
--
C  - Detailed geographical  distribution in  1960  and  1975 
19603)  1975 
Germany (Fed.  Rep.) 
I 
I  France 
1.  Schleswig-Holstein 
I 
1.  Paris 
(plus  Hamburg}  0.2  0.3  2.  Paris  basin 
2.  Lower  Saxony  I  3.  North 
(plus Bremen)  0.3  0.6  4.  East 
3.  North  5.  West 
Rhine-Westphalia  0.8  0.8  6.  Massif  Central 
4.  Hessen  0.3  0.3  7.  South-West 
5.  Rhineland-Palatinate  0.2  1.8  8.  South-East 
6.  Baden-Wiirttemberg  3.8  6.2  9.  Mediterranean 
7.  Bavaria  7.4  11.0 
8.  Saar  - -
I 
} 
} 
9.  Total  13.0  21.0  10.  Total 
Italy 
1.  Northern Italy  34.9  46.1 
2.  Central Italy  5.4  9.2 
3.  Southern Italy  5.2  7.0 
4.  Sicily  and  Sardinia  0.6  0.7 
5.  Italy as  a  whole  I  46.1  63.0 
1)  Coefficient of conversion: 1 kWh  =  0.4  kg.  hard-coal equivalent. 
~)  Based on the electricity demand  estimated  in  Chapter 3. 
3) Year of very high runoff. 
1970 
8.9 
1.1 
34.5 
48.6 
41.2 
-
23.2 
19603) 
0.1 
0 
4.6 
0.3 
7.4 
7.6 
21.1 
41.1 
1975 
21.0 
0.3 
61/55 
63.0 
1.4 
0.2 
146.9-140.9 
58.8-56.4 
1975 
6.9 
0.9 
28.3/25.5 
38.9 
40.0 
0.5 
19.2/18.4 
1975 
0.2 
-
6.9 
0.8 
6.6 
8.9 
34.6 
58.0 
105 These tables call for the following remarks : 
(i)  in  all  the  hydro-power-producing  countries,  the  share  of  hydro-
electric energy in the total supply is a  falling one; 
(ii)  the  data for  1950,  1955  and  1960  refer  to  actual  production,  1960 
being a  year of very high runoff; 
1
)  those for  1965, 1970 and 1975 
have been estimated on an average  runoff basis.  In this  connection 
it should be noted that at present the  possible  divergence  of hydro 
output from the average figures in the case of an exceptionally wet 
or dry year is about  ± 12,000 million kWh. This figure will increase 
in proportion to the increase in average producibility; 
(iii)  as regards France, the range given for 1975 is mainly due  to  uncer-
tainties  regarding  the  extent  to  which  nuclear  power  stations  will 
be  built.  If the  nuclear  programme  goes  ahead  as  planned,  hydro 
producibility would drop by about 6  TWh and would thus be concen-
trated on meeting peak demand. 
In o:rder to assess its competitiveness with other primary sources of energy 
more accurately; the hydro power produced in each country acquires increased 
significance when broken down, even if only roughly, according to its geogra-
phical location at present and as forecast for 1975 (see Table 32 C). 
In  connection  with  our  earlier  remarks  on  interchanges  with  countries 
producing  hydro  power  outside  the  Community,  it  should  be  noted  that 
although  exchanges  generally  balance  out  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  France, 
Italy and the Netherlands this is not so  of Germany and Luxembourg, which 
show the following import balances : 
Import balances in TWh 
1  1950  1955  1  1960  1965  1  1970  1975 
r~~~~~~u~~ed. Re;)---~-~--0-._;-_-_--_;_-- -~·~  __  I  ~--4-.0--.--~-:~---_I __  ~:~ ___  ]_:~--
Whereas  the  German balance  is  mainly of hydro  power,  that of Luxem-
bourg is thermal and is largely directed towards the Vianden pumped storage 
plant. 
1)  According  to  U.C.P.T.E.,  the  pmducibility  factor  in  the  three  hydro-power-producing 
countries in the Community was  a  follows  for 1950, 1955  and 1960: 
Germany  France  Italy 
-----
1950  1.01  0.92  0.95 
1955  1.10  0.96  0.98 
1960  1.05  1  1.36 
106 The  production  trends  indicated  above  are  the  most  likely  today  if  we 
assume  a  price  of  about  $13.00  per  metric  ton  hard-coal  equivalent  c.i.f. 
Rotterdam and $12.00  c.i.f.  Genoa. A  slightly higher price might accentuate 
the trend, but the level would still be susbstantially the same in 1975, whereas 
a  slightly lower price would probably result in the transfer of some base-load 
energy to  peak-load  energy and here  again the 1970 and  1975  levels  would 
be substantially as forecast. 
Chapter  12 
Nuclear energy 
The building of nuclear power stations involves wntlng off large  capital 
sums over long periods. Decisions to build are therefore linked to medium and 
long-term  energy  economy  prospects.  The  alternatives  offered  by  the  Com-
munity's  energy  policy  would  thus  have  considerable  repercussions  on  the 
future of nuclear energy in the six countries. 
It is also clear that nuclear energy possibilities in future years will consti-
tute a determining factor in formulating an energy policy for the Community. 
In this respect we need only mention the effect which the generation of cheap 
nuclear electricity will have  on price trends in competing forms  of primary 
energy, particularly oil. 
In order to gain some idea of the significance and extent of these mutual 
influences, we shall examine in turn the development of production costs  as 
a  factor  in determining the  use  of nuclear  energy for  generating  purposes, 
the most likely production outlook as foreseeable today and the contribution 
which  nuclear  energy  can  make  to  the  security  of  energy  supplies  in  the 
Community. 
Section 1 - Trend in generating costs 
The trend in competitiveness between  nuclear  and  conventional  thermal 
electricity will  ultimately  depend  not  only  on  demand  (level  and  shape  of 
load  curve)  but also  on  the  conditions  under which  conventional  energy  is 
supplied  on  general  industrial  and  financial  conditions  and  on  technical 
progress. These factors, particularly the first three, will interact to introduce 
a  geographical dimension, in that the same degree of competitiveness will not 
be achieved on the same date in all areas in the Community. 
107 A  comparison between the generating costs of competing forms of energy 
is  not the  only factor involved,  although in our present state  of knowledge 
it  constitutes  the  most  useful  means  of  assessing  the  prospects  of  nuclea~ 
energy. 
A - Generating costs 
The  generating  costs  of  thermal  electricity,  whether  conventional  or 
nuclear, basically consist of the following three items : 
(i)  fixed overheads; 
(ii)  fuel cycle costs; 
(iii)  operating and maintenance costs. 
The  limited  experience  at  present  available  mainly  relates  to  three 
"families"  of  reactors  which  can  he  regarded  as  having  proved  themselves 
industrially,  namely  the  pressurised-water  reactor,  the  boiling-water  reactor 
and  the  gas-graphite  reactor,  the  first  two  of  which  use  slightly  enriched 
uranium and the third natural uranium. 
The following details on the present generating costs of nuclear energy and 
their probable trend in the future  are mainly based on existing information 
on  power  stations  either  under  construction  or  in  the  planning  stage  (see 
Table 35a in Section 2  of this  chapter). These have been obtained from the 
operators or manufacturers  as  regards  Community power  stations,  from  the 
publications  of  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission  for  American  stations 
and from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority for British stations. 
The installation costs  relate  to  stations  supplied ready for use  and the  fuel 
cycle  costs  to  contracts  entailing  guaranteed  supplies,  burn-up  and  fuel 
element life. 
The manufacturers' and operators' calculations are nevertheless based on 
data which may differ, sometimes considerably.  Interest rates in the  electri-
city sector, for instance, vary from  5.5%  to  7%  and taxes  are  between O% 
and  5%  per  annum  on  the  capital  invested.  In  addition  the  depreciation 
periods are fifteen years in the Netherlands,  seventeen years in the Federal 
Republic  and between twenty  and twenty five  years  in the  other  countries, 
the differences being due to tax requirements. 
The  various  departments  of  Euratom  have  endeavoured  to  work  out 
co-ordinated  figures  from  the  information  available  for  various  reactors  in 
course of construction or in the planning stage. 
108 Owing  to  the  diversity  of  interest  rates  and  depreciation  periods,  the 
generating  cost per  kilowatt-hour  has  been  worked  out  for  three  different 
annual fixed overhead rates, namely 8.6%, 10% and 13%. These figures  are 
based on a probable nuclear power station life of 20 years, which corresponds 
to the minimum life universally recognised. 
As  regards  annual  loads,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  nuclear  power 
stations  will  he used to  meet the  base  of the  load curve.  Calculations  have 
accordingly been worked out for  two  hypotheses  of 6,000  and  7,000  hours' 
annual load. 
The  cost  of generating  electricity at a  nuclear  station  of  current  design 
not destined  to  enter  service  until  1965-1967  owing  to  the  length  of  the 
building period is  as follows : 
(i)  enriched uranium (light water, boiling or pressurised) : 
installation cost  $200-250 per k We 
fuel cycle costs 
1
)  2.4-3.5 mills per kWh 
operating and maintenance costs  $5.00-8.00 per kWe installed 
(ii)  natural uranium  (gas-graphite) : 
installation costs 
fuel cycle costs 
2
) 
operating and maintenance costs 
$250-280 per kWe 
2.1-2.5 mills per kWh 
$4.00-7.00 per k We installed 
The prospects for nuclear power stations with a  unit capacity of at least 
400 MWe entering service about 1968-1970 are as follows : 
(i)  enriched uranium and light water : 
installation costs may drop  to  $175  per k We 
2
)  and  fuel  cycle  costs 
to 2 mills per kWh or less; 
(ii)  natural uranium : 
gas-graphite  reactors  are  still  capable  of  considerable  improvement 
technologically and this should enable installation costs to he brought 
down to below $250 per kWe and fuel cycle costs of between 1.6 and 
2  mills per kWh to he achieved. 
The generating costs of stations entering service about 1968-1970 would 
thus seem to he roughly the same for the different families of reactors. 
It should he pointed out that these prospects are somewhat less optimistic 
than those given by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in its declaration of 
1)  This  allows for the  price  at  which  the  U. S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission buys  back  plu-
tonium, i.e. $ 9.50 per gram of plutonium metal for 1966 and $  8.00 per gram for 1970. 
A  certain  amount  of  recoverable  plutonium  is  produced  when  uranium  is  burned  in  a 
reactor. 
2)  This hypothesis is justifie·d by the tendency on both si,des  of the Atlantic to increase unit 
sizes  at both conventional and nuclear power stations. 
109 June  25,  1962,  according  to  which  installation  costs  of  $170  and  $135  per 
kWe and fuel cycle costs of 1.8 and 1.5-1.7 mills per kWh could be expected 
for 600 MWe stations in 1966 and 1970 respectively. 
If we now supplement the above information for the periods 1965-1967 
and 1968-1970 with co-ordinated generating costs for the best power station 
of each type placed in service in 1962 or expected to commission in 1963, we 
obtain the figures given in the following table. 
Table  33  - Estimated  Nuclear Energy  Generating  Costs  (mills/kWh) 
--~~~~~~---------~---~~---~~-~-~--------~-
Annual fixed charges as percentage of capital investe  d 
8.6 °/o 
I 
10 °/o 
I 
Annual load hours  6000  \  7000  6000  I 
7000  6000 
Date  of entry into 
I 
I  service 
I962-I963 
enriched  U  9.1  8.3  9.8  8.9  Il.3 
natural  u  8.7  7.8  9.5  8.5  ll.3 
1965-1967 
enriche·d  U  6.8  6.2  7.4  6.7  8.7 
natural  u  6.7  6.1  7.4  6.7  8.8 
1968-1970  5.5  5.0  6.0  5.4  7.0 
D  - Competitiveness with conventional thermal power stations 
13 °/o 
I 
7  000 
I 
I 
0.2 
0.2 
7.8 
7.9 
6.3 
The  competitiveness  of  nuclear  power  stations  has  been  estimated  by 
comparison with  a  conventional thermal power station having the  following 
costs : 
(i)  installation  costs  are  $150  per  k We  for  stations  commissioning  in 
1962-1963,  $140  for  those  entering  service  in  1965-1967  and 
$125  for those commissioning subsequently 
1
); 
1)  The following should be noted regarding these figures : 
(i)  they apply solely to co·al-fire·d  stations; the unit installation cost of fuel oil stations 
is  somewhat lower and that of dual fire.d  stations somewhat higher; 
(ii)  they  include  the  cost  of  the  coal-yard  and  handHng  installations  (but  not  of  coal 
stocks)  and of ash extraction and d1sposal  equipment; 
(iii)  they are based on net kWe; 
(iv)  they include interest during the  construction period; 
(v)  they relate  to  new  stations on virgin land  and not  to  extensions  to  existing power 
stations. 
Apart from  (i)  these conditions correspond most closely to  those  a·dopted in determining 
the  present  and future  installation  costs  of nuclear power stations. 
110 (ii)  the following specific fuel consumptions have been assumed : 
1962-1963: 2,350  kcal/kWh,  i.e.  335  g  H.C.E. 
1)/kWh net; 
1965-1967: 2,200  kcal/kWh, i.e. 315  g  H.C.E./kWh  net; 
1968-1970: 2,100  kcal/kWh, i.e.  300  g  H.C.E./kWh  net; 
(iii)  operating and maintenance costs are estimated at $5.00 per k We per 
annum in the first two periods and $4.00 for the end of the present 
decade. 
We can now estimate the price level per metric ton of hard coal equivalent 
to  7,000  kcal/kg  delivered  to  a  coal-fired  power  station  and  enabling  the 
latter to generate electricity at the same price as the nuclear stations examined 
above. 
Table  34  - Fuel  Price  Ensuring  Equivalence  between  a  Thermal  and  a  Nuclear  Power 
Station  on  Different  Dates  and  under  Different  Conditions  ($/m.t.  H.C.E.  to 
7,000 kcal/kg) 
Fixed annual charges as percentage of capital invested 
8.6 °/o  10 °/o  13 °/o 
Annual load hours  6000  7000  6000  7000  6000  7000 
Date  of entry into 
service 
1962-1963 
enriched  U  18.80  17.60 
I  19.40  18.10  21.60  20.00  I  natural  u  17.40  16.00  I  18.40  16.80  21.40  19.40 
I 
1965-1967 
enriched  U  13.10  12.30  13.50  12.60  15.20  14.10 
natural  u  12.90  12.10  13.50  12.60  15.80  14.50 
1968-1970  10.70  10.10  10.80  10.20  12.10  11.30 
The above  figures  obviously entail some margin of uncertainty, hut they 
are reasonably likely indications of the rate of diminution in nuclear station 
generating costs. 
It should  also  he  noted that  they  imply  no  revolution  in  processes  and 
that they  err on  the  side  of caution,  since  a  nuclear  power  station  life  of 
twenty years may now he thought a  somewhat low estimate. 
1)  H.C.E. : hard-coal equivalent to 7,000 kcal/kg. 
Ill Assuming a  coal fuel  reference price of  $13.00  per metric ton hard-coal 
equivalent,  therefore,  in  line  with  the  results  adopted  as  a  hypothesis  in 
earlier chapters, 
1
)  nuclear power stations may he expected to become compe-
titive in many parts of the Community between 1965 and 1967 and throughout 
the Community by 1968-1970 with 6,000 load hours and over per annum. 
Since generating costs will continue to fall after that, nuclear stations may 
even  become  competitive  at  less  than  6,000  load  hours  per  annum,  which 
means that their use will tend to extend accordingly. 
Thus from 1970 or so  onwards there will no longer be any reason, from 
the point of view of generating costs, why nuclear energy should not he used 
on  an  increasing  scale;  the  main  limiting  factor  will  he  the  difficulty  of 
installing further capacity at an economically desirable speed. Reliable sources 
generally take the view that for  a  large number of technical  and industrial 
reasons it will he difficult to more than double the annual capacity installed 
every three years. 
For  several  years  now  the  Euratom  Commission,  in  conjunction  with 
interested circles, has been endeavouring to  overcome this  obstacle as  far  as 
possible  and  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the  rapid  development  of  nuclear 
energy in the future. 
Section 2 - Production outlook 
On December 31, 1961, the net electrical capacity of nuclear power stations 
in  service  was  73  MW  e.  The  commissioning  of  new  plants  and  increased 
capacity at existing plants  will  raise  this  figure  to  175 MWe  by  the  end of 
the present year and subsequently to over 700 MWe by the end of 1963 and 
more than 1000 MWe by the end of 1964. In 1965 production could amount 
to  6,500  million  kWh.  In  addition,  stations  representing  a  capacity  of  at 
least 1,500 MW  e  are at present under construction or in the planning stage 
and will he commissioned between 1965 and 1967 (see Table 35a). 
From then onwards production is obviously uncertain; the figures  quoted 
below  are  taken  mainly  from  publications  or  statements  made  by  senior 
representatives of national and international bodies or by these bodies them-
selves.  The  range  of possibilities  as  to  production in  1970  is  comparatively 
1)  Imported American steam coal, $  13.00; fuel  oil,  $  17.00-19.00  per metric ton. 
112 narrow - somewhere between  20  and 25  TWh for  the  Community  overall. 
For 1975 the uncertainty is much greater, of course; a rough estimate suggests 
between 60 and 100 TWh, although it should he noted that these figures are 
considerably below those given in a  recent UNIPEDE study which suggested 
an installed capacity of between 11,000  and  26,000  MWe,  corresponding  to 
an output of between 65 and 150 TWh. 
In  terms  of  installed  capacity,  the  above  figures  correspond  to  about 
10,000  and  16,000  MWe  for  1975.  It will  he  seen  that  a  reasonable  extra-
polation  of  these  figures  up  to  1980,  based  on  the  hypothesis  of  doubled 
nuclear capacity every three years (or treble every five years), would produce 
estimates  substantially  agreeing with  the  prospective  figure  of 40,000  MWe 
for 1980 quoted by the Euratom Commission in its third annual report. 
Data for individual countries are given in the following table. Fairly broad 
estimates have been made for countries whose intentions are as yet unknown, 
hut the small quantities involved are not likely to  have  any great effect on 
Community totals. 
Table  35  - Outlook for Nuclear Electricity Generation  (TWh) 
Country  1960  1965  19701)  19751) 
Germany  (Fed.  Rep.)  - 0.2  4-6  19-30 
Belgium  - 0.1  0.5  1-5 
France  0.1  2.5  10-12  19-30 
Italy  - - 6-8  20-30 
Netherlands  - 3.7  0.3  1-5 
Community  0.1  6.5  20-25  60-100 
1)  Uncertainties make it necessary to give two sets of figures. 
-----·-------------------------------
As regards regional distribution, we can assume that nuclear power stations 
will mainly be built in areas which hitherto have had no local source of energy 
hut  which  are  reasonably  close  to  consumption  centres  and  can  easily  he 
connected to the interconnecting network. 
113 Table  35a - Nuclear Power Stations completed  (C),  planne·d  (P)  decide·d  on  (D)  or begun 
(B)  in Community Countries by October 1,  1962 
Location  and  description  I country 
Mol.  - Br. 3  Belgium 
Kahl  (Main)  - Vak  Fed. Rep. 
Jiilich  - Avr  Fed. Rep. 
Karlsruhe  - Mzfr  (Multipurpose  Fed. Rep. 
experimental  reactor) 
Grundremmingen  (Donau)  Krb  Fed. Rep. 
(RWE-Bayernwerk) 
Obrigheim  - Kbwp 
(Baden-Wiirttemberg) 
Fed. Rep. 
Chooz  (Ardennes)  Sen  a  France 
(Soc. energ. nucl. des Ardennes)  Belgium 
Marcoule  (Gard)  France 
G.1 
G. 2. 
G.3 
Chin  on  (lndre-et-Loire)  France 
EDF1 
EDF2 
EDF3 
St-Laurcn  t-des-Eaux  France 
(Loir-et-Cher) 
EDF4 
Brennilis  (Brittany)  France 
EL4 
Garigliano  (Campania)  Senn  Italy 
(Soc.  Elettronucleare  N azionale) 
Latina  (Latium) Simea (Soc. ltal.  Italy 
Merid. Energia Atomica) 
Trino  V ercellese  (Lombardy)  Italy 
Selni  (Soc.  Elettronucleare ltal.) 
GKN  (Gelderland)  (Gemeensch.  Nether-
Kernenergiecentrale  Nederland)  lands 
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I  Net  I 
I 
capacity 
(MWe) 
Type 
10.5  Pressurised 
water 
15  Boiling 
water 
15  High 
temperature 
50  Nat.  U-heavy 
water 
237  Boiling 
water 
150  Organic 
I 
moderator 
210-242  Pressurised 
! 
water 
5  Graphite-gas 
37  Graphite-gas 
37  G  n  phi  te-gas I 
70  Graphite-gas! 
170-190  Graphite-gas 
375-480  Graphite-gas 
400-500  Graphite-gas 
80  Nat.  U-heavy 
water 
150-230  Boiling 
water 
200  Graphite-gas 
257  Pressurised 
water 
I  50  Boiling 
water 
I 
Critical 
date 
30.  8.62 
13.11.60 
1963 
1965 
end  1965 
1967 
end  1965 
7.  1.56 
21.  6.58 
ll. 6.59 
16.  9.62 
1963 
1965 
1967 
1964 
1963 
1963 
1964 
1967 
i 
I 
State 
of 
progress 
B 
c 
B 
B 
D 
p 
B 
c 
c 
c 
B 
B 
B 
D 
B 
B 
B 
B 
p Section 3 - The contribution of nuclear energy to the 
Community's security of supply 
As  we shall see in Chapter 17,  the volume of imports necessary to  meet 
energy demands from 1970 onwards endows the question of security of supply 
with  a  particular importance  and makes it necessary  to  forecast  the  extent 
to which the development of nuclear energy is capable of making an increasing 
contribution towards meeting demand. 
The extent of this contrii)ution depends on nuclear fuel supply conditions 
and the ease with which the products involved can be stored. 
A  - Nuclear fuel supplies 
Nuclear  energy  suffers  from  no  supply  problem,  because  the  market  is 
more than abundantly supplied and is also backed up by strategic stocks. 
Proved reserves of uranium workable at a  price of $8-10 per lb. of U30s 
in the form of concentrates represent about 600,000 metric tons of uranium 
metal content.  They are mainly located in three continents, namely Canada, 
the U.S.A. and South Africa, and to a lesser extent in Australia; this constitutes 
a  favourable geographical distribution amongst politically stable countries in 
the free world. 
As regards the Community in particular, production is steady and is  even 
slightly  increasing,  despite  the  fact  that  extraction  and  concentration  costs 
are higher there than in some other parts of the free world. 
The  prices  quoted  above  are  those  generally  adopted  in  calculating 
electricity  generating costs,  although  the  influence  of the  price  of uranium 
concentrate on the generating cost per kilowatt-hour of nuclear energy is low 
(e.g.  ±  0.4 mills per kWh for present types of reactors, i.e. about 5% of the 
generating cost). This means that a  price increase enabling more substantial 
reserves to be worked than those mentioned above would only slightly raise 
the  cost per kilowatt-hour and in any  case  to  lesser  extent  than  reductions 
arising from possible future improvements as referred to below. 
As regards enriched uranium, although the Community has no enrichment 
plant and in practice the  U.S.A.  has  a  sales  monopoly,  agreement has  been 
reached on supplying the  Community and other countries in the  free  world 
under existing bilateral agreements, whereby the same terms are available to 
foreign as to American reactors. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission is  also 
prepared to conclude long-term supply contracts. 
115 It should  also  be  pointed  out that  ex1stmg American  enrichment  plants 
have sufficient production capacity to maintain normal supplies to  enriched-
uranium power reactors  totalling  40,000  MWe,  and  the  forecasts  show  that 
the entire free world will only reach this  level with all  types of reactors in 
the early part of the next decade. 
According to a  report in Forum Memo for December 1959, a  new isotope 
separation plant to be built in the U.S.A. would have been capable of covering 
production costs at the selling price then charged. Since recent price cuts are 
based on reductions in the purchasing price of natural uranium and enrichment 
costs, this remark must still be true today. 
Despite  this  we  must  not,  when  investigating  the  various  aspects  of  an 
energy policy which is  intended to  guarantee security of supply to  the Com-
munity, fail to consider steps capable of enabling nuclear energy to make an 
increasing contribution to such security. 
We should be especially aware of the need to conclude long-term uranium 
purchasing contracts at advantageous prices outside the Community, to build 
up  stocks  of nuclear  fuel,  to  encourage  prospection in the  Community  and 
perhaps in a  number of third countries and lastly to stimulate research into 
improvements  in  uranium  extraction  and  concentration  processes,  and 
eventually thorium ores, in order to gain access to substantial reserves which 
are not workable at present prices. 
Security will also be helped by research into improved operation of known 
types of reactors and by the development of more efficient versions. Increased 
thermodynamic efficiency in power reactors will produce more  energy from 
known  uranium  reserves.  In  addition  plutonium  re-cycling,  the  use  of 
plutonium  in  fast  reactors,  particularly  breeder  reactors,  and  the  use  of 
thorium  and  stocks  of  spent  uranium  should  lead  to  a  very  considerable 
multiplication of reserves and of their potential energy content. 
Progress would thus be along the following lines : 
(i)  about 50% of the fissile energy in natural uranium would be utilized, 
as against less than 1  o/o  at present; 
(ii)  spent uranium, of which unworkable stocks at present exist in abun-
dance, would be re-utilized; 
(iii)  thorium  reserves,  which  are  more  abundant  and  more  widespread 
than those of uranium, would be developed; 
(iv)  the  already  low  influence  of  fissile  material  prices  on  generating 
costs  would  be  reduced,  thus  increasing  workable  reserves  without 
raising these costs. 
The conclusion can thus be drawn that under these circumstances nuclear 
plants could count on virtually unlimited supplies. 
116 B  - Storage 
The storage of nuclear fuel can also contribute to security of supply. We 
have  therefore  endeavoured  to  determine  the  effect  on  generating  costs  of 
building up adequate stocks to ensure one year's operation of conventional or 
nuclear stations. 
In doing so we have allowed for the financial and maintenance charges on 
the  special  installations  required  ( coalyard,  storage  tanks  or  fuel  depot), 
interest and taxes, together estimated at 9%  of the value of the stored fuel, 
handling  costs,  withdrawal  costs  and  loss  of  value  due  to  storage.  The  last 
three items only apply to coal and are negligible in other cases. We have also 
assumed that fuel stocks are financed out of the station's own resources; this 
also applies to enriched-uranium stations where fuel is at present hired. 
We thus arrive at the following estimates : 
Coal-fired  Fuel-oil- Nuclear  power  stations 
power  fired  power 
I  storage point  stations  stations  Natural U  Enriched  u 
Pit  Lower  station  Fuel element plants 
Basic price of fuel  I 
{in  dollars)  $14.00  $20.00  $8.00  Present 
per  metric  per  metric  per lb.  tariff 
ton  ton  according 
to degree 
Increase in cost of coal  of 
and  fuel  oil  due  to  enrichment 
storage  {in  dollars 
per metric ton)  3.00-3.50  3.00-3.50  - -
Increase  in  cost  of 
electricity  (in  mills 
per kWh)  1.00  l.OO  0.10  0.20 
The  comparison  shows  that  under  the  conditions  referred  to  above  the 
storage of fuel for one years' operation is  between five and ten times dearer 
for conventional than for nuclear stations, without allowing for the fact that 
in any case nuclear reactors  have  more  than  one  year's  reserve  represented 
by their fuel charge. 
C - Conclusions 
The  foregoing  details  show  that  nuclear  energy  generation  meets  the 
highest possible security of supply requirements : 
117 (i)  present and  future  reserves  of natural uranium in  politically  stable 
countries  are  sufficient  to  ensure  supplies  for  an  extensive  reactor 
programme; 
(ii)  enriched  uranium  reactors  obtain  their  fuel  supplies  from  the  U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission, which under its present supply policy is 
prepared  to  conclude  long-term  contracts.  In  addition  enrichment 
plants  are  capable  of  meeting  the  long-term  forecast  demand  for 
enriched uranium; 
(iii)  to store nuclear fuel for one year's operation costs one third or one 
quarter of the expense of storing fuel for conventional stations; 
(iv)  in view of anticipated technical  progress,  nuclear  energy  will  even-
tually  constitute  a  virtually  inexhaustible  source  offering  a  high 
degree  of security.  Its  contribution  to  the  Community's  security of 
energy supplies will therefore be capable of measuring up to the use 
made of it. 
The formulation of principles for a  common supply policy for fossil  and 
fissile  material  would  obviously  help  to  improve  medium  and  long-term 
security of sl:tpply even further. 
118 Part Four 
The Supply and Demand Position 
in 1970 
The object of Part Four is  to see how the overall demand for energy,  as 
assessed in Part Two,  can be  met from  the various  primary energy  sources 
under the supply conditions described in Part Three. 
The guiding principal is that this breakdown should be made on the basis 
of comparative costs to the consumer in the light of the advantages inherent 
in each form of energy. 
1
)  The strict application of this principle would entail 
examining the position of each class of consumer step by step, with comparable 
consumers grouped together in each region, but at the present time we cannot 
hope to undertake such an investigation in full. 
We are thus led to  carry out a  less  rigorous procedure involving various 
stages. Firstly, the present state of technology and its probable development 
means that even in ten to  fifteen years  time  some energy requirements will 
only  be  met by  specific  products,  for  instance  coke  for  blast  furnaces  and 
motor fuel for road, rail and inland waterway transport; this  also  applies to 
energy producers' own consumption. 
Secondly,  some  items  will  find  a  readier  market  than  others  owing  to 
inevitability  or  cheapness  - the  former  including  blast  furnace  and  coke-
oven gas and the latter hydro power, brown coal and natural gas from deposits 
already discovered. 
l)  It  seems  superfluous  to  recall  that  we  are  in  no  way  attempting  to  plan  an  energy 
breakdown  pattern  but  merely  to  determine  the  shape  this  pattern  is  likely  to  take 
in an economy characterised by free consumer choice. 
119 The remainder of the demand will be met by various  fuels  according to 
their relative cost to the consumer, although the advantages inherent in some 
types  will  lead  certain  consumers  to  use  those  forms  only  as  long  as  the 
relative prices continue to lie within the probable range suggested by earlier 
chapters. 
A  close  investigation  of  all  these  factors,  as  attempted  in  Chapter  13, 
enables us to considerably narrow down the portion of the demand for which 
two or more products will actually compete. The breakdown of this demand 
amongst the various products entails more detailed analyses at regional level; 
this  will  occupy  Chapters  14  and  15,  in  which  several  alternatives  will  be 
examined for different imported energy prices at varying levels of assistance 
for Community coal. 
In due  course we  shall thus  arrive at an overall energy position for  the 
Community. 
Chapter  13 
Specific, sure-market and sectors of competition 
We  shall  deal  first  with  specific  demand,  secondly with  products  which 
have a  sure market owing to their cheapness and lastly with coverage of the 
remaining  demand,  thus  enabling  us  to  estimate  the  extent of  the  area  of 
competition  in  energy  products  and  the  sphere  of  influence  of  an  energy 
policy. 
Section 1 - Specific demand 
This category contains blast furnace  coke, motor fuel  and energy produ-
cers' own consumption. 
A - Blast furnace coke 
Energy consumption in the iron and steel industry at present consists of 
about two  thirds  coke,  the  remainder being  accounted for  by heating fuels 
for furnaces and rolling mills and by electricity. 
120 As noted above, the estimated coke consumption is based on the pig iron 
production forecast and on probable developments in processes. Blast furnace 
requirements  are  expected  to  be  53  million metric  tons  in 1970  and  58  in 
1975, as against 48 in 1960. 
1
) 
By adding on the forecasts for the use of dust in sintering plants and other 
uses  of coke  in iron  and  steel production,  we  can  give  a  final  estimate  of 
61  million  metric  tons  in  1970  and  66  million in 1975  for  total  coke  con-
sumption by the iron and steel industry. 
On the basis of employing the latest processes in coking plants, some 92 
million metric tons  of  coking  coal need  to  be burnt to  produce  61  million 
metric  tons  of coke  suitable  for  iron  and  steel  production,  the  comparable 
figure for 1975 being 98 million metric tons. 
B  - Motor fuel 
The  total  motor  fuel  demand  for  road,  air,  rail  and  inland  waterway 
transport and agricultural machinery is expected to be 65 million metric tons 
in  1970,  i.e.  95  million  metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent  and  126  million 
metric tons hard-coal equivalent in 1975. 
C - Energy producers' and converters' own consumption 
This demand can be considered as more or less specific, with a  few minor 
exceptions. 
The  exact  amount  cannot  be  determined  until  the  general  breakdown 
of demand into various forms  of energy is  known,  although we  can  suggest 
a figure of approximately 50 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent in 1970. 
D- Summary 
One or two other specific demands must be added to  the  above  figures, 
including  coal  for  cement  works  and  the  coal  chemicals  industry  and  oil 
products  for  petrochemicals.  These  quatities  are  very  difficult  to  estimate, 
and  since  the  size  of  the  genuinely  specific  demand  is  probably  small  in 
relation to total energy requirements we propose to ignore it. 
Table 36 now summarises specific energy requirements, which are expected 
to account for about one third of the total demand. This figure will remain 
fairly  constant,  since  the  sharp  rise  in motor  fuel  requirements  will  offset 
the  very  slight  increase  in  demand  for  coking  coal  in  the  iron  and  steel 
industry. 
1)  It was found  in Chapter 3  t'hat  the  1975  figure  could  be  reduced  by 10-15°/o if natural 
gas  reduction processes  developed quickly. 
121 Table  36  - Specific Energy Requiremelllts  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
'ron and  steel  industry  Coking  coal  to  meet  1 
coke demand 
Motor fuel 
Energy  producers'  an 
consumption 
d  converters'  own 
Total  specific  demand 
1960 
761) 
I 
44 
43 
163 
1965  1970  1975 
82  92  98 
70  95  126 
47  51  58 
199  238  282 
1)  This figure  only includes cokmg coal for the Iron and steel mdustry and  IS  thus lower than 
the total coking plant output for 1960. 
Section 2 - Sure-market products 
Two types of output may be regarded as having a  certain market : 
(i)  primary products whose cost is obviously competitive; 
(ii)  secondary  products  associated  with  production  for  specific  demand. 
A  - Sure-market primary products 
These are items which will certainly he competitive because their produc-
tion  costs  are  low  owing either to  geological  conditions  or to  the  fact  that 
expenditure  has  already  been  incurred  (for  instance  on  dam  building  or 
discovering oil and natural gas deposits)  and future production costs are thus 
fairly low. 
The items concerned are brown coal, hydro power and the natural gas and 
crude oil already discovered in the  Community,  plus  the  amount of nuclear 
energy disclosed by the minimum forecasts. 
On the basis of our earlier conclusions as to  the trend in supply, we can 
estimate these figures as shown in Table 37. The output involved would meet 
about 20% of the total demand for energy. 
Allowing  for  present  projects,  about  60%  of  the  brown  coal  would  be 
burnt in thermal power stations  and  the  rest  divided  between the  domestic 
sector and industry. 
Initially, natural gas will supply markets in which its use offers substantial 
specific  advantages  (e.g.  controlled  atmosphere  heat treatment,  glass  works, 
ceramics, chemicals and the domestic sector). These at present represent about 
122 60o/o  of the total consumption of natural gas, hut the need to utilise pipelines 
to  a  fuller extent will entail the acquisition of more competitive markets in 
which natural gas will find its place commercially (e.g. intermittent contracts), 
tariff-wise  (two-part tariffs)  and technically  (peak demand plant and under-
ground storage). 
B  - Sure-market secondary products 
Gas is  a  by-product of both coke production and blast furnace operations 
(in the latter case its volume per ton of pig iron and calorific power decrease 
owing to the drop in the coke rate). 
1
) 
In addition a  certain amount of fuel oil is hound to arise from motor fuel 
production,  although  we  have  already  reached  the  stage  where  European 
refinery operation is not directed, as in the United States, to maximum output 
of motor fuel; under the American pattern the 1975 output of fuel oil would 
he lower than the Community's present consumption. Owing to the anticipated 
increase in fuel requirements, there is no doubt that the minimum liquid fuel 
output associated with motor fuel production which is  imposed by technical 
conditions would  have  no  difficulty in  finding  a  market,  even  allowing  for 
the substantial part to he played by natural gas. 
2
) 
Table 37 - Sure-Market Products  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
1960  1965  1970  1975 
Primary  products  I 
Brown coal  29  30  32  34 
Hydro  and  geothermal power1)  43  46  54  60 
Community  natural  gas  14  22  33  42-54 
Community  oil  17  18  19  20 
Nuclear  electricity  - 2  8  24-36 
Total  103  us  146  180-204 
----- -----
Secondary  products 
Coke-oven  gas  23  23  24  25 
Blast furnace  gas  26  24  24  25 
Refiner  y  fuel  oil  and  g  as  for record only 
1)  Including net imports. 
1)  See  Annex 3  to  fuU  Community-language  edition :  The  energy  requirements  of the  iron 
and  stee'l  industry. 
2)  Care must be taken to  avoid  duplicating  certain  items  when  adding sure-market output 
to specific demand. Amongst primary products, Community oil  ~s  used to produce motor 
fuel  (approximately  4  million  metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent  in  1970)  and  amongst 
secondary products coke-oven gas is  already included under coking coal. 
123 Section 3 - Remainder of demand 
Specific demand and sure-market products represent somewhat over half 
the total demand. The remainder consists solely of fuel requirements and can 
he met by coal or fuel oil or by nuclear generation in excess of the minimum 
figures suggested above. 
The part to he played by each of these various sources of energy mainly 
depends on two types of factor : the comparative cost of the fuel  (and of the 
corresponding plant)  required  to  obtain the  same  degree  of  efficiency,  and 
various supplementary factors such as flexibility, ease of handling, purity, etc. 
These can he no sudden transition, however, from the present situation to 
another balanced situation determined by the above factors, because the trend 
is retarded by inertia, including the need to retain existing installations which, 
if fairly  modern,  cannot he  scrapped  without  considerable  expenditure  and 
which in any case could not all be renewed simultaneously. Apart from these 
technical factors, purchasers' habits and views on safety, as well as the fairly 
close  financial  links  between  energy  producers  and  consumers,  have  to  he 
reckoned  with.  The  influence  of  these  financial  links  must  not  he  over-
estimated,  although  they  will probably he  quite  significant for  four  or five 
years' time. In ten or fifteen years' time, on the other hand, the effects will 
certainly he  much  less  marked  and  can  probably he  ignored  in  our  initial 
approach to the problem. Consequently, our calculations need only allow for 
the technical rigidity represented by current installations; the effects of the 
financial links can then be examined on a purely qualitative basis. 
This means that the present situation cannot he considered as  a  balanced 
one. Even if relative price levels were not to change, certain trends which are 
already under way would continue, resulting in an alteration in the relative 
shares of different forms  of energy. Some consumers will clearly go  over to 
liquid  or  gaseous  petroleum  products  without  hesitation,  which  gives  us  a 
lower  limit for  oil  product  consumption  and  thus  a  ceiling  for  the  market 
available to coal. On the other hand the specific nature of certain requirements 
and the factors of inertia mentioned above will help to maintain a fair level of 
coal  consumption.  The  following  sub-sections  will  briefly  review  the  trend 
in recent years and suggest the limits between which a  balanced level may be 
expected to lie if the ratio of fuel prices per calorie to that of coal remains 
between 0.8 and 1.2. 
In order to determine the extent to which this ratio can vary, we shall now 
examine the major consumption sectors individually. 
A - I ron and steel industry 
In  addition  to  blast  furnace  coke  and  electricity,  the  iron  and  steel 
industry's energy requirements cover heating operations in the furnace itself 
124 (injecting  of pulverised  coal,  fuel  oil  or  gas)  and  in  accessory  installations 
(including  blast  heating)  and  in  steel  works  and  rolling  mills  (reheating 
furnaces). These requirements can he met by coal, fuel oil or gas. 
Future blast furnace gas output will rise less rapidly than coke consumption 
owing to the drop in the coke input coefficient. 
Allowing  for  likely  technical  developments,  the  above  needs  suggest  a 
coal  consumpiton  figure  of  3  million  metric  tons  in  1975,  the  uncertainty 
involved being perhaps 0.5 million metric tons. 
B - Other industries 
Before passing on to a breakdown of energy consumption between various 
fuels it is worthwhile briefly reviewing the trend over the last ten years. 
Table 38 and Graph IV show the decreasing share of solid fuel during the 
period 1950-1960, a  tendency which was most marked in Italy, the Nether-
lands  and  Belgium.  In  the  Federal  Republic  the  trend  accelerated  rapidly 
after 1957, whereas France shows  a  much  steadier tendency than the other 
countries. 
Mechanical extrapolation of these curves would give a  share of solid fuel 
in the  sector's  non-electrical  energy not exceeding  20%  in  1970  and  below 
10% in 1975 for the Community as  a  whole. 
Nevertheless  we  cannot  accept  the  results  of  this  extrapolation  just  as 
they  stand,  partly because  the  present situation  is  one  of  imbalance  owing 
to  reactions  to  relative  price  fluctuations  being  influenced  by  inertia,  hut 
mainly  because  energy  consumption  in  industry  shows  a  non-homogeneous 
pattern owing to widely differing uses. At this point certain technical aspects 
must he examined. 
A comparison between the relative advantages and disadvantages of various 
types of fuel must  allow  for  the  following  technical  and  economic  factors : 
Firstly,  efficiency often  differs  from  one  fuel  to  another,  i.e.  the  same 
efficiency is  obtained with  a  different number  of calories  according  to  the 
fuel used. 
Then  there  is  the  economic  aspect :  at  a  given  degree  of  efficiency 
operating  costs  and  depreciation  may  vary  from  one  fuel  to  another  or  a 
particular  fuel  may  have  special  advantages  over  its  competitors  by virtue 
of its flexibility or purity, thus enabling product quality to he improved and 
manufacturing costs to he reduced. 
To  pursue the  analysis  in terms  of figures  we  should  need  to  know the 
effect of  all  these factors  on various  types  of industrial operations,  as  well 
as a  breakdown of total energy consumption according to use. Although only 
125 partial information, often difficult to extrapolate, is available on these points, 
we can nevertheless draw certain conclusions. 
Firstly we know that of the two major categories of industrial operation, 
steam  production  absorbs  about  55%  of  energy  consumption  and  furnace 
heating about 35%; the remainder is  represented by specific uses,  including 
the supply of raw materials. 
The information available  on steam production  suggests  that the calorie 
price ratio to equate fuel oil and coal is about 1  at major plants, particularly 
thermal power stations, rising to 1.2 at small and medium-size plants. In the 
case of furnaces,  on the other hand, the ratio  appears  to  exceed 1.2 and in 
some cases to rise considerably above 1.3. 
In the past it seems quite likely - as borne out by existing data -- that 
the change-over from coal to fuel oil (or gas) initially took place in operations 
with the highest equivalence ratio (furnaces). 
There is little to suggest that by 1975 the breakdown between uses will be 
substantially different from  what it is  now.  Despite  the  fact  that chemicals 
will probably expand quicker than cement and glassware,  the  effect of this 
expansion may be largely offset by increased energy economies in the former. 
By 1975 it can be estimated that about 80% of furnaces will have turned 
over to fuel oil or gas, assuming that the calorie price ratio remains between 
0.8 and 1.2. Since furnace life is  about fifteen to twenty years, the influence 
of  technical  inertia  factors  will  be  low.  Coal  should  nevertheless  retain  a 
market  in  the  lime  and  cement  industries 
1
)  if  the  calorie  price  ratio  is 
sufficiently close to l. 
As  regards  steam production we  must  first  of  all  bear in  mind  that  an 
increasing portion of the chemical industry is  becoming integrated with the 
oil industry and will thus obtain its heat from fuel oil. 
2
)  Outside this sector 
coal should retain a  substantial share in steam production. 
The ceiling to the coal market thus constituted by non-petrochemical steam 
production and a  portion of the furnace requirements in the lime and cement 
industries  would  therefore  be  about  half  the  industrial  demand,  although 
this  result  is  only  valid  in  countries in  which  coal  retains  more  than  50% 
of the industrial market. If we assume that its present share would be main-
tained  in  Italy,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  and  that  it  will  be  SO%  in 
the other countries, we reach  a  figure  of about 40%  for  the  Community as 
a  whole, i.e.  a  ceiling of 55 million metric tons in 1975. For 1970 a  slightly 
higher  percentage  may  be  envisaged,  corresponding  to  approximately  the 
same tonnage. 
1)  In 1955 this branch  accounted for 37°/o  of  the  energy consumed by furnaces  in France. 
Coal's share of this was 84°/o,  whereas it only accounted for 14°/o in the glass industry. 
2)  In  1955  chemicals  accounted  for  27'0/o  of  the  energy  consumed  by  steam  production  in 
France. The share of coal in this figure was 71°/o. 
126 Table  38  - Fuel Consumption Breakdown in Other Industries Sector  (0/o) 
Region  Solid fuel  Liquid  fuel  Gas  Total 
Community 
1950  82  12  6  100 
1955  68  20  12  100 
1960  48  36  16  100 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.) 
1950  90  2  8  100 
1955  83  5  12  100 
1960  63  24  13  100 
Belgium 
1950  88  9  3  100 
1955  70  24  6  100 
1960  34  53  13  100 
France 
1950  75  20  5  100 
1955  65  30  5  100 
1960  54  35  11  100 
Italy 
1950  67  26  7  100 
1955  33  39  28  100 
1960  1:)  50  35  100 
J  .uxemhourg 
1950  100  100 
1955  72  14  14  100 
1960  50  38  12  100 
Netherlands 
1950  73  17  10  100 
1955  52  35  13  100 
1960  36  55  9  100 
Extrapolation of the trend for the past ten years would  give  us  a  figure 
of  about  25  million  metric  tons.  A  lower  figure  may  he  envisaged  on  the 
basis of today's equipment which will still he in use in ten years' time,  and 
in fact  the  only  really  guaranteed  market  is  from  certain types  of  vertical 
integration, particularly the coal chemicals industry. 
To  sum up,  we  can provisionally  estimate  that  the  consumption  of coal 
and coke in industry in 1970 will he between 20 and 55 million metric tons, 
that of fuel  oil  and  gas  between  65  and  100 million  metric  tons  hard-coal 
equivalent and  that of brown  coal 4-5 million metric  tons  hard-coal  equi-
valent. Gas will he used mainly in furnaces, where its flexibility of operation 
is  particularly  appreciated;  its  consumption  will  lie  at  between  25  and  40 
million metric tons hard-coal equivalent. There thus remains between 25 and 
75 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent for fuel oil. 
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During the past decade the fall in the share of solid fuels  in consumption 
in this sector was less marked than in industry. Not only did inertia factors 
probably  play  a  greater  part  but  some  consumers  continued  to  prefer  the 
coal-burning stove. 
Graph V  shows that these factors help  to maintain solid fuel at a  higher 
level  than  in  the  other  industries  sector.  In  addition  in  countries  such  as 
Germany the fall  in the solid fuel share only became marked in the second 
half to  the  decade. Moreover Italy, in which  the  share  (50%)  in 1950  was 
already well below that of other countries, underwent a  development similar 
to that of Belgium and the Netherlands, where the initial level exceeded 80% 
in 1950. 
It should also be noted that the relative share of gas remained extremely 
stable. 
The future trend will largely be conditioned by the form of new housing 
(flats or houses)  and in the case of the latter by the choice between central 
heating or stoves. Coal seems to stand the greatest chance of holding its own 
in big blocks of flats and in homes heated by stoves. 
Quantitatively  it  is  difficult,  in  the  absence  of  information  on  existing 
appliances, to do  more than extrapolate the past trend and assume a  gradual 
slackening-off in the rate at which the solid fuel share will drop.  This gives 
us a  figure of about 60 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent in 1965  and 
40 million in 1975, by comparison with 65  million in 1960, for solid fuel. The 
1970 limits for the coal and coke markets can be estimated at 45 and 75, plus 
some million metric tons of brown coal and brown coal briquettes. For gas 
we  can visualise  a  figure  of between 15  and  20  (12-13% of the  demand), 
leaving between 35 and 70 to be covered by oil products (including liquefied 
petroleum gas). 
129 Table  39  - Fuel  Consumption  Breakdown  in  Domestic  Sector  (O/o) 
Region  Solid  fuel  Liquid  fuel  Gas  Total 
Community 
1950  87  7  6  100 
1955  83  11  6  100 
1960  67  26  7  100 
Germany  (Fed. Rep.) 
1950  94  1  5  100 
1955  92  4  4  100 
1960  74  21  5  100 
Belgium 
1950  87  9  't  100 
1955  80  16  4  100 
1960  69  27  4  100 
France 
1950  86  7  7  100 
1955  80  14  6  100 
1960  69  24  7  100 
Italy 
1950  50  37  13  100 
1955  42  44  14  100 
1960  31  54  15  100 
Luxembourg 
1950  88  8  4  100 
1955  87  10  3  100 
1960  72  25  3  100 
Netherlands 
1950  83  9  8  100 
1955  79  12  9  100 
1960  61  29  10  100 
D - Rail transport 
As  noted  above,  far-reaching  changes  are  taking  place  in  rail  traction 
methods  for  economic  reasons.  Steam  (using  coal,  brown  coal  and  a  very 
slight amount of fuel oil) is giving way to electric or diesel haulage, the division 
between the two depending on the volume of traffic, permanent way conditions 
and various  other factors.  The  result is  a  very  clear trend  towards  reduced 
direct  coal  consumption on the  railways.  In the  Netherlands  and  Italy this 
process is virtually complete; in Belgium and France it is well advanced and 
has  recently  begun  in  Germany.  Coal  consumption  by  Community  railways 
will probably drop to 7-8 million metric tons in 1965 and about 1-2 million 
in 1975, an infinitesimal figure. 
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Electricity demand has been estimated at 574 TWh in 1970 and 790 TWh 
in 1975.  These  figures  can he  regarded as  being correct to  the  nearest  59fo 
under  the  economic  growth  hypothesis  adopted  and  to  the  nearest  10% 
generally. 
Part of the output will come from "sure-market" forms of energy, namely 
hydro and geothermal power and stations using brown coal and blast furnace 
gas.  This output is  estimated at 206  TWh in 1970,  i.e.  34%  of the total  (as 
against 53% in 1960). The corresponding figure for 1975 is  about 225  TWh, 
i.e.  28%.  362  TWh in 1970  and about 555  TWh in 1975  thus  remain to  he 
generated from coal, fuel oil, natural gas and nuclear energy. 
For the latter we envisage an output of 20-25 TWh in 1970, correspond-
ing  to  3.5  million  k W  installed,  and  an  output  of 60-100 TWh  in  1975, 
corresponding to 10-16 million k W  installed. 
1
) 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  c:Jttempt  to  give  maximum  and  minimum 
estimates for coal consumption. 
For 1965  existing  programmes  allow  relatively  little  latitude;  output  at 
coal-burning  power  stations  (including  other  industries'  own  production)  is 
expected to he about 177 TWh. 
For  1970  and  1975  the  range  is  obviously  considerably  greater  for 
technical reasons. 
The maximum would correspond to the following hypotheses : 
(i)  no  new  stations  using  fuel  oil  or  natural  gas  built  after  1965, 
continued operation of those in existence in 1965 (assuming maximum 
coal consumption); 
(ii)  lower limit for nuclear generation. 
1)  It should nevertheless be noted that although the anticipated competitive advantage will 
become felt from 1968-1970 onwards, the amount of electricity produced by nuclear sta-
tions in 1975 could be greater than the above figures  if expansion is not limited by the 
difficulty  of  installing  further  capacity  at  an  economically  desirable  rate.  Suitable  en-
couragement from  government policies and Euratom intervention under the second five-
year programme should nevertheless remove some of these obstacles and enable  a  higher 
output to  be  achieved. For reasons  of  caution this  possibility  has  not been  entertained 
in  our  present  calcUJlrations,  which  are  based  on  the  following  working  hypothe·sis  of 
nndear  generation:  1970:  20  TWh;  1975 :  80  TWh. 
132 We thus obtain an output of about 290 TWh for coal-burning power stations 
in 1970, corresponding to a  consumption of 105 million metric tons hard-coal 
equivalent. 
Table 40  - Electricity Generation Breakdown by Form of Primary Energy Used 
(TWh, gross)  (Revised  table) 
Line  1960  1965  1970  1975 
1  Consumption  285  409 
I 
574  789 
2  Balance of trade 
(net imports)  4  5  6  6 
3 = 1-2  Gross  aggregate  production 
From sure-market sources :  281  404  568  783 
4  Hydro  and  geothermal 
power  1021)  Ill  130  141-147 
5  Brown coal  and peat  32  51  63  71 
6  Blast-furnace gas  13  13  13  12 
7  Other sure-market sources2)  3  6  6  7 
8=4+5+6+7  Sub-total  150 
I 
181  212  231-237 
9'= 3-8  From other sources 
I  13!3)  223  356  547-552 
1)  Very high water run-off in 1960. 
2)  Slurry, household refuse, industrial waste, etc. 
3)  111  from coal,  20  from fuel oil and natural gas. 
The  m~n~mum would  represent  keeping  the  coal-burning  stations  com-
missioned  by  the  1965  in  service  after that  date  without  any  new  stations 
being built. All the increase in production would thus come from oil products 
or nuclear reactors. In this case we get an output of about 180 TWh in 1970, 
necessitating the use of about 65  million metric tons hard-coal equivalent. 
To a  certain extent these two limits correspond to physical concepts. The 
fundamental  factor  in  the  analysis  now  becomes  the  calorie  price  ratio  to 
equate kilowatt-hour costs as between coal-burning and fuel-oil-burning power 
stations  with  the  same  load  curve.  Calorific  equivalence  is  approximately 
unity, the efficiencies being roughly the same.  The building costs  of a  coal-
fired power station, on the other hand, are about 10-15% higher than that 
of a  station using fuel oil. Since costs are divided into about 30% for depre-
ciation, 60%  for fuel  and 10% for  overheads, the calorie price ratio  at the 
station to ensure equivalence must he between 0.9  and 0.95.  A  more detailed 
study at regional  level  is  therefore  necessary  in order to  be  certain  of the 
breakdown.  In  addition  there  is  the  possibility  of  building  mixed  power 
stations operating either on coal or fuel oil. 
133 Section 4 - Summary. Extent of influence of energy 
policy on energy source structure 
The above data can be summarised as follows  (in millions of metric tons 
hard-coal equivalent) : 
1960  1965  1970  1975 
Total  demand  (Table  9)  461  570  700  847 
Specific demand  (Table 36)  163  199  238  282 
Demand  covered by inevitable  primary 
products1)  (Table  37)  99  114  141  179 
Balance  199  257  321  386 
1)  Corrected for duplication with specific demand. 
As  regards  the  breakdown  of  the  balance,  the  analysis  has  shown  that 
virtual certainty  exists  as  to  the  breakdown  in  the  iron  and  steel industry 
and rail transport, whereas in the other sectors relative prices must be borne 
in mind. Finally it must not be forgotten that coal markets can be supplied 
either with Community coal or imported coal. 
The  figures  given  in  the  foregoing  pages  are  summarised  in  Table  42, 
which compares the probable structure of demand in various sectors in 1970 
with  the  actual  structure  in  1960.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  1970 
figures can only be regarded as approximate. 
To sum up, subject to the fact that we have provisionally adopted a  single 
working  hypothesis  for  nuclear  production,  consumption  in  the  genuinely 
area of competition where the relative price level will be the decisive factor 
and  where  the  energy  policy  can  therefore  play  its  part  is  likely  to  be  as 
follows in 1970 : 
(1) Competition between coal, fuel oil and natural gas : 
134 
(i)  fuel  for  industry 
(ii)  fuel  for  the  domestic  sector 
(iii)  fuel  for  power  stations 
some  50  million 
metric tons H.C.E.; 
some  30  million 
metric tons H.C.E.; 
some  40  million 
metric tons H.C.E.; 
making  a  total  of 110-120 million  metric  tons  H.C.E.  (a  little  less 
than 20%  of the demand); (2) Competition between Community and imported coal 
(i)  the same consumers as in (l); 
(ii)  part of the coking coal requirements,  the  total of which  amounts  to 
92 million metric tons. 
Table  41  - Primary Energy Consumption Breakdown in  1960  by Sectors  and  Products1} 
('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
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I. Energy  producers, 
I 
I 
converters3)  and 
energy  distributors 
a)  Own consumption and 
I 
conversion and trans- 17.3  2.6  8.62)  0.6  9.0  4.9  .,..-- - 43.0 
mission  losses 
b)  Manufactured  gas 
equivalent in terms of  +24.9  - +1.2  - -26.1  - - - - primary  energy  ------------------
c)  Total a+b)  42.2  2.6  9.8  0.6  -17.1  4.9  - - 43.0 
------------------------------
II. Iron  and  steel 
industryS) 
a)  Gross  consumption  51.6  0.5  4.8  1.2  6.0  13.9  - - 78.0 
b)  Blast  furnace  gas  I 
production 
I 
-26.0  - -26.0 
1------~-
C)  Net  consumption  of  -I 
sector  (a+  b)  51.6  0.5  4.8  1.2  6.0  -12.1  - - 52.0 
I 
------------------
III. Other industriesS)  35.6  6.5  31.2  7.1  6.6  0.6  - - 87.6 
------------------
IV. TransportS)  13.3  0.1  45.2  0.4  - - - - 59.0 
----------------------
v. Domestic  sectorS)  55.3  9.4  25.4  2.2  4.2  - - - 96.5 
---------------
VI. Power  stations4)  50.0  15.4  6.3  2.0  0.3  6.6  42.5  0.1  123.2 
----------------
VII. Total primary 
energy  requirements I 
(Ic  +  lie  +  III  + 
IV  +  V  +  VI)  248.0  34.5  122.7  13.5  - - 42.5  1  0.1  461.3 
Totals are as in the tables in Annex 2  to the full  Community-language edition. 
1)  These figures represent the end consumption of the different products in a  number of sectors. 
Thus the item "hard coal" for the iron and steel industry indicates the industry's consumption 
of coke, not the amount of hard coal required for  that consumption of coke;  the difference 
is allowed for under "energy producers,  converters and distributors". 
2)  Less  refinery losses,  and  minus  1.5  million  metric tons  H.C.E.  (benzole,  etc.)  produced  from 
hard  coal. 
3)  Less  electricity. 
4)  Ton for  ton in the case of coal. 
135 Table 42 - Primary  Energy  Consumption  Breakdown  in  1970  by  Sectors  and  Products. 
Approximate  zone's  of  substitutability1)  2)  ('OOO.OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
(Revised  table) 
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I. Energy  producers, 
I 
convertersS)  and 
energy  distributors 
a)  Own consumption and 
conversion and trans-
mission  losses  12-15  2  24-21  1  7  5  51 
b)  Manufactured gas 
equivalent in terms of 
primary energy  19-26  8  ·(27-34)  -
------------------
C)  Total a+b)  31-41  2  32-29  1  ·(20-27)  5  - - 51 
----------------------
II. Iron  and  steel 
industryS) 
a)  Gross  consumption  61  - 15-12  5-5  6  14  101 
b) Blast  furnace  gas  -=-1-
production  -24 
------------ -------
C)  Net  consumption  of 
sector  (a+b)  61  - 15-12  5-8  6  10  77 
-------------------------
III. Other industriesS)  20-55  4  75-25  20-31  6-10  - - - 125 
------------------
IV. TransportS)  3  - 99  - - - - 102 
---------------
V. Domestic  sectorS)  45-75  3  70-35  7-9  8-11  - - - 133 
----------------------
VI. Power  stations  65-105  23  55-15  2  - 5  54  8  212 
-------------------------
VII. Total primary 
energy  requirements 
(Ic  +  lie + III + 
IV  +  v  +  VI)  225-340  32  1341-218  40-484)  1  0  0  54  a I  700 
1)  See footnote 1 to preceding table. 
2)  Lines: in  each  line,  the  coefficients  of  uncertainty  for  hard  coal,  for  natural  gas  and  for 
manufactured gas are taken as independent;  the sum of the three gives the coefficient of 
uncertainty for  oil. 
Column: in  the  case  of hard  coal  and  natural  gas  the  sums  of the  individual  maxima  and 
minima do not equal the overall maxima and minima,  inasmuch as the ranges are not all 
independent; the hypothesis is thus ruled out that the consumption of these products will 
ever be simultaneously at either minimum or maximum in all sectors. 
3)  Less  electricity  .. 
4)  Of which  8-12  imported. 
Chapter 14 
Coverage of competitive requirements based on 
comparative costs at the consumer's level 
We  have  now  reached  some  sort  of breakdown  of  energy  requirements 
according  to  source.  This  is  more  or less  independent  of  the  ratio  of  coal 
136 to fuel oil prices, provided that the latter remains within the range 0.8-1.2, 
although two factors of uncertainty persist : the margin of doubt as between 
coal  and  oil  products,  particularly  as  regards  the  other  industries  sector, 
households and power stations and the margin of doubt as  to the breakdown 
of coal into Community and imported coal. 
In  order  to  reduce  these  margins  we  must  carry  out  a  fairly  detailed 
geographical  analysis  so  as  to  make  at least  an  approximate  comparison  of 
costs  at the  consumer's  level;  this  must  allow  for  transport  costs  from  the 
point of production or entry to the point of consumption. 
The  breakdown  into  energy  sources,  and  especially  the  position  to  be 
occupied  by  Community  coal,  will  depend  not  only  on  the  comparative 
production  costs  of  the  products  involved  but  also  on  the  energy  policy 
adopted. The latter will mainly consist in controlling comparative consumer 
costs for various fuels either by levying duty on imports or granting subsidies 
to Community producers.  · 
For the time being we shall confine ourselves to  examining a  number of 
specimen calculations based on the  supply and  demand  position as  outlined 
in  previous  chapters.  Each  specimen  calculation  will  show  the  combined 
influence of various hypotheses as  to future imported energy prices and the 
extent of price intervention in the form of duty and subsidies. 
1
) 
Section 1 - Basis of calculations 
It is  possible  to  make  at least  an  approximate  estimate  of the  possible 
market  available  to  each  coalfield  in  the  face  of  competition  from  direct 
imports of coal or indirect imports of fuel oil through refineries. 
The basic data used in the calculation are as follows : 
(i)  prices and costs : 
Pi  c.i.f. price per ton of imported product at port A; 
Cm  pithead cost of Community coal; 
t i  inland transport charges per ton from port A to place of 
consumption; 
t m  inland transport charges per ton from pit to point of 
consumption; 
(ii)  coefficient  of  physical  equivalence  e  between  one  metric  ton  of 
Community coal and one metric ton of imported product; 
1)  These specimen calculations  are  restricted  to  non-electrical  energy,  since  power stations 
are treated as  final consumers. 
137 (iii)  the  vane  a  of  the  specific  advantages  to  the  consumer  in  using  a 
competing  product  instead  of  one  metric  ton  of  Community  coal : 
(iv)  forms of intervention available to the authorities : 
D  duty per metric ton on imported product; 
S  subsidy per metric ton on Community coal. 
The respective prices to the consumer are as follows : 
Pi  +  D + ti  for  imported product; 
Cm  - S  +  tm for  Community  coal~ 
there  being  indifference  to  the  consumer  between  the  two  products  when 
e  (Pi  +  D + td -a  =  em-S +  tm so that Community coal is competitive 
in the consumption zone in question when the pithead cost (before any subsidy) 
is e  (pi  +  D + t1) - a  +  S - tm or below. (It will be readily apparent that 
as  regards  the  consumer's  choice  between the  two  products  a  subsidy  of  x 
X 
has the same effect as a  duty of -).  In  the  case  of  an  open  market  (where 
e 
there are no subsidies) the equation comes down to  [ e  (pi+ t i )  - a  =  c m 
+ tm.J 
We can thus determine the maximum pithead cost at which the output of 
a  particular coalfield will be competitive for each consumer group located in 
the same place. By carrying out the same calculation for all the consumption 
zones we obtain a  demand curve for the output of the coalfield in question 
and by  comparing  this  curve  with  a  supply  curve  based  on  the  cost  curve 
plotted in Chapter 6, which corresponds to  an assumed efficiency  trend~ we 
can calculate the proportion of the coalfield's output which can be marketed 
in  face  of  competition  from  imported  products  under  given  protection  or 
subsidy conditions. 
1
) 
Before applying these specimen calculations~ five points require definition: 
A-
B 
c 
D 
E-
factors involved in coal-coal and coal-fuel oil-gas comparisons; 
regional breakdown of energy requirements; 
calculation of transport costs; 
definition of supply curves; 
privileged outlets. 
A  - Factors involved in coal-coal and coal-fuel oil-gas comparisons 
In determining the comparative consumer cost of various  fuels~ we must 
bear  in  mind  differences  in  the  efficiency  of  equipment  and  any  specific 
advantages  (cleanness~ ease  of  handling~ flexibility  etc.)  possessed  by  given 
products; these items have been represented above by e  and a. 
1)  In practice the calculations  which  follow  usc  D  =  o  and  different  values  of S, hut the 
results are the same if we replace S  by__!!__ or even by S' and D' so that S  S'  plus _Q_ 
e  e 
138 The  comparisons  for  coal-coal  (Community  and  imported  coal,  or  coal 
from different fields) are the simplest, since a is not involved. The only correc-
tion to be made is for quality differences between imported and Community 
coal. The following table shows that these differences range from 4% to 10% 
for coking coal and 7% to 16% for steam coal. 
1
) 
Table  43  - Coal Quality Differences according to  Origin 
U.S.A. 
Ruhr 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
Lorraine 
Belgian coalfields 
Saar 
Dutch Limburg 
Origin 
Fall in value by comparison 
with American coal  (0/o) 
steam 
- 7.2 
- 9.4 
- 16.0 
-11.5 
-13.7 
- 15.0 
coking 
4.1 
- 8.2 
- 7.5 
-10.3 
8.2 
- 6.8 
The  coal-fuel  oil,  coal-gas  and  fuel  oil-gas  comparisons  are  more  tricky, 
however, and involve technical and economic data which at present are only 
available to  a  very limited extent. 
In order to overcome this difficulty, we shall proeeed in stages: 
(a)  Coal-coal comparison 
Since they have different markets, coking coal, steam coal and anthracite 
should  be  examined separately,  although  the  outputs  of the  first  two  types 
are  not  absolutely  independent  of  each  other  in  that  coking  coal  consists 
of fines,  the production of which is  automatically accompanied by that of a 
certain volume of graded coal. We have assumed a  figure  of one metric ton 
of graded coal, used for steam raising, for every three metric tons of fines. 
1)  These coefficients are the result of estimates which are open to some doubt. A  group of 
experts  consulted  by  the  High  Autority  has  put  forward  the  following  somewhat  dif-
ferent set of figures : 
Ruhr 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
Lorraine 
Belgian coalfields 
Saar 
Dutch Limburg 
Steam  coal 
- 4.6 
-13.2 
2.8 
0.1 
0.1 
Coking coal 
8.6 
5.0 
2.8 
- 10.3 
8.6 
- 5.7 
Unfortunately  these  coefficients  only  refer  to  about  25'0/o  of  the  output  marketed  in 
1960. The tonnages involved do not constitute a  representative sample of the entire out-
pot, since  they mainly  consist of certain specified  grades for particular uses.  The  coef-
ficients  representing  this  portion  of  the  output  are  thus  useless  for  the  present  study, 
which deals with the market as  a  whole. 
139 It should  also  be  noted  that  coke  for  the  iron  and  steel  industry  only 
represents  a  fraction  of the  total output  of  cokes-ovens.  We  have  assumed 
that in 1975 this fraction,  which  comprises not only blast furnace  coke but 
also  coke  dust  for  sintering  plants,  will  represent  87%  of  the  total  coke 
output. 
Allowing  for  the  fact  that  Community  coking  coal  is  relatively  more 
competitive than steam coal by comparison with the corresponding imported 
varieties, we can proceed with our investigation in the following order : 
(i)  joint production, a  certain output of graded steam coal and coke for 
demand for coke in the iron and steel industry, which implies,  as  a 
joint production, a  certain output of graded steam coal and coke for 
consumers outside the iron and steel industry; 
(ii)  satisfaction of fuel demands. 
(b)  Incorporation of fuel oil and gas into the analysis 
First of all we shall see to what extent competition between fuel oil and 
gas is  capable of altering the marketing pattern outlined above for  Commu-
nity  coal. 
We shall then examine the competitive position of coal and fuel oil more 
concisely. 
B - Regional breakdown of energy requirements 
The first stage is to break down the estimated future energy requirements 
of each  country into  regions.  At  the  present time  we  have  no  information 
on  future  growth  rates  of  individual  regions  by  comparison  with  national 
figures, and consequently as  a working hypothesis, subject to eventual correc-
tion, we have assumed that all regions  will  develop  at the same rate  as  the 
country as a whole, except as regards iron and steel production (see below). 
1
) 
The regional demarcation adopted is based on that given by the E.E.C. in its 
Essai de delimitation regionale de la C.E.E., with Germany divided into eight 
Lander and France into nine  regions. 
2
)  Each region is  then represented by 
a  consumption centre. 
It will be obvious that for large regions whose consumption is not concen-
trated  around  the  centre  selected  (e.g.  the  Lander  south  of  North  Rhine-
Westphalia) this is only a  very approximate method. 
1)  We  shall find  later on that the  differences  by  comparison  with  this  homothetical trend 
are not  likely to  make  mnch  difference  to  the  conclusions  reached  on  Community coal 
outlets. 
2)  For the  time  being  we  have  considered  Italy  as  a  single  unit  (although the  E.E.C.  dis-
tinguishes six regions), since there is  no likely outlet for Community coal in Italy. 
140 Graph VI 
Map of the Community showing  Re·gional  Boundaries, Ports  of Entry 
and Representative Localities 
- Coalfield 
Representative  locality 
•  Port of entry  and  representative  locality 
D  Port  of entry 
Boundary  of  economic  region As regards fuel requirements, the results of the calculation are summarised 
in Table 44. It will be noted that power station requirements which are bound 
to be covered by inevitable or quasi-inevitable sources, i.e. blast furnace  gas 
and brown coal, are excluded. 
Table 44 - Regional Fuel Requirement Outlook in  1970  ('OOO,OOOm.t.  H.C.E.) 
I 
Thermal 
I 
power 
! 
Other  Domestic  stations 
(excluding  Total  industries  sector  brown coal 
and  blast 
furnace  gas)t) 
Germany (Fed.  Rep.) 
Schleswig-Holstein  3.0  4.6  3.1  10.7 
Lower  Saxony  4.8  7.3  5.9  18.0 
North 
Rhine-Westphalia  21.0  17.0  23.1  61.1 
Hess  en  3.0  5.1  4.0  12.1 
Rhineland-Palatinate  3.7  3.6  5.2  12.5 
Baden-Wiirttemberg  4.7  8.2  5.2  18.1 
Bavaria  5.6  10.1  4.7  20.4 
(Saar)  - - 1.9  1.9 
Total  45.8  55.9  53.1  154.8 
France 
Paris and Paris Region  4.8  8.6  7.2  20.6 
Paris Basin  4.8  5.1  5.6  15.3 
North  6.0  6.7  6.2  18.9 
East  4.5  4.2  4.1  12.8 
West  1.3  2.7  0.7  4.7 
Massif  Central  0.8  1.1  - 1.9 
South-West  2.8  ?.9  1.7  7.4 
South-East 
I 
4.6  4.3  {  4.5  {  18.2  Mediterranean  2.6  2.2 
Total 
I 
32.0  37.8  30.0  99.8 
Belgium  5.8  10.6  8.8  25.2 
Italy  33.0  18.0  18.9  69.9 
Luxembourg  0.14  0.49  0.20  0.83 
Netherlands  8.4  10.2  11.0  29.6 
Community Total  125.1  133.0  122.0  380.1 
1)  Adjustment to  the  total requirements  of  the sector  as  determined  in  Part Two  is  achieved 
by adding the demand met by brown  coal  and blast furnace  gas,  viz. : 
I  Total 
Blast  Other  require-
Table  44  Brown  ments  Country  total  Furnace  coal  com- of thermal 
I 
gas  bustibles  power 
stations 
Germany  (Fe,d.  Rep.)  53.1  1.4  21.2  0.5  76.2 
France  30.0  2.0  1.0  - 33.0 
Belgium  8.8  0.6  - - 9.4 
Italy  18.9  0.3  0.7  - 19.9 
Luxembourg  0.2  0.7  - - 0.9 
Netherlands  11.0  0.1  - - 11.1 
------
Community  122.0  5.1  22.9  0.5  150.5 
142 The method adopted for fuel requirements nevertheless requires correction 
when  applied  to  the  geographical  distribution  of  pig  iron  production.  We 
must allow for  the  fact  that iron ore  production in  the  Community cannot 
increase much after 1965 and that the rising demand will mainly be met from 
imported  ore.  This  means  that  the  present  tendency  in  the  iron  and  steel 
industry to shift towards  the coast will probably continue and that pig iron 
output in the present inland production areas will increase less  rapidly than 
total output. 
To sum up, we have worked on the basis of two hypotheses for pig iron 
production (Table 45): the main hypothesis A corresponds to the shift towards 
the  coast,  the  results  of  which  are  contrasted  with  those  of  hypothesis  B, 
representing  a  homothetic  development of the  anticipated  1965  position  in 
the years between 1965 and 1970 (and 1975). 
Table  45  - Pig  Iron  Production  Location  Outlook  in  1970  and  Regional  Breakdown  of 
Coking  Coal  Requirements  ('000,000  m. t.) 
Pig iron Production 
1960  1970 
I 
A  B 
Germany  (Fed.  Rep.)  25.7  34  34 
North Rhine-Westphalia  18.0  23  24 
Schleswig-Holstein, Lower 
Saxony  3.2  6  5 
Saar  3.3  4  4 
Remainder  1.2  1  1 
France  14.0 
I  21  21 
East  10.5  12.5  15 
North  (non-coastal)  2.3  3  3 
North  (coastal)  - 3  1 
West  0.8  1  1 
South  (coastal)  and  other 
regions  0.4  2  1 
Belgium  6.5  9  9 
Interior  6.5  7  7.5 
Coast  - 2  1.5 
Italy  2.7  9  9 
Luxembourg  3.7  4  4 
Nether  lands  1.3  3  3 
Community 
I  54.0  I  80  80 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Coking coal 
requirements 
1970 
A 
I 
B 
38  38 
26  27 
6  5 
5  5 
1  I  1 
25.5  25.5 
16  18 
3.5  4 
3  1 
1  1 
2  1 
10.5  10.5 
8.5  9 
2  1.5 
9  9 
6  6 
3  3 
92  92 
The  foregoing  table  gives  the  anticipated  location  of  blast  furnaces  in 
1970, although the coking coal is actually consumed by the coke-ovens, and it 
143 is  the location of the latter which must be taken into  account in comparing 
the costs of CoP.Jmunity and imported coal. 
As  the  present  time  we  have  pithead  coking  plants  and  blast  furnace 
coking plants  (Table 46).  In view of the  long  life  of these plants,  we  shall 
assume that the present capacity of pithead coking plants will be maintained 
in the years to  come  and  that any  other plants  required  will  be located  at 
iron and steel plants. 
This table supplements Table 45 and relates to four coalfields; Nord and 
Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine, South Belgium and Dutch Limburg. In the Ruhr and 
the Saar we have assumed that pits and iron and steel plants are located in 
the same place and in the Campine there are no pit head coking plants. 
The previous tables relate to 1970. The figures for 1965 and 1975 represent 
a regular trend between now and 1975. 
Table  46 - Coking Plant Production Capacity  ('OOO,OOOm.t.) 
Region  1960  output 
Pithead coking plants 
Ruhr  31.7 
Aachen  1.9 
Lower  Saxony  0.1 
Saar  1.6 
Belgium  and  Netherlands  4.3 
North-Pas-de-Calais  4.8 
Lorraine  1.9 
Centre/Midi  0.7 
TotaP)  46.9 
Blast  furnace  coking plants 
Germany  9.5 
Belgium and Netherlands  6.0 
France  4.4 
Italy  1.9 
TotaP)  21.8 
Independent  coking plants 
Belgium and Netherlands  1.8 
France  -
Italy  1.8 
To  taP)  3.6 
Grand  To  taP)  72.2 
I 
Capacity 
actual, 
beginning 1961 
40.9 
1.9 
-
1.6 
4.5 
4.9 
1.9 
0.8 
56.5 
11.1 
6.3 
4.7 
2.3 
24.3 
1.9 
-
2.5 
4.4 
85.3 
I 
anticipated, 
beginning 1966 
40.8 
1.9 
-
1.7 
4.4 
5.8 
3.1 
1.0 
58.7 
10.8 
6.3 
4.8 
5.1 
27.0 
1.6 
-
2.6 
4.2 
89.9 
Source:  Investment in the Community Coalmining and Iron and Steel Industries, July 1961,  page 
44,  and July 1962,  page 44. 
1)  Rounded figures,  which may therefore  differ slightly from  the sum of the individual items. 
144 C - Calculation of transport costs 
Estimates of future transport costs are extremely difficult. An investigation 
of the probable trend in costs of different forms of transport would have been 
desirable,  hut the  extreme  complexity  of  cost  calculations  in  the  transport 
sector,  due  to  the  provision of  a  large  number  of related  services  and  the 
fact that transport capacities do not increase at a  predictable steady rate, hut 
rather  in  a  series  of  erratic  laps,  has  prevented  upon  us  embarking  on  a 
study of this kind. It should also he noted that the illlportant factor in energy 
studies is not costs but charges, and that an element of uncertainty thus arises 
as to the transport charges policy which will operate in the Community. 
In view of these difficulties we have worked on the basis of 1960 transport 
charges and the cheapest form of transport on each route, except in two cases 
where major projects now in hand will considerably improve inland waterway 
facilities,  namely the  canalisation of the  Moselle  as  far  as  Metz  and  of the 
Main as  far as  N uremherg. 
The fact that 1960 rates have been utilised in no  way anticipates future 
trends in transport policy,  especially  as  regards the harmonisation of tariffs 
for different forms of transport. The differences between the specimen calcu-
lations  worked  out  below  can  equally  well  he  interpreted  in  terms  of  the 
influence  of transport policy measures  or  as  expressing  trends  in imported 
energy prices or the influence of official policy in the energy sphere proper. 
D - Definition of supply curves 
The  volume  of  Community  coal  capable  of  competing  with  imported 
products depends on the supply curve used in the calculations. Several diffe-
rent types of curve can he envisaged. 
We shall assume a single pithead price per coalfield and type of coal which 
is  independent of the kind of consumer and the use  to  which the  coal will 
be  put.  The  first  hypothesis  is  then  as  follows :  this  price  represents  the 
production  costs  of  the  marginal  pit,  in  other  words  the  supply  curve  is 
identical with the cost curve given in Chapter 6  and the level of equilibrium 
corresponds  to  the  intersection  of  this  curve  and  the  demand  curve  whose 
form has been explained above : a quantity q can he sold at a pit head price p. 
This hypothesis will constitute the basis of our specimen calculations. 
There is  also  a  second hypothesis whereby each coalfield  always  sells  at 
a  single price equal to average production costs. 
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Pt 
Cost  and  prices 
Cost of the  marginal  mine  1n  the  coalfield 
Demand 
\. 
Tonnages 
Ignoring for the time being the actual methods adopted in such a  process~ 
we can see straightaway that it would lead to higher sales q1  and a lower selling 
pnce Pl. 
We  can  also  envisage  a  differential  pithead  price  structure  for  a  given 
quality of coal whereby each consumer pays the same price as for  imported 
coal; the saleable output would then be even higher than in the previous cases. 
In the long term,  however~ the adoption of such methods by the seller would 
lead  to  the  industry being chased  out of coalmining  areas  and  at the  same 
time  attract oil refineries  into  them; this  would operate  against the  sought-
after aim of increasing coal outlets. 
In the  calculations  which  follow  we  shall  mainly  concern  ourselves  with 
the first hypothesis hut also give results for the second. 
E  - Privileged outlets 
A  substantial  proportion  of  coal  output~ varying  according  to  the  field 
involved, is supplied direct by pits for certain purposes without going through 
the  market.  Particular  examples  are  deliveries  to  pithead  coking  plants~ 
pithead  sintering  plants,  pithead  power  stations  and  employees,  as  well  as 
collieries~ own  consumption.  In 1960  these  supplies  represented  about 45% 
of the marketed total. 
The conditions under wh~ch these supplies compete with imported energy 
are obviously special ones. Collieries will always tend to use their own output 
rather than feed  their  coking  plants  or power  stations  with  imported  coal~ 
even if the  latter  is  cheaper.  This  trend  will  he  particularly  noticeable  in 
146 coking plants  running on Community  coal  where  a  changeover  to  imported 
coal  would  entail  substantial  modifications.  In  the  long  term  this  practice 
would be limited by the need to ensure the financial stability of the : collieries-
plus-coking-plants-plus-power-stations complex. 
In order to deal fully with the question of competitiveness between Com-
munity  coal  and  imported  energy  it  would  be  necessary  to  examine  the 
possible selling prices of gas, coke and electricity, i.e. to study competitiveness 
between  pithead  and  blast  furnace  coking  plants,  between  pithead  coking 
plants and the  gas  industry  and between pithead power stations  and  public 
power stations. This is out of the question, at least for the moment. We shall 
therefore proceed in two stages : 
·w:r.;.a 
(i)  we  shall  first  of  all  examine  competitiveness  between various  forms 
of energy irrespective of legal ties  between pits  and  users,  which  is 
the obvious approach to adopt in a  long-term view; 
(ii)  we  shall  see  to  what  extent  these  ties  can  affect  the  above  results 
during the period covered by the forecast. 
Section 2 - Detailed examination of a specimen calculation 
In order to illustrate the application of the calculating methods explained 
above, we shall now show the detailed stages involved in a specimen calculation 
for the year 1970. 
1
) 
A - Coal-coal  competition 
We have already seen that at consumer level there is no difference between 
Community coal and imported coal when 
e  (Pi  + D + td =  Cm- S + tm 
If  e =  1, this equation can be written Cm =  Pi + D + S + t i- tm. 
The calculation is  based on the hypothesis that Pi + D + Sis $15.00 for 
American steam coal and  $17.00  for  American coking  coal.  For steam  coal, 
for example, this figure of $15.00 can be interpreted as a c.i.f. price of $13.00 
plus assistance [(customs duty plus subsidy) of $2.00 or as a c.i.f. price of $14.00 
plus assistance] amounting to $1.00 or again as  a  c.i.f. price of $15.00 and no 
assistance. The calculation can proceed in the same way whatever the inter-
pretation. 
2
)  To make the calculation more explicit, we shall assume that we 
1)  This section can be omitted by rea,ders  who  are only interested in the results, which  are 
to be found  in Chapter 15. 
2
)  Subject to minor differences due to  the fact that e  differs  slightly from 1. 
147 have adopted the interpretation of a  c.i.f.  price of $13.00  and  a  subsidy of 
$2.00 (and for coking coal a c.i.f. price of $15.00 plus a  subsidy of $2.00), but 
no conclusion should be drawn from this example because it is designed solely 
to illustrate the method of procedure. 
We shall take coking coal, steam coal and anthracite in that order. 
(a)  Coking coal 
1970 requirements amount to 92 million metric tons distributed regionally 
as  shown in Table 45 above. 
With a  price c.i.f.  Rotterdam  (not discharged)  of $15.00,  Table 47  gives 
the  "delivered"  price  in  the  different  consumption  areas  (column  3)  and, 
allowing  for  quality  differences,  the  competitive  pithead  price  for  various 
Community coalfields (column 6)  and finally the maximum cost including the 
subsidy (column 7). 
We can then see what the supply pattern would be for each iron and steel 
production area. 
Table  47 - Marketing  Conditions  for  Community  Coking  Coal  assuming  a  c.i.f. 
Coal Price of $15.00 and a  Community Coal Subsidy of $2.00  ($m.t.) 
Imported 
I  Commu-~ 
nity coal  Pithead  Pithead 
c.i.f.  equivalent  equivalent tnaximum 
Iron  and  Steel  Port  of  coal  delivered  Coalfield  price  cost  production  aera  entry  price  price  for  I  e (Pi+ti)  e(pi+ti)  Commu-
I  nity  Coal  -tm  -tm.+S 
e (Pi+ti) 
2  3  4  6  7 
North 
Rhine-Westphalia  Rotterdam  16.90  16.20  Ruhr  15.90  17.90 
Lower  Saxony  Bremen  17.90  17.20  Ruhr  14.20  16.20 
Schleswig-Holstein  Hamburg  16.00  15.30  Ruhr  11.30  13.30 
Saar  Rotterdam  18.80  18.00  Saar  13.20  15.20 
France-East  Rotterdam  18.60  17.20  Saar  15.80  17.80 
17.80  Lorraine  14.30  16.30 
France-North  Dunkirk  17.20  15.80  Nord-
(non-coastel)  \Pas-de-Calais  15.10  17.10 
North  Coast  Dunkirk  15.90  14.60  Nord-
Belgium-interior  Antwerp  16.80  15.10  Pas-de-Calais  13.00  15.00 
(Liege)  16.10  Cam  pine  13.90  15.90 
Coast  15.80  14.20  Ruhr  14.00  16.00 
Italy  Genoa  16.40  15.70  Cam  pine  12.30  14.30 
Luxembourg  Rotterdam  18.80  18.00  Ruhr  10.70  12.70 
Netherlands  Rotterdam  16.00  14.90  Ruhr  14.00  16.00 
Dutch 
Limburg  13.60  15.60 
148 Germany. - Ruhr coal is competitive in all consumption areas in Germany 
except on the coast. 
For Saar iron and steel plants we can envisage mixed supplies, the majority 
being  from  the  Saar  (3  million  metric  tons),  supplemented  by  Ruhr  coal 
(2 million metric tons). 
Belgium.- In 1970 the Campine basin will he able to supply the 8.5 million 
metric tons of coking coal required by the inland iron and steel industry. 
For iron and steel plants on the coast, however, the Campine is  not com-
petitive with imported coal. 
France.  - For supplies  to  iron  and  steel  plants  in Lorraine,  locational 
advantages offer substantial protection against imported coal, hut there is  a 
possibility of outlets being shared between Lorraine, the Saar and the Ruhr 
in view of comparative costs and the technical need to obtain supplementary 
coal from the Ruhr. The calculations give us a  figure of 6  million metric tons 
from Lorraine, 4  million metric tons from the Saar and 6  million metric tons 
from the Ruhr. 
A  strict calculation would show that the Nord and Pas-de-Calais coalfield 
could dispose of only 3.5 million metric tons to pithead coking plants, whereas 
the  capacity  of  the  latter  is  some  6  million  metric  tons.  Nevertheless  the 
advantage  of  obtaining  supplies  from  the  local  coalfield  (easy  availability 
and coke-ovens specially built for this  type of coal)  suggest that in fact  5.5 
million metric tons could he sold. 
All the coastal iron and steel industry's requirements will he covered by 
imports. 
Italy. - There are  no possibilities  of supplies from European coalfields 
(they would require a pithead price of less than $11.00). 
Luxembourg. - In view of transport costs  (with the Moselle  canal)  and 
quality differences, the Ruhr can supply the entire requirements of the Luxem-
bourg iron and steel industry. 
Netherlands. - Limburg coking coal can cover the country's entire requi-
rements. 
Community. - The above results are summarised in Table 48. Community 
coalfields will supply 74 million metric tons and imports 18 million metric tons. 
Two conclusions can he drawn from this : 
(i)  Community coal can supply all the pithead coking plants expected to 
he in operation in 1966 (Table 46); 
(  ii)  imported coal will only he used in Italy and for the coastal iron and 
steel industry. 
149 Table  48 - Coking  Coal  Supplie's  for  the  Community  Iron  and  Steel  Industry  in  1970 
hypothesis :  import price + duty + subsi,dy  =  $17.00)  ('OOO,OOOm.t.) 
--
I 
Nord 
cam- and  Lor- Dutch I Com- Im- Country  Ruhr  Saar  pinet)  Pas- raine  Lim- munity  ports  Total 
I  de- burg 
i  I  Calais 
I 
I 
Germany 
(Fed.  Rep.)  32  3  - - - - 35  3  38 
Belgium  - - 8.5  - - - 8.5  2  10.5 
France  6  4  - 5.5  6  - 21.5  4  25.5 
Italy  - - - - - - - 9  9 
Luxembourg  6  - - - - - 6  - 6 
Netherlands  - - - - - 3  3  - 3 
--------------
-3-174 
------
Community  44  7  8.5  5.5  6  18  92 
1)  Under this calculation the s.  Belgian coalfield  markets  no  coking  coal. 
These  figures  assume  that there  will  be  a  considerable  shift  towards the 
coast in pig iron production. Such a  pattern is  obviously uncertain and it is 
interesting to  see  the  results  of calculating  on  the  basis  of the  other hypo-
thesis~  whereby  coastal  plants  are  less  numerous.  The  differences  concern 
Germany~ Belgium and France. 
In Germany we  can envisage  a  reduction  in  the import figure  by  about 
1  million metric tons in favour of the Ruhr; in Belgium the difference would 
be 0.5 million tons in favour of the Campine. In France the difference would 
be 1  million metric  tons in favour  of either the  Nord  and  Pas-de-Calais  or 
Ruhr coalfields. The overall difference would be about 3  million metric tons. 
Finally  it must  be  noted  that  these  disposals  figures  are  based  on  the 
implicit assumption  that the  associated  output of graded  coal  and  coke  for 
consumers outside the iron and steel industry would be sold at least at cost 
price  and  that  coking  coal  would  no  longer  have  to  support  the  burden 
represented by the selling price of graded coal. Later  on~ when dealing with 
steam  fuel~ we shall see whether this assumption is  justified. 
(b)  Steam coal 
As  regards  steam  coal~ competition  exists  between  Community  coal~  im-
ported coal and fuel oil. 
As explained above, we shall first of all work on the basis of there being 
only  two  competing  products~  Community  and  imported  coal.  If the  c.i.f. 
cost per calorie of imported coal and fuel oil is  the same inland the  use  of 
fuel oil is  at least a§  advantageous  as  imported coal and often more so. The 
calculation will  thus  overestimate the potential outlets  for  Community  coal. 
150 At a later stage we shall attempt an approximate estimate of the market which 
would in fact have to be abandoned to fuel oil. 
The basic specimen calculation which we are now investigating represents 
an import price of $13.00 
1
)  for  American  coal  and  a  subsidy of  $2.00 per 
metric ton for Community coal. 
Table 49  gives  the  cost of imported  coal  carriage  paid  to  point of  con-
sumption  and  the  corresponding  pithead  cost,  corrected  for  differences  in 
quality. It will be noticed that the maximum pithead cost is always for outlets 
situated in the same region as  the pit; this factor will govern the procedure 
adopted in the calculations. 
First of all we shall examine outlets near the pit. Table 44 has given us a 
possible  regional  breakdown  of  solid,  liquid  and  gaseous  fuel  requirements 
for 1970. From the previous chapter we can determine the ceiling in the solid 
fuel market. The second stage is  to deduce the following inevitable or quasi-
inevitable items : 
(i)  brown coal {and briquettes); 
(ii)  small coke (equal to 1/10th of coking coal); 
(iii)  anthracite  (see  (c)  below); 
(iv)  graded coal associated with consumption of Community coking  coal 
(1/3rd of coking coal). 
It is  the remainder of the market which has  to  be investigated for  com-
petitiveness with imported coal. 
VIe  are then faced with three possibilities : 
(i)  the coalfield's steam coal is  completely uncompetitive with imported 
coal; 
(ii)  the coalfield's steam coal is  only competitive with imported coal in 
a  portion of the market; 
(iii)  the coalfield's steam coal is  competitive with imported coal through-
out the market. 
In the first two  cases  the analysis  is  at an  end. In the  case  of the third 
we must see whether the output of the coalfields can be marketed in other 
regions;  the procedure for this fresh  analysis  is  then identical with  that set 
forth  above. 
The  systematic application  of this method to  all  coalfields  enables  us  to 
estimate the outlets in industry and the domestic sector (excluding anthracite) 
on the one hand and at power stations on the other. 
1)  This  price  applies  to  fines;  for  graded  coal  we  must  allow  between  $  0.50  and  $  1.00 
extra. 
151 T
a
b
l
e
 
4
9
 
-
M
a
r
k
e
t
i
n
g
 
C
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
S
t
e
a
m
 
C
o
a
l
 
(
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
 
:
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
c
.
 
i
.
 
f
.
 
A
R
A
 
p
o
r
t
 
+
 
d
u
t
y
 
+
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
y
 
=
 
$
 
1
5
.
0
0
)
 
/
D
e
l
i
v
e
r
e
d
 
E
q
u
i
v
a
-
P
i
t
h
e
a
d
 
A
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
!
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
l
e
n
t
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
-
P
o
r
t
 
o
f
 
c
o
s
t
t
)
 
o
f
 
d
e
l
i
v
e
r
e
d
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
 
t
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
n
t
r
y
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
-
1
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
f
r
o
m
 
p
i
t
 
e
 
(
P
i
+
 
t
i
)
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
 
s
u
m
e
r
 
c
o
a
l
 
C
o
m
m
u
-
1
 
-
t
m
 
-
t
m
 
P
j
+
t
j
 
n
i
t
y
 
c
o
a
l
 
1
 
I
 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
(
F
.
 
R
.
)
 
I
 
S
c
h
l
e
s
w
i
g
-
H
a
m
b
u
r
g
 
H
a
m
b
u
r
g
 
1
.
0
0
 
1
4
.
0
0
 
1
3
.
0
0
 
4
.
0
0
 
9
.
0
0
 
H
o
l
s
t
e
i
n
 
L
o
w
e
r
 
S
a
x
o
n
y
 
H
a
n
n
o
v
e
r
 
B
r
e
m
e
n
 
2
.
9
0
 
1
5
.
9
0
 
1
4
.
8
0
 
3
.
0
0
 
1
1
.
8
0
 
N
o
r
t
h
 
R
h
i
n
e
-
D
u
i
s
b
u
r
g
-
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
1
.
9
0
 
1
4
.
9
0
 
1
3
.
0
0
 
0
-
0
.
5
0
 
1
3
.
3
0
-
1
3
.
8
0
 
W
e
s
t
p
h
a
l
i
a
 
E
s
s
e
n
 
H
e
s
s
e
n
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
2
.
3
0
 
1
5
.
3
0
 
1
4
.
2
0
 
3
.
1
0
 
1
1
.
1
0
 
R
h
i
n
e
l
a
n
d
-
C
o
b
l
e
n
z
 
I
 
2
.
1
0
 
1
5
.
1
0
 
1
4
.
0
0
 
2
.
8
0
 
1
1
.
2
0
 
P
a
l
a
t
i
n
a
t
e
 
3
.
8
0
 
1
1
.
0
0
 
B
a
d
e
n
-
S
t
u
t
t
g
a
r
t
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
2
.
9
0
 
1
5
.
9
0
 
1
4
.
8
0
 
3
.
2
0
 
1
1
.
2
0
 
W
t
i
r
t
t
e
m
b
e
r
g
 
M
a
n
n
h
e
i
m
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
2
.
5
0
 
1
5
.
5
0
 
1
4
.
4
0
 
3
.
4
0
 
1
1
.
0
0
 
B
a
v
a
r
i
a
 
N
u
r
e
m
b
e
r
g
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
3
.
7
0
 
1
6
.
7
0
 
1
5
.
5
0
 
3
.
7
0
 
1
1
.
8
0
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
P
a
r
i
s
 
P
a
r
i
s
 
L
e
 
H
a
v
r
e
 
3
.
0
0
 
1
6
.
0
0
 
1
4
.
8
0
 
4
.
0
0
 
1
0
.
8
0
 
1
4
.
5
0
 
2
.
9
0
 
1
1
.
6
0
 
P
a
r
i
s
 
B
a
s
i
n
 
R
o
u
e
n
 
L
e
 
H
a
v
r
e
 
1
.
9
0
 
1
4
.
9
0
 
1
3
.
5
0
 
3
.
0
0
 
1
0
.
5
0
 
N
o
r
t
h
 
L
i
l
l
e
 
D
u
n
k
i
r
k
 
2
.
2
0
 
1
5
.
2
0
 
1
3
.
8
0
 
0
.
5
0
-
1
.
0
0
 
1
2
.
8
0
-
1
3
.
3
0
 
E
a
s
t
 
T
h
i
o
n
v
i
l
l
e
 
A
n
t
w
e
r
p
-
3
.
6
0
 
1
6
.
6
0
 
1
3
.
9
0
 
1
.
4
0
 
1
2
.
5
0
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
1
5
.
4
0
 
3
.
5
0
 
1
1
.
9
0
 
1
4
.
4
0
 
1
.
5
0
 
1
2
.
9
0
 
S
t
r
a
s
b
o
u
r
g
 
A
n
t
w
e
r
p
-
3
.
2
0
 
1
6
.
2
0
 
I
 
1
5
.
0
0
 
3
.
2
0
 
1
1
.
8
0
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
1
3
.
6
0
 
2
.
2
0
 
1
1
.
4
0
 
I
 
1
4
.
0
0
 
I
 
2
.
6
0
 
1
1
.
4
0
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
B
r
u
s
s
e
l
s
 
A
n
t
w
e
r
p
 
2
.
0
0
 
1
5
.
0
0
 
1
3
.
3
0
 
I
 
1
.
8
0
 
1
1
.
5
0
 
L
i
e
g
e
 
A
n
t
w
e
r
p
 
1
.
8
0
 
1
4
.
8
0
 
1
3
.
1
0
 
1
.
2
0
 
1
1
.
9
0
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
2
.
1
0
 
1
5
.
1
0
 
1
3
.
4
0
 
1
.
9
0
 
1
1
.
5
0
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
W
e
s
t
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
 
R
o
t
t
e
r
d
a
m
 
I
 
0
.
8
0
-
1
.
3
0
 
1
3
.
8
0
-
1
4
.
3
0
 
1
1
.
7
0
-
1
2
.
2
0
 
I
 
6
.
3
0
 
1
0
.
4
0
-
1
0
.
9
0
 
L
i
m
b
u
r
g
 
1
.
7
0
 
1
4
.
7
0
 
1
2
.
5
0
 
-
1
2
.
5
0
 
I
 
P
i
t
h
e
a
d
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
c
o
s
t
 
C
o
a
l
f
i
e
l
d
 
e
 
(
p
j
+
t
i
)
 
-
t
m
+
S
 
i
 
9
 
1
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
1
.
0
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
3
.
8
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
5
.
3
0
-
1
5
.
8
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
3
.
1
0
 
S
a
a
r
 
1
3
.
2
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
3
.
0
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
3
.
2
0
 
S
a
a
r
 
1
3
.
0
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
3
.
8
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
2
.
8
0
 
I
 
N
o
r
d
-
P
.
-
d
.
-
C
.
 
1
3
.
6
0
 
\
N
o
r
d
-
P
 
.
-
d
.
-
C
.
 
1
2
.
5
0
 
.
N
o
r
d
-
P
.
-
d
.
-
C
.
 
1
4
.
8
0
-
1
5
.
3
0
 
L
o
r
r
a
i
n
e
 
1
4
.
5
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
3
.
9
0
 
S
a
a
r
 
1
4
.
9
0
 
R
u
h
r
 
1
3
.
8
0
 
L
o
r
r
a
i
n
e
 
1
3
.
4
0
 
S
a
a
r
 
1
3
.
4
0
 
C
a
m
 
p
i
n
e
 
1
3
.
5
0
 
C
a
m
 
p
i
n
e
 
1
3
.
9
0
 
S
.
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
1
3
.
5
0
 
L
i
m
b
u
r
g
 
1
2
.
4
0
-
1
2
.
9
0
 
L
i
m
b
u
r
g
 
I
 
1
4
.
5
0
 
1
)
 
T
h
i
s
 
I
t
e
m
 
m
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
r
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
a
s
 
a
g
a
m
s
t
 
A
R
A
 
c
.
I
.
f
.
 
p
n
c
e
,
 
d
e
d
u
c
t
i
O
n
 
o
f
 
2
°
/
o
 
m
 
l
l
e
u
 
o
f
 
w
e
i
g
h
m
g
,
 
d
i
s
c
h
a
r
g
m
g
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
l
a
n
d
 
f
r
e
i
g
h
t
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
u
n
l
o
a
d
i
n
g
 
c
h
a
r
g
e
s
 
a
t
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
'
s
 
e
n
d
.
 As regards the latter, we must lastly compare the coal disposals figure with 
the  probable  requirements  of  pithead  power  stations  on  the  basis  of  the 
anticipated 1965 capacities of the latter (see Table 50). The method of calcu-
lation employed, including the concentration of demand at a  single point in 
each region, means that we cannot take precise account of the advantage to 
pithead stations of being in the immediate vicinity of their source of supply. 
The figures for certain outlets should thus he raised slightly, so that all pithead 
stations will run on Community coal. 
Table  50 - Pithead Power Stations 
Ruhr 
Aachen 
Lower  Saxony 
Saar 
Campine 
S.  Belgium 
Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Lorraine 
Centre/Midi 
Italy 
Dutch Limburg 
Total 
1960  coal 
consumption 
('000,000  m.  t.) 
7.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.8 
0.4 
1.2 
3.2 
1.7 
1.1 
0.9 
17.0 
Actual  capacity,  I Estimated  capacity, 
beginning of 1961  beginning of 1966 
('000,000  kW)  ('000,000  kW) 
3.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.5 
0.4 
o.a 
1.3 
0.7 
0.6 
0.1 
0.4 
8.5 
5.2 
0.3 
0.2 
0.8 
0.4 
0.9 
1.3 
0.7 
0.5 
0.3 
0.5 
11.6 
Cost curves are not available for Lower Saxony, the French Centre/Midi 
or  Italy.  On  the  basis  of  available  information  and  comparisons  between 
these fields and those already studied we have assumed that 1970 market will 
he about 5 million metric tons (1960 production was 13.5 million metric tons). 
We thus arrive at the final figures for all Community coalfields as  shown 
in Table 51. 
Table  51  - Steam Coal Outlets from Community Coalfields in 1970 under a  Specimen Cal-
culation  (hypothesis : import price + duty + subsidy  =  $15.00m.t.) 
('000,000  m.  t.) 
-------------------------------------------~-------------------------
Industry  and  domestic  sector 
Power stations 
Total steam coal 
24 
45 
69 
153 (c)  Anthracite 
Output in 1960 was 19 million metric tons. This is  a  quality product with 
a  high  market value  and  competition with  oil  products  will  he  particularly 
marked.  In  the  absence  of  a  detailed  analysis  we  can  assume  that  future 
figures  will be  as  shown in Table  52,  which  shows  a  slightly  falling  output 
trend. 
Table  52  - Anthracite  Marketing  Estimates  ('OOO,OOOm.t.) 
Marketing estimates 
1960 
output  1965  1970  1975 
Ruhr 
Aachen 
Lower  Saxony 
S.  Belgium 
Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
Centre/Midi 
Netherlands 
Total 
(d)  Hard  coal  as  a  whole 
I 
I 
4.4 
2.1 
0.2 
5.9 
1.1 
1.7 
I  3.4 
18.8 
4  4  4 
2  2  2 
0.2  0.2  -
5.5  5  4 
1  1 
I 
1 
1.5  1  1 
3  3  .3 
-~---
17.2  16.2  15 
The figures obtained in the preceding sections are summarise·d in Table 53 
to  give the possible market for Community coal in 1970 under the specimen 
calculation studied. 
Table  53  - Possible  Market  for  Community  Coal  in  1970  in  Competition  with  Imported 
Coal  under  a  Specimen  Calculation  (hvoothesis :  imported  coal  price  + duty 
+ subsidy: coking fines f  =  $17.00, ste•am  coal v  =  $15.00).  ('OOO,OOOm.t.) 
Coking  coal 
Graded coal for industry and domestic sector 
Anthracite 
Power stations 
Collieries'  own  consumption 
Total disposals 
Total Supplied 
B - The effect of fuel  oil competition on Community coal 
74 
24 
16 
45 
159 
5 
164 
If the  c.i.f.  price per calorie is  the same  for fuel  oil and imported coal, 
competition from  fuel  oil  may  restrict  the  market  for  Community  coal  for 
two reasons. 
154 Firstly, transport charges differ for coal and oil products, sometimes consi-
derably.  This  gap  will  increase  as  time  passes,  since  the  number  of  inland 
refineries obtaining their crude supplies by pipeline will rise.  In 1970  liquid 
oil products are expected to  represent between  220  and 340  million  metric 
tons hard-coal equivalent,  i.e.  150-230 million metric  tons  of oil  products. 
It  is possible that there will then be between 25 and 40 refineries in operation; 
this means at least one refinery in each of our consumption regions (with the 
exception of one  or two  regions  of very low  consumption,  for  instance  the 
Massif Central in France)  obtaining its crude by pipeline at a  transport cost 
of $0.20-0.30 per metric ton per 100 kilometres. 
Coal transport is much more expensive, with the difference in cost rising 
the further inland we go. The difference per metric ton of hard-coal equivalent 
may be estimated as follows : 
Consumption  region 
North  Rhine-Westphalia 
Eastern  France 
Port of entry 
Rotterdam 
Antwerp 
I 
Transport  charge  difference 
per m.  t.  H.C.E.  available 
I 
$  1.00  -----
$  2.00 
In addition, as  already noted in the previous chapter, fuel  oil may offer 
certain specific  advantages  over  coal,  varying considerably  according  to  the 
use involved. 
Fuel oil competition will effect graded coal, anthracite and power station 
steam coal. A  detailed calculation of the effect of fuel oil competition would 
entail the possession of accurate information which is not at present available, 
but we can gain some idea by looking at the share of solid fuel in meeting the 
demand represented by the market figures  calculated  above.  The  lower  thi" 
share, the less the effect of fuel oil consumption. 
Except for the Ruhr coalfield, the percentages in industry and the domestic 
sector are  fairly  low.  This  suggests  that  competition  from  fuel  oil  will  not 
appreciably  encroach  on  the  market  envisaged  for  graded  coal  and  small 
coke.  In the  Ruhr,  on  the  other hand,  the  percentage  is  high  and  without 
risking an exact figure  we  can  say that the  coal market would  probably he 
reduced by several million tons. 
The same type of calculation can be made for power stations. Here again 
the Ruhr presents  the  major  problem. If the  c.i.f.  price  per  calorie  is  the 
same  for  fuel  oil  and  coal,  we  can  estimate  a  difference  of  $0.70-l.OO  in 
favour of fuel oil in the Ruhr. Competition from  fuel oil may be capable of 
reducing the power station market for Ruhr coal by 4-5 million metric tons. 
155 C - Overall results of the specimen calculation undertaken 
It remains  to  he  seen  how  competition  operates  between  fuel  oil  and 
imported coal. If the c.i.f. price per calorie is the same, fuel oil will supplant 
imported coal with most inland consumers owing to its lower transport cost 
per calorie and its specific advantages for certain uses.  We can thus assume 
that the coal market (Community + imported coal)  will roughly achieve the 
minimum level forecast in the previous chapter. 
We can now work out the suggested primary energy breakdown according 
to major sectors of consumption, as shown in Table 54. In more overall terms, 
total demand would he met as follows : 
Community  Imports  Total  output 
Hard coal  164  70-80  234-244 
Brown coal  32  32 
Oil  20  312-294  332-314 
Natural  gas  33  7-15  40-48 
Hydro  power  and  nuclear energy  60  2  62 
Total  309  391  700 
The Community output would thus cover 44o/o  of demand. 
The same type of calculation can he applied using other values of v  and f 
corresponding to the sum of the c.i.f. import price, duty (if any)  and subsidy 
(if  any)  per  metric  ton  of  marginal  Community  coal  for  steam  coal  and 
coking fines respectively. It can also he utilised either - as above - on the 
assumption that each coalfield sells at a  single price per grade equivalent to 
the production costs of the marginal pit, or else on the assumption that sales 
take place at  average  coalfield  cost.  The  following  chapter gives  the  result 
of various alternatives for both hypotheses. 
156 Table  54  - Suggested Primary Energy Supply Breakdown in 1970  ('000,000  m. t. H. C. E.) 
I. Energy 
for v 
f 
producers 
converters 
and  distributors 
a) Own consumption and 
conversion  and 
transmission losses 
b)  Manufactured gas 
equivalent  in  terms 
of primary energy 
c)  Total  (a+b) 
II. Iron  and  steel 
industry 
a)  Gross  consumption 
b)  Blast  furnace  gas 
production 
c)  Net consumption of 
sector  (a+b) 
III. Other  Industries 
IV. Transport 
V. Domestic  Sector 
VI. Power Stations 
VII. Total  primary 
energy  requirements 
Ic+IIc+III+IV 
+V+VI) 
$  15.00 
$  17.00 
Hard  coal 
------
Com-~  Im-
mu- por-
nity  ted 
12 
19  5 
---
31  5 
------
48  13 
---
48  13 
----
!:-
---
32-
\_ 
37 
----
45  20-25 
---
164  70-80 
s:: 
~c; 
00 
1-<U 
~ 
2 
---
2 
---
-
---
-
---
4 
3 
---
23 
---
32 
'iU 
I  Q.l  ....  I  I  ~E  u 
~~I'll  ~u~! 
,..  :J'Crn  Q.IU  'iU  =:  ;:srn 
g~~  cuS::cu  _  .....  ... 
0  .-cu  l»G.I'C~ 
ur..  0  CUbJJ  il:izbJJ  ::s ..  z  cu.Z  IJ::.CS::O  z~ 
~ 
:;?1  ... CUP. 
Q) 
24  1  7  5  51 
3  -27  -
----------------------
27  1  -20  5  - 51 
---------------------
12  8  6  14  101 
-24  -24 
---------------------
12  8  6  -10  77 
----------------------
75-65  22-28  6  - 125 
------
99  102 
64-61  7-9  8  133 
---------------------
55-50  2  - 5  54  8  212 
---------------------
I 
332-3141 ......  ·I 
I  - - 54  700 
I 
N.B. The maximum and minimum figures given in the body of the table do not add up to the 
totals given in the bottom row as some of the items involved overlap. 
157 Chapter  15 
The position in the Community 
in 1970 
Section 1 - Community coal disposals according to 
various specimen calculations 
The method described in the preceding chapter has been applied to various 
specimen  calculations  differing  according  to  the  import  price  + duty  + 
subsidy  total.  Calculations  have  been  made  for  four  values  for  each  main 
product,  namely  $13.00,  15.00,  16.00  and  18.00  per  metric  ton  hard-coal 
equivalent for steam coal and $15.00, 17.00, 18.00 and 20.00 for coking coal. 
We have also allowed for both selling alternatives in each coalfield, namely 
marginal  cost  or  average  cost.  In  the  former  case  there  is  a  single  selling 
price per coalfield for each grade of coal equivalent to  the production costs 
of the marginal pit supplying that grade; in the latter there is  a  restriction 
imposed by the need for  the  coalfield as  a  whole  to  balance  its  costs.  This 
means that profits from high-productivity pits are used to  offset losses from 
low-productivity pits  in order to  balance  the  total revenue  and expenditure 
of the coalfield in question. The latter method obviously presupposes a  more 
highly  developed  organisation  in  the  coalfields  involved.  It has  only  been 
possible  to  make  this  calculation  for  the  types  of  coal  and  coalfields  for 
which cost curves are available. For anthracite in general and for steam coal 
from the Lower Saxony and Centre/Midi fields the quantities given are those 
adopted in the marginal cost calculation. 
We  have  thus  examined  eight  alternatives,  whose  results  are  shown  in 
Tables  55  (sale  at marginal  cost)  and 56  (sale  at  average  cost).  The  results 
for alternatives A  are not given in the tables and call for  special comment. 
The mechanical application of the calculation methods described above results 
in very low outlet figures  of the order of 105  million metric tons for  Com-
munity coalfields as  a  whole. At this output level, which differs considerably 
from the present one, the market would have to be very highly concentrated 
geographically and in this case our analytical fiction of concentrating a region's 
consumption at its centre would no longer be a sufficiently refined instrument, 
especially since it cannot allow for the advantages to pithead power stations 
and coking plants of being in the immediate vicinity of their source of supply. 
This makes a  correction necessary, thus entailing a  very detailed examination 
of each coalfield. Provisionally it can be estimated that all the pithead coking 
plants and power stations expected to be operating in 1966 will, in the light 
of the investigation into investment expenditure, still be running in 1970 and 
will  be  supplied  exclusively  with  Community  coal.  This  means  that  we  can 
158 raise the figure by about 20  million metric  tons,  thus giving us  a  market of 
some  125  million  metric  tons  with  sales  at  marginal  cost  and  135  million 
metric tons with sales at average cost (a little more than half of this relates 
to coking coal). 
The outlet figures for the various alternatives mean that output must be 
about 3% higher in order to meet collieries' own consumption,. 
Selling at average instead of marginal cost increases the market for Com-
munity  coal.  Thus under alternative  C  the Ruhr could reach  South  German 
markets and the Nord and Pas-de-Calais could meet the entire demand from 
the north of France with the exception of the coastal regions. 
It should be  emphasised  that the  results  given  in  Tables  55  and  56  are 
based on full  costs, including depreciation and financial  charges, i.e.  on the 
assumption that the production capacities achieved by 1970 will be maintained. 
Calculating on the basis of regression costs for marginal pits, disposal levels 
in 1970 would be higher (although output would have to drop in subsequent 
years); this point will be dealt with in greater detail in Section 4  below. 
We  would repeat that the level of the parameters v  and  f  is  capable of 
several  interpretations,  since  a  given  value  of  v  or  f  may  reflect  different 
values of the two terms c.i.f. import price and Community coal aid. v  =  $16.00 
may thus have the following alternative interpretations : 
c.i.f.  price  13 
aid  3 
14 
2 
15 
I 
16 
0 
and  the aid may be either in the form of duty or subsidy or a  combination 
of the  two. 
The advantage of this parametric presentation is to give the reader results 
which are valid for various estimates of the c.i.f. price. 
It now remains to ask what seems the most likely c.i.f. price level for 1970. 
On the basis of the details given in Part Three, we can suggest $13.00-13.50 
for American steam coal c.i.f. ARA port and approximately $15.50 for coking 
fines. The c.i.f. fuel oil price will be $18.00-19.00, so that the cost per metric 
ton hard-coal equivalent would be for the same as coal. 
On the basis of the foregoing calculations the volume of Community coal 
which is competitive with imported energy in the absence of duty or subsidy, 
on the basis of selling at coalfield marginal cost would be about 125  million 
metric tons, i.e. a  little over half the present output. 
Assistance  (via duty or subsidy)  amounting to  $2.00  would enable outlets 
to be increased by 40 million metric tons; $4.00-5.00 would give an increase 
of 100 million metric tons. 
These tables and figures relate to 1970. Similar calculations could be made 
for 1965 and 1975, but the results are not given for the following reasons. 
159 Table  55  - Possible Market for Community Coal in 1970 under Various Alternatives on Full 
Basis  (marginal cost sales) 
I. Each variant is  defined by the differing values  of the parameters v  and f,  represent· 
ing,  for  imported steam  coad  and coking fines  respectively, the  c.i.f.  import price  plus 
duty  (if any)  and subsidy  (if any)  per metric ton of marginal Community coal  (v and f 
in $ m. t. H. C. E.)  ('000,000 m. t.) 
Alternative  Steam-
raising 
I 
Total  I'  Collieries'  i  Anthra- sales  own  Total 
cite  to  con- market 
consumers, sumption 
A.  v  13  For record only - see text. 
f  =  15 
B.  v  =  15 
I  I 
f  =  17  74  69  16  159  5  164 
c.  v  =  16 
f  =  18  75  85  16  176  5  181 
D.  v  =  18 
f  =  20  77  119  16  212  6  218 
N.B. These  figures  are  based  on  full  costs.  With  regression  costs  they  work  out  appreciably 
higher, especially in cases A  and B  (see Section 4,  page 168). 
Table  56 - Possible Market for  Community Coal in 1970 under Various Alternatives  (ave-
rage  cost  sales) 
I.  Each variant is  defined by the differing values of the parameters v  and f,  represent· 
ing,  for imported steam  cowl  and  coking fines  respectively,  the  c.i.f.  import price plus 
duty  (if any)  and subsidy (if any)  per metric ton of marginal Community coal  (v and f 
in $ m. t. H. C. E.)  ('000,000  m. t.) 
Alternative  I Coking  I 
Steam-
raising  I 
Total  I  Collieries' I  Anthra- sales  own  Total 
cite  to  con- market 
consumers  sumption 
A.  v  =  13  For record only - see text. 
f  =  15 
B.  v  =  15 
f  =  17  74  81  16  171  5  176 
c.  v  =  16 
f  =  18  76  117  16  209  6  215 
: 
---
D.  v  =  18 
f  =  20  78  126  16  220  7  227 
N.B. These  figures  are  based on full  costs.  With  contraction  costs  they  work  out  appreciably 
higher, especially in cases A  and B  (see Section 4,  page 168). 
160 For 1965 we can assume that the factors of inertia referred to earlier will 
still be  in  evidence,  so  that the  amounts  of  Community  coal  likely  to  find 
a  market  will  in  practice  be  appreciably  larger  than  those  arrived  at  by 
calculating strictly along the lines described. 
For 1975 this line of calculation has about the same validity as  1970.  In 
the interests  of brevity it is  not proposed  to  give  the  results  in full  detail, 
but in outline they are  as  follows.  As  compared with 1970,  two  factors  will 
be operating in opposite directions by 1975 : 
(i)  the upward trend in the costs of Community coal as  against a  compa-
rative  stability in the  prices of imported products  will result in  the 
price-indifference  lines  (lignes  d'  equiprix)  - along  which  the  con-
sumer  pays  the  same  price  for  indigenous  as  for  imported  coal --
shifting closer to production centres; 
(ii)  as a  result of the all-round rise in demand the requirements of consu-
mers close to the pits will tend to increase. 
The calculation shows that between 1970 and 1975  these two  factors will 
approximately  balance  each  other  out;  the  shrinkage  in  the  actual  area  of 
each coalfield's market will be offset by more  concentrated consumption of 
energy within that area, so that the marketable tonnages will be much the same 
in both years under each alternative. 
Section 2- The Community's overall energy position 
On the basis of the foregoing it is possible to work out a  rough picture of 
the Community's overall energy position in 1970. 
Table 58 gives figures based on parity of c.i.f. price per calorie for various 
imported products. In this case inland requirements not covered by Commu-
nity primary output will  be met by oil products rather than imported  coal, 
whose transport costs are much higher. Coal, both Community and imported. 
would then cover about one third of the demand and oil nearly half. 
161 The  estimated coal level would seem  to  represent  a  m1mmum  not likely 
to be substantially affected if the c.i.f price per metric ton hard-coal equivalent 
of  oil  products  is  a  little  less  than that of imported  coal.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  it.  is  higher - a  possibility which  cannot  be  entirely  ruled  out  (see 
Chapters 9  and 17) - coal imports might be some tens of millions of metric 
tons  higher,  so  that  coal  and  oil  products  would  then  meet  an  equivalent 
share of the demand (about 40% each). 
Community output would  thus cover between 40%  and 50%  of internal 
demand by 1970 as against 73% in 1960 (Table 57). 
Table  57  - Energy  Supply Pattern  of the  Community  in 1960 
A  - In millions  of metric  tons hard-coal equivalent 
Hard coal 
Brown  coal 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Hydro Power 
Nuclear  Energy 
Total 
B  - In percentages 
Hard coal 
Brown  coal 
Oil 
Natural  Gas 
Hydro Power 
Nuclear Energy 
Total 
1)  And  stock  fluctuations. 
2)  Excluding  bunkers. 
162 
Community 
output 
235 
29 
17 
14 
41 
336 
Community 
output 
51 
6 
4 
3 
9 
--
73 
Net importst) 
13 
4 
106 
2 
125 
Net imports 
3 
1 
23 
-
-
-
27 
Total2) 
248 
33 
123 
14 
43 
461 
Total 
54 
7 
27 
3 
9 
-
100 Table  58 - Energy Supply Pattern of the Community in 1970 
A  - In millions of metric tons hard-coal  equivalent 
Hard coal 
Brown  coal 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Hydro Power 
Nuclear Energy 
Total 
B  - In  percentage'S 
Hard coal 
Brown  coal 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Hydro Power 
Nuclear Energy 
Total 
Community 
output 
125-225 
32 
20 
33 
52 
8 
270-370 
Community 
output 
18-32 
5 
3 
5 
7 
1 
39-53 
Imports  Totall) 
U0-30  235-255 
- 32 
310-286  330-306 
8-12  41-45 
2  54 
- 8 
430-330  700 
Imports  Total 
15-4  33-36 
5 
45-42  48-45 
1  6 
7 
1 
61-47  100 
N.B. These figures assume parity of c.i.f.  prices per metric ton hard-coal equivalent as between 
imported coal and fuel  oil. 
163 Table  59  - Energy Supply Pattern of the  Community in 
A  - In millions  of metric tons hard-coal  equivalent 
Hard coal 
Brown  coal 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Hydro Power 
Nuclear  Energy 
Total 
B  - In percentages 
Hard coal 
Brown  coal 
Oil 
Natural Gas 
Hydro Power 
Nuclear Energy 
Total 
1)  Excluding  bunkers. 
164 
Community 
output 
125-200 
34 
20 
44-56 
58 
24-40 
305-408 
Community 
output 
15-23 
4 
2 
5-7 
7 
3-5 
36-48 
I 
I 
1975 
Imports  Totalt) 
100-40  225-240 
34 
420-371  440-391 
20-26  64-82 
2  60 
24-40 
542-439  847 
Imports  Total 
11-5  26-28 
- 4 
50-44  52-46 
3  8-10 
- 7 
- 3-5 
64-52  100 900 
.800 
700 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
Graph VII 
Changes  in the  Energy Supply Pattern of the Community, 1950-1975 
(in  millions  of metric tons  hard-coal  equivalent) 
-Hard  coal 
miiJ Oil 
c=J Natural  gas 
-Brown coal 
~  Hydro  and  geothermal  power 
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- Zone  of  uncertainty 
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165 Graph VIII 
Coverage of Community Requirements  from  Indigenous 
and  Imported  Sources,  1960,  1970  and  1975 
(in  millions of metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent) 
900  --Energy overall ------------------------------
1960  1970  1975 
800 
700 
fill Community  output 
f:tNfJ  Imports 
~  Zone  of  uncertainty 
600---
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
f---------------Oil 
1960  1970  1975 
Hard  coal 
1960  1970  1975 
Natural  gas 
N. B.:  The  zones of uncertainty for the different products are to some extent interdepen-
dent,  so  that  the  zone  indicated  under  ,overall"  does  not  simply  represent  the 
aggregate. 
166 Section 3 - Accuracy of results 
No  illusions  can  be  entertained  about  the  mass  of  figures  given  above, 
which  should  be  regarded  as  merely  approximate,  owing  to  the  numerous 
factors of uncertainty involved in the various  stages of the  calculation.  The 
main implications of this will now be dealt with. 
A - Cost curves 
We have already noted that the hypotheses adopted, particularly as regards 
wage  trends, probably result in somewhat low  costs,  so  that outlets  tend  to 
be overestimated. 
A parametric presentation of the alternatives selected has been adopted in 
the preceding sections. This reveals straightaway the effect of an alteration in 
cost curves arising from different miner's wage or productivity trends. 
Furthermore,  as  stipulated in Chapter 6,  the  cost curves  for  Community 
coal maintain the present ratio between social security charges and wages for 
the period under review.  They therefore  imply that measures  will  be  taken 
to prevent this ratio deteriorating in the event of contraction. The fact remains 
that the present ratio may nevertheless include certain abnormal items which 
can only be estimated with great difficulty. Initial analyses suggest that these 
charges should not exceed $1.00 per metric ton under the most unfavourable 
circumstances. If subsequent investigations confirm this figure,  the following 
tables  indicating  the  level  of  competitiveness  must  be  read  as  though  the 
point of equilibrium corresponded to  a  c.i.f.  price or aid level of $1.00  less. 
B - Regional energy requirements 
Uncertainty exists as to overall requirements and regional breakdown. It 
is  clear that the homothetic growth hypothesis  adopted  above  is  inaccurate, 
because the regional policies of various countries  aim at levelling out diffe-
rences  in  living  standards  between  one  region  and  an'Jther.  Nevertheless  a 
detailed examination of the  anticipated outlets for  Community coal in  each 
region shows that in most cases these outlets would remain substantially the 
same if a different regional development hypothesis were adopted, seeing that 
they  only  represent  a  fraction  of  the  energy  requirements  of  each  region. 
Only in the Ruhr might there be  appreciable  differences; here outlets  need 
correcting  in  the  same  direction  as  demand,  but it  is  likely  that  regional 
policy will tend to provide regions such as Bavaria with a  higher growth rate 
167 than the  national  average,  so  that the  trend in the Ruhr  would  be  slightly 
slower than that of the rest of the country. The conclusion is  that the hypo-
thesis  of  homethetic  development  tends  to  increase  outlets  for  the  Ruhr 
coalfield. 
C - Transport charges 
These  constitute  one  of  the  major  links  in  the  calculation.  Community 
coal  outlets  will  clearly  depend  to  a  certain  extent  on  transport  policy. 
Although it is impossible to estimate the effect exactly, it is already noticeable 
that a  general increase in transport charges tends to expand Community coal 
outlets,  since  by  1970  the  indigenous  product  will  be  carried  over  shorter 
distances  than  competing  imported  products.  An  attempt  will  be  made  to 
estimate the effect of this at a  later stage. 
D - Overall results 
Despite  the  difficulty  of  giving  an  accurate  estimate  of  the  degree  of 
uncertainty  affecting  the  above  figures,  it  seems  likely  that  the  market  is 
overestimated  rather  than  the  contrary  for  each  alternative,  although  this 
is  only valid if the productivity trend assumed  for  the  collieries  is  correct; 
with a different trend the market could vary. 
Section 4 - The influence of timing on the above results 
The tables showing the possible market for Community coal under various 
aid  alternatives  in  the  previous  sections  are  intended  to  represent  various 
specific  points  in  time  in  order  to  show  the  competitive  position  of  a  pit 
which  is  assumed  to  be  maintaining  its  production  capacity  over  a  long 
period. 
To use these tables to advantage, we must be very careful to bear in mind 
that production levels at different dates are interdependent : 
(i)  firstly,  we  cannot envisage  substantial fluctuations  either upwards  or 
downwards  over  a  period of time,  because  this  would  mean  capacity 
being  under-employed  at  some  time  and  the  number  of  miners  in 
employment fluctuating to an extent which is unthinkable; 
168 (ii)  secondly,  coal  can  be  mined  at  pits  which  it  is  intended  to  close 
down  at  a  later  date,  in  which  case  the  pit's  production  costs  drop 
considerably. Further reference will be made to this point. 
A - Regression costs 
Under normal circumstances a  colliery acts so  as to enable its production 
capacity  to  be  maintained  several  years  later,  e.g.  by  preparing  to  work  a 
lower level. If this preparatory work is  done  away with a  substantial saving 
results.  In addition  a  decision  to  close  the pit enables  depreciation  charges 
to be discounted on equipment no longer requiring renewal. 
The competitive position  of  a  pit at  a  given moment therefore  depends 
on its future production prospects. Three cases can be envisaged : 
(i)  permanent maintenance of production capacity; 
(ii)  pit kept open, but with the prospect of closing in a  few years; 
(iii)  immediate closure. 
To  study the first  possibility we must work on the basis of full  costs  as 
calculated in Chapter 6, which is what we have done previously. 
In the other two cases we must use "regression costs", 
1
)  which are derived 
from full costs by deducting certain items relating to  preparatory work and 
depreciation. At a  given pit these items increase as closure draws nearer, but 
they can vary very heavily from  one pit to  another according to  geological 
conditions and the degree of modernisation of the pit. 
Financial  charges  require  careful  treatment  when  calculating  regression 
costs,  owing  to  certain  legal  considerations.  Past  financial  charges  have  to 
be distinguished from new ones. Economically the closing of a  pit makes no 
difference  to  past financial  charges,  i.e.  the  charges  will  continue  to  apply 
whether the pit remains open or not, so  that they should be excluded when 
calculating the production costs of a  pit kept open temporarily. 
Legally several situations are possible : if the pit belongs to an undertaking 
continuing in business, the latter must continue to  pay the charges, whereas 
if the pit is  the undertaking's  sole  business  the  closing-down  of the  former 
will  entail that of the latter and  the  undertaking's  creditors  will  lose  their 
capital. 
1)  So-called  because  they  relate  to  pits  whose  output  will  contract  fairly  quickly. 
169 A  conflict may thus arise between the economic and legal aspects. If the 
undertaking  remains  in  business,  closing  down  one  pit  may  raise  the  book 
cost of other products  (particularly the output of other pits),  without there 
being  any  corresponding  increase  in  economic  cost,  which  means  that  pits 
which  would  be  economically  competitive  are  rendered  un-competitive.  If 
the  undertaking  is  a  single  pit,  the  burden  of  past  financial  charges  may 
force it to close, although on the basis of partial costs it would be economic 
to continue operations for some years. 
The case of fresh financial charges is  obviously quite different and much 
more simple : if carrying on mining means creating fresh charges, these must 
be included in the ""regression costs". 
For all these reasons, ""regression costs" differ from full costs by an amount 
which varies considerably from one pit to another. Purely by way of guidance, 
calculations in respect of certain pits seem to indicate a  difference of between 
$1.00 and 3.00.  Likewise the  lifetime of such  a  pit varies  greatly  according 
to  its  condition at the  time when it is  decided to  close it down;  the  period 
involved may be between roughly three and ten years. 
B  - Working out production prospects 
Strictly speaking  the  proper method  is  to  work  backwards  from  a  date 
for which one has postulated the  desired long-term production level  and by 
when  one  assumes  that  reorganisation  will  have  been  completed.  The 
following is an example : 
Table  60  - Hypothetical Trends in Marketable Production of Community Coal 
('000,000  m. t.) 
Hypo-~ 
thesis 
1 
--
2 
---
3 
4 
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1960 
Aid  $ 2.00  from 1963  onwards  230 
Production  steady  after  1975 
Aid  $ 3.00  from  1963  to  1970 
$ 2.00  after 1970  230 
Production steady after 1975 
Aid  $ 2.00  from  1963  230 
Production steady after 1980 
Aid  $ 3.00  from  1963  to 1970  230 
$ 2.00  after 1970 
Production steady after 1980 
I 
Marketable  production 
1965  1970  1975 
I 
215  195  150 
I 
225  205  150 
------------
215  195  165 
---
225  205  170 
I 
1  1980 
150 
150 
---
150 
I 
150 
I 
I Assuming that we  decide on a  capacity of 150 million metric  tons  after 
1975, necessitating aid amounting to  $2.00 per marginal metric ton in 1975, 
production in the previous years would he 150 million metric tons  plus  the 
output of the pits  due to  close  before 1975.  Thus  for  1970, with  $2.00  aid, 
160 million metric tons can he marketed on a full cost basis plus approximately 
30-40 million metric tons on a  regression costs basis.  Corresponding figures 
for  1965  would  he  160  and  50-55. If we  assume  an  aid  level  of  $2.00 
throughout the period and steady production after 1975, we obtain the trend 
shown for hypothesis I  (see Table 60). With a  different level of aid between 
now and 1970 the trend will  differ,  as ist will if the  date when  production 
assumes  a  steady level is  put forward.  Three further  examples  are  given in 
the table. 
A  variety  of  trends  are  therefore  possible  according  to  the  hypothesis 
adopted  as  to  the  trend  in  the  level  of  aid  and  the  completion  date  for 
reorganisation. 
171 Part Five 
The Major Problems 
Involved in the Long-Term 
Energy Balance 
The  previous  chapter  shows  the  Community's  possible  energy  supply 
structure - assuming  free  consumer  choice  automatically  directed  towards 
the  cheapest supplier - for  alternative  Community  coal  output  levels  and 
varying degree of aid from the authorities. 
The degree  of aid  required  to  raise  the  production  level  of  marketable 
coal not only results in a  burden on the economy but also  has other effects. 
for instance on the average price of energy at consumer level. These problems 
will be dealt with in Chapter 16. 
The supply patterns arrived at in Chapter 15 show the increasing impor-
tance of imports, not only in volume but also in the share of demand covered. 
It is  thus necessary to examine the outlook for long-term security and stabi-
lity of supply (see Chapter 17). 
Increasing reliance on imports may also influence the balance of payments 
position, which is briefly discussed in Chapter 18, Section 2. 
Although the intention is  not to  deal with manpower questions in detail 
until  the  General  Objectives for  Coal  are  actually prepared,  a  brief review 
will be given in Chapter 18, Section 1, of labour force trends and the problems 
they raise. 
Lastly,  we  shall  see  that  cyclical  fluctuations,  to  which  not  all  energy 
producers  are  equally  sensitive,  are  capable  of  constituting  an  obstacle  to 
the steady trend in the energy position (Chapter 18, Section 3). 
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Forms and cost of assistance 
for Community coal 
The  aim of this  chapter is  to  describe  the  means  and  cost  of providing 
assistance  for  Community  coal  to  raise  sales  above  a  level  which  would  be 
strictly competitive. 
1
) 
Firstly we must remember that there are two selling systems for any given 
coalfield :  either  the  price  equals  the  costs  of  the  marginal  pit  with  the 
highest production costs  (less  any  subsidy)  or else  the  average  costs  of the 
coalfield  (again  less  any  subsidy)  arrived  at  by  compensation  between 
efficient and inefficient pits. 
2
)  (We have seen in Chapter 15, Section 1, that 
the  amount of aid required to  ensure the marketing of a  given  quantity of 
Community  coal  is  lower  in  the  second  case  than  in  the  first.)  Whatever 
method is  actually employed,  we  shall assume  that there is  a  single  pithead 
price for any given grade at all mines in the coalfield concerned. 
There are several possible ways of achieving the objective of reducing the 
difference  to  the  consumer between  the  price  of  Community  coal  and  that 
of imported  energy : 
(i)  by imposing  a  duty,  thus  making  imported energy more  expensive; 
(ii)  by subsidising production, thus making Community coal cheaper. The 
subsidy can either be payable at a flat rate for all the pits in a  given 
coalfield  (or  possibly  in  all  coalfields),  equalling  the  difference 
between the selling price and the costs of the marginal pit  (i.e.  the 
highest-cost pit in production) or else it can be differentiated pit by 
pit according  to  production  costs  so  as  to  represent  the  difference 
between the selling price for the coalfield and the production costs 
of the particular pit concerned; 
(iii)  by subsidising consumption so  that consumers will pay the same for 
Community coal as for imported fuels. 
Two factors  require consideration : 
(i)  the cost to the economy as a  whole; 
(ii)  the  apportionment  of  benefits  and  disadvantages  amongst  those 
concerned according to the method of aid proposed. 
1)  The account which follows is deliberately simplified, but even so sufficient complications 
remain  to  s'how  the  reader how  complex  the  problem  is  and  how  far-reaching  are  the 
repercus·sions  which  aid  may have  throughout  the  economy. 
2
)  Present practice probably lies somewhere between these two extremes, since some under-
takings posse.ss  both efficient and inefficient pits whose  costs can to  a  certain extent be 
balanced  out. 
174 These two factors must be carefully distinguished, since paying a  subsidy 
does not automatically constitute a  burden on the economy if its only effect 
is  to  transfer  from  certain  economic  agents  to  other  agents  without  any 
additional call on production factors.  On the other hand any measure which 
raises  the  volume  of  production  factors  required  to  ensure  overall  energy 
supplies  does  constitute a  burden on the  economy even if no  direct subsidy 
is paid. We shall see below how these two notions compare with each other on 
a  quantitative basis. 
To calculate all the effects involved accurately is  extremely difficult and 
entails having a  detailed knowledge of cost and demand curves  (and thus of 
consumer location)  and assessing the side-effects on the economy as  a  whole. 
This precludes our offering a  complete set of figures  here,  hut in  order  to 
render  the  following  exposition of the  main  effects  more  intelligible,  since 
they vary according to the type of aid adopted and the method used  to  fix 
coal prices, we shall give rounded figures for raising Community coal disposals 
from the marginal-cost-sale level
1
)  they would achieve without aid (about 125 
million metric tons) to a level of about 180 million metric tons (corresponding 
to aid per marginal metric ton of about $3.00 for marginal cost sales and about 
$2.00 for average cost sales). The results are summarised in Table 61. Although 
this example is  hacked up by figures it in no way affects the final choice of 
a  production  level  lying  between  the  competitive  nucleus  and  the  present 
output. 
Section 1 - The cost to the economy of supporting 
Community coal production 
Whatever the system of aid adopted, the basic  cost to  the economy  as  a 
whole  is  the  result  of producing  at,  say,  $14.00  per  metric  ton  (delivered 
price to  the consumer)  a  product which could he imported and paid for  by 
exported  goods  manufactured at a  cost  of,  say,  $13.00 per metric  ton.  The 
cost to the economy would then he $1.00 per protected or subsidised metric 
ton. 
Thus,  as  regards  coal  production,  suhsidisation  and  protection place  the 
same burden on the economy inasmuch as they serve to keep plant, manpower 
and capital artificially tied up in the  collieries that could he  used  to  better 
advantage  elsewhere.  The  cost  to  the  economy  of  marketing  180  million 
metric tons instead of 125 would work at about $120 million a year. 
1)  Assuming a  c. i. f.  imported product price of $ 13.00 per metric ton hard-coal equivalent. 
175 From this gross cost should he deducted any costs incurred as  a  result of 
unorganised  regression  in  production  and  injudicious  redevelopment.  These 
latter costs, however, tend to cancel one another out after a  period of years. 
In addition the cost to the economy increase in the case of tariff protection, 
which  puts  up  the  price  of imported  energy  and  may  enable  other  energy 
producers  to  increase  their  output  and  market  products  which  would  not 
he  competitive  with  unpenalised  imported  energy.  Additional  hydroelectric 
plants can he built, for instance. Here we have a  second example of the cost 
to  the  economy of its  energy  supplies  being increased, hut this  item  is  not 
estimated here in terms of figures  because it is  well below the level  of the 
main item. 
Section 2 - The effect of different types of assistance 
Besides placing a  heavier burden on the  economy,  a  policy of assistance 
for Community coal will have a  number of other effects varying according to 
the type of arrangement adopted. These will now he discussed (see Table 61). 
A  - The effect of tariff protection 
Tariff protection  sends  up  the  price  of imported  energy  and  hence  the 
level of pithead prices at which Community coal can be marketed. This means 
that  the  price  of  other  Community  energy  then  benefiting  from  the  same 
protection as Community coal may also rise. 
(a)  When  the  selling  price  of  coal  is  fixed  at  marginal  cost  level,  the 
following effects may he noted : 
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(i)  the  cost  to  the  economy  of  its  energy  supplies  rises  (see  above 
(production  of  expensive  coal  at  a  cost  of  $120  million  and  a 
possible rise in output of other Community energy producers  above 
the economically reasonable level); 
(ii)  a  rise in the price of imported energy ($1,120 million); 
(iii)  the  provision  of intra-marginal  rent  owing  to  the  increased  selling 
price of Community energy. First of all there is  intra-marginal rent 
for all pits whose production costs are below that of the marginal pit 
($130  million).  Secondly,  there  is  possible  intra-marginal  rent  for 
other Community energy producers who can raise their selling price 
by the amount of the duty (amount x, between $0 and $440 million). The  increased  price  to  the  energy  consumer  is  the  sum  of  the  above 
effects  (increased cost of energy  to  the  economy,  rise  in price  of imported 
energy and provision of intra-marginal rent) )and may thus amount to $1,370 
+ x  million (i.e. 15-20% of total cost of supply). 
This  increase  in  price  to  the  consumer  might partially  be  prevented  by 
using all or some of the revenue from the import duty to bring down energy 
prices by a  general subsidy in respect of all fuels, which leaves their compe-
titive  position  vis-a-vis  one  another  unchanged.  Assuming  this  possibility  is 
exploited to the full, the net amount of the increase is $1,370 + x - 1,120 = 
250 + x  million. This more or less wipes out the rise in the price of imported 
energy and  leaves  us  merely with  the  greater burden  on the  economy  as  a 
whole  and  the  provision  of intra-marginal  rent  ($120 + 130 + x  million, 
i.e. 3-8%). 
It  will be seen that the more important of these two factors is the provision 
of intra-marginal rent, in particular to other energy producers. 
(b)  With  coal  sold  at  average  coalfield  cost,  we  are  faced  with  a  new 
situation.  Selling  at average  cost  means  that  the  efficient  pits  subsidies  the 
inefficient ones; at coalfield level the transition from marginal cost to average 
cost  sales  thus  eliminates  the  intra-marginal  rent  of  the  better  pits  ($80 
million) and at the same time increases the marketable output. In addition the 
other effects mentioned above continue to operate, but to a  different extent. 
Although the cost to the economy is the same ($120 million), the increase in 
import  prices  is  nevertheless  lower  ($750  million),  as  is  the  intra-marginal 
rent, since the level of protection can be lower in order to  ensure the same 
volume of coal sales ($2.00 instead of $3.00). 
B - The  effect of subsidising coal producers 
The  aim of the  subsidy  is  to  reduce  the  price of  Community  coal  so  as 
to enable it to find fresh markets. 
As stated above, there are three possibilities : 
(i)  flat-rate subsidy for all pits in the coalfield and marginal cost sales; 
(ii)  flat-rate subsidy and average cost sales; 
(iii)  differential  subsidy  depending  on  the  production  costs  of  each  pit 
and marginal cost sales. 
In the case of average cost sales,  the pits are balanced out and the  only 
possibility is then the flat-rate subsidy for all pits in the coalfield. 
177 (a)  Flat-rate subsidy and marginal cost sales 
The subsidy is the amount necessary to make the marginal pit competitive 
($3.00 in the calculated example). The main effects are as follows : 
(i)  an  increase  in  the  cost  to  the  economy  of its  energy  supplies  (see 
above) owing to the production of expensive coal  ($120 million); 
(ii)  the provision of intra-marginal rent for pits whose  production costs 
are lower than those of the marginal pit (the reduced income of these 
pits owing to the lower price of coal is more than offset by payment 
of the subsidy  ($130 million); 
(iii)  the provision of a  consumer surplus for coal purchasers, who benefit 
from the reduced selling price of Community coal ($290 million). 
The  subsidy  required  is  the  sum  of  the  above  three  amounts,  namely 
$540 million. 
The effect on the price the consumer pays for his energy depends on the 
way in which  tax is  collected  to  produce the  subsidy.  If it is  levied  on the 
remainder of the economy, we have the apparent paradox of a  slight drop in 
price owing to  the lower selling price of Community coal  (  -'-3.1 «fo).  If it is 
levied solely on energy, however, the price to the consumer rises, thus balan-
cing out the additional cost to the economy as a  whole and the intra-marginal 
rent enjoyed by certain pits  ( +2.8%  ). 
(b)  Flat-rate subsidy and average cost sales 
At $2.00 the subsidy is less than in the preceding case (marginal cost sales) 
because the more efficient pits to  a  certain extent subsidise the less efficient 
ones. The cost to the economy is  the same  ($120 million), as is the consumer 
surplus  ($290 million).  At this  point,  however,  we  have  a  repetition of the 
phenomenon referred to  above  in  connection with  tariff protection,  namely 
a  reduction in the producers' intra-marginal rent owing to the transition from 
marginal  cost  to  average  cost  sales  ($80  million).  The  total  amount  of  the 
subsidy is the algebraical sum of the above three items (120 + 290 --- 80 = 
$330 million). Here again the effect on the average price the consumer pays 
for his energy depends on the way in which the subsidy is  financed.  If it is 
levied entirely on energy, the increase in average cost is  about 0.5%. 
(c)  Differentiated subsidy and marginal cost sales 
The  subsidy  varies  from  pit to  pit  according  to  production  costs  and  IS 
limited to what is strictly necessary to make each pit competitive. 
178 The effects are then as follows : 
(i)  increased cost to the economy of its energy supplies  ($120 million); 
(ii)  the provision of a consumer surplus for certain purchasers (as above) 
($290 million); 
(iii)  owing to the fall in the price of coal, the elimination of all or part 
of  the  intra-marginal  rent  previously  enjoyed  by  some  producers 
owing to the difference between their production costs and the coal-
field selling price (unlike the case of the flat-rate subsidy, this effect 
is  no  longer counteracted by the subsidy payment)  (-$70 million). 
The  subsidy  must  cover  both  the  cost  to  the  Community  and  the 
difference between the above-mentioned consumer surplus and elimi-
nated intra-marginal rent (120 + 290 - 70  =  $340 million).  Here 
again the effect on the price of energy depends on the way in which 
the subsidy is financed. 
1
) 
1)  A  further means of increasing Community coal outlets is  to combine subsidies to selected 
pits with subsidies to selected consumers so  that the latter pay the same price for Com-
munity as for imported energy. Thi,s  procedure enables either type of subsidy to be  con-
centrated on and a  wide range of effects to be obtained; in addition  a  certain amount of 
latitude exists in selecting the consumers to be subsidised  (for instance subsidies can he 
restricted to  thermal power stations or extended  to  other major consumers  such  as  the 
iron and steel industry, cement works, partircular types of chemical factories, etc.). Owing 
to the wide range of alternatives, we  have  decided not to  work out any figures  because 
they would be only of limited value. 
179 Table  61  - Example Illustrating Effects of Various Types of Aid for Community Coal (1970) 
(rounded figures in millions of dol·lars) 
Selling 
system 
Reference  Marginal 
calculation  cost 
Hypothesis A  Marginal 
cost 
Hypothesis B  Average 
cost 
I. Increased  cost  to  the 
Community 
2.  Increased  price  of  other 
sources of energy 
a)  imported  energy 
b)  other Community 
energy 
3.  Intra-marginal  rent  for 
coal producers 
4.  Intra-marginal  rent  for 
other energy producers 
5.  Coal  consumer  surplus 
6.  Amount  of  subsidy 
(=1 +3+5) 
7.  Revenue  from  duty 
(=2a) 
8.  Change in total energy 
expenditure of consumer 
(+  rise  - fall) 
a)  Financial  machinery 
confined to energy 
(1 +2+3-7) 
b)  Financial  machinery 
operating outside 
energy1) 
(1 +2+3-6) 
a)  As  percentage of cost 
of  energy  to  the 
economy  as  a  whole 
b)  Do. 
Community 
production  Imports 
Aid  ('000,000  m.t.  H.C.E.)  ('000,000 
($/m. t.)  m.t. 
I 
H.C.E.) 
- 125  146  429 
3  181  146  373 
2  176  146  378 
--
Customs duty  Flat-rate  tariff 
A  B  A  B 
120  120  120  120 
1,120  750  - -
(for record only) 
X  y  - -
130  -80  130  -80 
X  y 
- - 290  290 
1,120  750  540  330 
250+x  40+y  +250  +40 
1,370+x  790+y  -290  -290 
3  to  8{)/o  1  to  3°/o  +2.8°/o  +0.5°/o 
15 to 20°/o  9  to llOfo  -3.1{)/o  -3.1{)/o 
Total 
consump-
tion 
('000,000 
m.t. 
H.C.E.) 
700 
700 
700 
Differen-
tiated 
tariff 
A 
120 
-
-
-70 
290 
340 
+50 
-290 
+0.6°/o 
-3.1°/o 
1)  Revenue from duty distributed to or subsidies financed out of remainder of economy. 
A.  Marginal  cost  sales. 
B. Average  cost  sales. 
180 Section 3 - Effects compared 
Bearing in mind that the foregoing details (summarised in Table 61) relate 
to  the  main  and  most  likely  effects  and  do  not  exhaust  all  the  complex 
aspects of aid for Community coal, we can now compare the various forms of 
assistance. 
Firstly we  must  remember  that  the  cost  to  the  economy  as  a  whole  of 
raising coal production is the same whatever the form of aid adopted, whereas 
tariff  protection  runs  the  risk  of  encouraging  the  anti-economic  output  of 
energy in the Community other than coal. 
Secondly, a  number of criteria can he adopted in comparing the different 
methods  available  - degree  of  selectivity,  workability,  effects  on  colliery 
rationalisation. Finally, the combination of different systems can he envisaged. 
(a)  In order of increasing  selectivity we  have  tariff protection,  flat-rate 
subsidies to producers, differentiated subsidies to producers and differentiated 
subsidies to producers and consumers. 
The customs duty is intended to  aid overall sales of marginal output and 
cannot therefore he varied to fill the price gap between imported energy and 
Community coal in separate regions. 
The provision of intra-marginal rent in favour not only of efficient mines 
hut also of all other forms of energy, including competing sources, thus stimu-
lating an anti-economic rise in other forms of Community output, is the most 
expensive  solution  to  the  consumer.  This  is  because  in  order  to  affect  the 
production of some tens of millions of tons of coal it is  necessary to operate 
on the price of 300--400 million tons of imported products. 
Subsidy systems  are  aimed  at producing the  desired  effect  directly.  The 
most costly method is  to  pay a  flat-rate  subsidy  and  allow the  coalfields  to 
sell  at  marginal  cost.  Subsidy  differentiation  obviously  enables  the  total 
volume of subsidy to he reduced, hut selling at marginal cost reduces it even 
further because the efficient pits subsidise the less efficient ones. This proce-
dure seems  specially suitable where the  aim is  to  maintain  a  given  level  of 
production in a  specified coalfield considered as a separate unit. 
Lastly, the solution which reduces the volume of subsidy to  the  absolute 
minimum by equating it with the additional cost to the economy of producing 
non-competitive  coal is  to  pay differentiated  subsidies  to  specific  producers 
and consumers and maintain the pithead price at equilibrium level without aid. 
(h)  In  order  of  workability  the  classification  is  roughly  the  opposite. 
Tariff protection and flat-rate subsidies are the easiest to operate. 
181 The payment of differentiated subsidies to producers entails a  knowledge 
of the relative position of each pit. 
The difficulty is  even greater where subsidies  are paid to  specific consu-
mers, because although the producer is already known, not all the consumers 
yet exist- they will only appear as new factories are built. 
(c)  Effect  on  colliery  rationalisation.  - The  drawback  of  the  diffe-
rentiated subsidy procedure, if strictly applied, is that it reduces the incentive 
to  cut  costs,  because  to  do  so  would  mean  a  reduction  in  the  subsidy.  If 
differentiated subsidies are not to have the effect of impairing rationalisation, 
the market organisation must he  such  as  to  supplement and  reinforce  it by 
enabling  control  to  he  exerted  over  the  relation  of  the  subsidies  to  the 
implementation of reorganisation programmes. 
In more concrete  terms,  if subsidies  are  to  stand in  the  correct relation 
to rationalisation programmes, it is necessary that administrative arrangements 
should to some extent be centralised, e.g. in the form of nationalised collieries, 
co-operative rationalisation schemes, selling agencies etc. 
(d)  Combination of various  forms  of aid.  - It may he  possible  to  even 
out  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  inherent  in  various  forms  of  aid  by 
adopting different systems simultaneously. 
As an example, steps could be taken to ensure the balanced operation, in 
book-keeping terms, of financial machinery aimed at enabling a  given volume 
of Community coal to be sold by using a  revenue-producing duty system and 
subsidization simultaneously. 
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The advantages of combining two systems in this way are as follows : 
(i)  at a  given  sales level the  subsidy  is  less  than under  a  pure  subsidy 
system and also tariff protection is very much lower than with a pure 
duty system (in the case of the volume of sales quoted above, with a 
flat-rate  subsidy and average  cost sales, the  duty required would be 
about $0.60 and the subsidy $1.40); 
(ii)  the  ratio  between  the  volumes  of imported  energy  and  Community 
coal output would be such that a  modest rate of duty would finance 
a  fairly high rate of subsidy; 
(iii)  because  the  trend  in  the  energy  position  will  only  accentuate  the 
relative share of imported energy  (at least until nuclear energy can 
play a  decisive role), maintaining tariff protection at a  constant level 
should enable  a  constant level of coal  disposals  to  be  ensured  even if the  competitiveness  of  Community  coal  vis-a-vis  imported  energy 
continues  to  deteriorate; if,  on the other hand, it settles  down  at a 
steady level, it might be possible to reduce the rate of duty. 
Chapter  17 
Security of supply 
The preceding chapters have shown that the share of imports in meeting 
the  Community's  requirements,  currently  running  at  about  one  third,  will 
tend to increase and after about ten years will exceed 50o/o. 
These  supplies  from  abroad  are  subject  to  an  element  of  risk  either  as 
regards  the  quantities  available  or  as  regards  price  stability,  but  often  on 
account of both at once. The importance of energy to the smooth running of 
the economy is such that steps must be taken to mitigate the harmful effects 
of these  risks.  This  chapter will first  of all  describe  the  nature  and  extent 
of the risks and then outline various possible remedies. 
Section 1 - Risks 
It is difficult to make any forecasts as to what might happen in the event 
of a  general war,  since far-reaching  disturbances of every kind would  affect 
the operation of the economy, even to the extent of cutting off energy supplies. 
Not only external supplies but also  Community energy production might be 
affected. 
We shall therefore confine our attention to the risks involved in a  partial 
conflict, either political, military or economic. 
1
)  Repercussions may be of two 
kinds, either affecting the volume it is  possible  to  import or else  leading to 
rises in product prices. 
1)  We  shall  ignore  the  influence  of  cyclical  fluctuations,  which  will  he  dealt  with  in 
Chapter  18. 
183 A - Quantitative repercussions. The share of imports in meeting demand 
In 1970 Community energy production will lie between the following two 
extremes: 
(i)  the  minimum  is  expected  to  be  about  275  million  tons  hard-coal 
equivalent,  125  million  of  this  figure  being  coal;  this  level  of  coal 
production  would  roughly  correspond  to  the  competitive  figure, 
assuming that the price of imported energy was situated at the bottom 
of the ranges forecast in Part Three; 
(ii)  the  maximum  is  expected  to  be  about  375  million  tons,  with  coal 
production maintained at the 1962 level (about 225 million tons). 
Imports  will  thus  cover  between  47%  and  61%  of  requirements.  The 
corresponding figures for 1975 would be slightly higher, showing the continued 
tendency of the relative share of requirements covered by imports to increase 
after 1970. Not until after 1980 will the expansion of nuclear energy enable 
this trend to be reversed. 
The foregoing very approximate figures conceal deep-seated differences in 
the position occupied by imports in meeting demand  for  various  uses;  they 
must  therefore  be  supplemented  by  a  somewhat  more  detailed  vtew  (see 
Tables 62  and 63). 
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(i)  Motor  fuel  requirements  for  road  transport,  inland  waterway  navi-
gation and a  part of railway transport, covering more than half the 
goods traffic and three quarters of the passenger traffic, will be met 
almost entirely by oil products, and thus by imports. 
(ii)  Two thirds of the specific requirements of the iron and steel industry 
will be covered by Community products if coal production is brought 
down to  a  competitive level; this percentage could amount to  about 
80-85% with Community coal assisted to the extent of $2.00-3.00 
per marginal metric ton, but is scarcely likely to rise any higher owing 
to  the  geographical location of certain iron  and  steel  plants  unless 
aid  considerably  exceeds  $5.00.  The  remainder  of  the  demand  will 
be met from the U.S.A. 
(iii)  41% of electricity requirements will be covered by hydroelectric and 
nuclear  production  and  by  power  stations  running  on  brown  coal. 
Community  hard  coal  will  provide  an  additional  15-35o/o  of  the 
demand, according to the production level, so  that 24-44% remains 
to be covered by imports. (iv)  The remam1ng requirements, mainly fuel,  are expected to amount to 
300  million  metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent  in  1970.  Internal 
production will  supply  about 85-125 million metric  tons  hard-coal 
equivalent, so  that imports will have to meet between 57%  and 70% 
of  the  demand  (about  45%  of  the  requirements  being  met  by  oil 
products). 
Table  62  - Coverage of Requirements from  Indigenous and Imported Sources 
('000,000  m. t.  H. C. E.  &  0/o) 
A 
Motor fuel  951  Iron  &  steel  industry 
(specific  requirements 
of coking  coal)  92 
Electricity  production  212 
Other requirements  301 
Total  700 
1970 
B 
5 
61-78 
120-160 
84-127 
270-370 
C1 
0/o 
95 
15 
25 
58 
47 
C2 
0/o 
95 
34 
43 
72 
---
61 
A 
1261 
98 
282 
341 
847 
1975 
B 
6 
61-80 
140-190 
98-132 
305-408 
A  - Total requirements in millions of metric tons hard-coal equivalent. 
C1 
0/o 
95 
18 
34 
61 
51 
C2 
0/o 
95 
38 
50 
71 
---
64 
B  - Requirements  covered  by  Community  production  in  millions  of  metric  tons  hard-coal 
equivalent. 
C1  - Share of requirements covered by low  0/o  import limit. 
C2- Share of requirements covered by high  0/o  import limit. 
Table  63  - Electricity Generation  (Ofo  of total  production) 
1960 
Hydroelectric  and  geothermal  36 
Brown coal, blast furnace  gas  16 
Nuclear  -
Sub-Total  52 
A  (Production 125 
I 
Thermal  million metric tons) 
from  B  (Production 160  38  Community  million metric tons) 
~  coal  c  (Production  220 
million metric tons) 
I 
Production  \  A  (  from 
Community  ( 
B  90 
c 
' 
energy 
I 
Thermal 
) 
A 
( 
from 
B  10  imported  c  products 
Grand  total  (A  or B  or  C) 
I  100 
1965  1970  1975 
I 
27  23  18 
15  14  12 
1  4  7-12 
43  41  37-42 
15  10 
25  17 
35  25 
56  47-52 
66  54-59 
76  62-67 
44  53-48 
34  46-41 
24  38-33 
100 
185 A  strict  rationing  system  for  requirements  of  lesser  importance  might 
prevent heavy cuts in supplies for a  short while - a  few weeks at the most 
- causing  serious  economic  difficulties~  but  prolonged  scarcity  would 
jeopardise the chances of maintaining the rate of growth. Precise calculations 
on this point are both tricky and open to uncertainty. 
1
) 
B  - Price aspect 
The main risk of higher prices concerns crude  oil~  whose price structure 
includes  royalties  and  taxes  paid  to  producer  country  governments  (see 
Chapter 9). We must not overlook the danger that these countries may well 
bring pressure to bear in the future to secure a  larger share of the proceeds. 
The risk of this increases as supplies become concentrated in a  few countries 
all situated in the same part of the world. 
These  price  trends  mainly  depend  on  political  factors  whose  prediction 
is a matter of great uncertainty~ although a  comparison of supply and demand 
prospects provi~es certain economic pointers. 
In the present state of technology~ refined oil products such as motor fuel~ 
lubricants and some petrochemicals raw materials cannot be replaced by other 
products.  Fuel~ on  the  other  hand~ competes  with  other  products~ and  one 
region~s oil competes with another's. 
With present royalties and the American government's policy of preserving 
the ratio between external purchases and domestic  consumption  maintained~ 
the  approximate  crude  oil  supply  and  demand  position  for  1970  can  be 
outlined as follows : 
2
) 
(i)  a  deficit  in  North  America  (U.S.A.  and  Canada)  and  a  surplus  in 
Central  and  South  America,  giving  a  slight  deficit  trend  for  the 
western hemisphere as a  whole; 
(ii)  a  very  large  deficit in  Western  Europe~ which  will  have  to  import 
95% of its requirements; 
(iii)  a  big surplus in Africa and Asia (mainly Middle East); 
(iv)  net shipments from Eastern countries. 
1)  The  report  of  the Energy Commission  of the  fourth French  plan provides  the  tentative 
estimate that in 1975 oil products will meet about 45°/o  of the French demand  (a slightly 
lower  figure  than  the  forecast  for  the  Community  given  above).  Oil  product  ·supplies 
could be  cut by 15°/o  without noticeably checking economic expansion. 
2)  For details  as  to  the  way in  which this pattern  is  made  up,  see  Annex 11  to  full  Com· 
munity-language  edition. 
186 (a)  Competition between oil and other products 
If the price of oil rises appreciably by comparison with our earlier fore-
casts,  this form of energy will lose some of its outlets owing to  competition 
from other products : 
(i)  American coal, not only on the U.S.A. market but also in Europe and 
many other countries. It should be borne in mind  that fuel  oil  can 
only be replaced by coal on an instantaneous basis if the  apparatus 
involved is  of the dual-firing type; if not, a  considerable amount of 
time  and money  will  need  to  be  spent In addition  coal  production 
elasticity in the U.S.A.  is  not unlimited and a  large-scale increase in 
outlets exceeding some tens of millions of metric tons would lead to 
a  rise in prices; 
(ii)  European  coal :  once  the  approximate  production  level  consistent 
with a particular energy policy is laid down, the short-term possibility 
of increasing production  is  very  slight  (at  the  most 10-20 million 
metric tons) ; 
(iii)  natural gas :  supplies to Europe could be increased either by inten-
sifying the rate of extraction in European fields or by increasing the 
amount of Sahara gas transported to Europe; by 1970, allowing a lapse 
of a year or two for the former and three to four years for the latter, 
additional resources of 20-25 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent 
could be counted on; 
(iv)  nuclear energy : by 1970 the extra production potential in the Com-
munity would  be  a  few  million  metric  tons  hard-coal  equivalent  at 
the most, with a much higher figure possible by 1980 (see Chapter 12). 
(b)  Competition between oil from various sources 
It was pointed out in Chapter 9  that Middle East reserves  are  at such  a 
level that production could be substantially increased very quickly, even when 
the production levels envisaged for 1970 are reached. 
Relatively few new reserves have been discovered in the U.S.A.  in recent 
years and it seems that the 1970 development and extraction forecasts for this 
country are barely likely to be reached, let alone exceeded. 
In  Venezuela  the  annual  extraction  rate  is  around  6%  of  the  reserves, 
which is a  fairly high figure. To increase production over and above the level 
forecast for the period from now until 1970 would entail a  very large amount 
of prospection in view of the slackening-off during the past two  years. It is 
unlikely that output can be increased above  some  sixty million metric  tons. 
187 In  North  Africa  the  1965  production  estimates  cannot  h~  very  much 
exceeded, but intensified prospection would enable a  fresh advance of 30-40 
metric million tons to be recorded. 
The  quantities  available  for  export  outside  the  Eastern countries  could 
probably be substantially exceeded. 
Lastly, there are the regions at present producing little or no  oil  (South 
America, Central Africa etc.). Scarely anything is  known of their production 
potential,  although  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  period  between  commencing 
prospection and extracting several tens of millions  of metric tons  would  be 
lengthy, possibly ten to  twelve years. 
To  sum up,  the  amount of crude oil  capable of being  replaced  by  other 
products by 1970 represents a moderate fraction of world requirements. 
Potential competition among major oil-producing areas is also a  significant 
factor,  although  only  to  a  limited  extent if  seen  from  the  1970  standpoint. 
The  further  ahead  we  look  the  more  it  is  likely  to  increase,  but  only  if 
prospection programmes  are  initiated  in  various  parts  of the  world  a  good 
ten years ahead. 
The risk of oil product prices rising above the level forecast in Chapter 9 
($17 .00-19.00  per  metric  ton  of  fuel  oil)  should  therefore  not  be  under-
estimated. This is less likely to happen if prospecting in general is carried on 
actively,  and  if  the  Community  in  particular  takes  the  steps  outlined  in 
Section 2  below. 
Section 2 - Means of improving security 
Not only the long-term risk of a  rise  in imported oil prices but also  the 
danger  of supplies  being  accidentally  cut off  forces  oil-consuming  countries 
to  see  to  it that alternative  sources  of supply  are  permanently  available  to 
enable  them to  quickly  offset  the  blocking  of  certain  import  channels  and 
resist price rises in imported products. 
Without going into details as to how security can be improved - a  subject 
which must be left for a  separate document - we propose to briefly discuss 
the economic aspects of three major types of measures. 
A  - Improvement in Community production 
Chapter 15 dealt in detail with the production costs of the most expensive 
Community coal tonnages. 
With other conventional forms of energy, the possibility of exceeding the 
production figures forecast in this report is fairly limited : 
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(i)  with hydro  power,  the  possibility  is  less  than  some  20  TWh  (equal 
to 8  million metric tons hard-coal equivalent); (ii)  with  brown  coal,  the  figure  of 95  million  metric  tons  forecast  for 
the Rhineland can certainly be  exceeded, probably up  to  a  level  of 
110-120 million  metric  tons.  The  additional  quantity  is  thus 5-7 
million metric tons hard-coal equivalent. It should he noted that this 
additional  brown  coal  would  compete  directly  with  Ruhr  coal  in 
thermal power stations; 
(iii)  with natural gas and oil, the element of uncertainty is  much greater, 
not only as  to  the quantities whose discovery may he hoped for hut 
also as to the cost of these discoveries. Nevertheless it looks as though 
by 1970 the additional quantity will not exceed 20-30 million metric 
tons hard-coal equivalent owing to  the time  involved in prospection 
and development (including, in the case of natural gas, the provision 
of transportation and distribution facilities). 
With nuclear energy, on the other hand, a priori a  fairly wide margin can 
now he envisaged, although not until 1975  and onwards. By 1970 the excess 
over the figure  of 20  TWh suggested earlier will  he 6-8 TWh at the most, 
i.e. 3 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent. By 1975, on the other hand, a 
production level 60 TWh (25  million metric tons hard-coal equivalent) higher 
than that envisaged may well be possible, with an increasing degree of scope 
for  improvement  in  later  years.  Chapter  12  showed  that  the  outlook  for 
nuclear fuel supplies is very sound, which means that nuclear energy can play 
a  major  long-term  part  in  improving  the  Community's  security  of  energy 
supplies. 
B  - Stockbuilding 
Stockhuilding within  the  Community itself is  a  helpful  means  of coping 
with any momentary stoppage or shrinkage of supplies from particular sources, 
and also affords a breathing-space for taking other steps to counter difficulties 
over tonnages and/  or prices, hut its effects are obviously only temporary. 
1
) 
Stockhuilding costs are the sum of three items : depreciation and financial 
charges on installations, financial charges on stored products and deterioration, 
if any, during storage. Naturally they depend on the length of time for which 
the product is stored. 
The E.E.C.  Commission has undertaken a  survey as  part of the  activities 
of the Working Party of Oil Experts in order to  pinpoint various  economic 
factors involved in stockhuilding, particularly costs. The next step will he to 
decide,  firstly,  what risks have  to  he  guarded  against  and  the  likelihood  of 
their occurring and, secondly, how they are to he met, so  as to calculate what 
level  of  reserve  stocks  is  necessary  to  avoid  supplies  being  cut  off  and  to 
mitigate the danger of a  rise in prices. 
1)  This does not refer to buffer stocks, which are dealt with in Chapter 18. 
189 C - Diversification of sources of supply 
A  policy of diversifying sources of supply is not a  new idea in itself; the 
oil companies themselves carry on prospecting in various parts of the world, 
where the discovery of valuable new oil deposits seems possible. 
Owing to the hazardous nature of prospecting, we can never know before-
hand what quantities of oil are likely to be discovered, nor their cost, which 
explains the highly fluctuating profitability of the deposits at present worked. 
Companies naturally prefer to prospect in regions where there is a  likelihood 
of discovering low-cost oilfields. This is  particularly true of the Middle East 
as  regards  supplies  to  Europe,  all  the  more  so  as  an  important  factor  in 
security of supplies lies in the reserve potential at present located in America. 
The  policy  followed  by  the  United  States  Government  has  entailed  the 
provision of a  production capacity reserve of over one hundred million tons 
which,  although  limited  in  time,  is  quickly  available,  and  this  indirectly 
contributes to the security of European consumers. 
The results of prospecting operations in the U.S.A.  in the last ten years 
and the outlook as to demand suggest that this reserve will steadily contract 
both absolutely and, still more, proportionately. 
To be sure of adequate security reserves commensurate with future require-
ments, it will be necessary to push ahead very actively with prospecting and 
development operations. 
European consumer countries must thus  adopt  a  policy  on  supply which 
encourages  this  diversification  of  sources.  Various  steps  are  open  to  them, 
ranging from trading policy measures to the provision of incentives to prospect 
for oil either in the Community itself or in other more suitable areas. One of 
the objectives of Community oil policy must therefore be to devise and intro-
duce arrangements for improving security of supply and preventing unjustified 
increases in oil prices. 
Chapter  18 
Other economic features of the 19  7 0 
energy position 
Although not attempting to  outline all the economic aspects  of the 1970 
energy  position,  this  chapter  will  review  four  especially  important  points : 
the trend in the labour force in the coal industry, the effect of imports on the 
balance of payments, the sensitivity of the energy position to cyclical fluctu-
ations and the trend between now and 1970. 
190 Section 1 - The trend in the labour force in the 
coal indus  try 
The aim of this section is  not to  deal  with  labour problems in the  Com-
munity's coalmining industry, which will he studied in great detail when the 
General Objectives for Coal are drawn up, hut simply to recall certain funda-
mental-figures in the present situation and to provide approximate estimates 
of the future trend in the light of the main hypotheses and results contained 
in the earlier parts of this report. A  final task will he to describe the nature 
of the major problems likely to arise. 
Table  64  - Labour employed in Community Coalmines  ('000  workers  at  end of year). 
1955  1958  1961 
Underground workers  649  637  I  488 
Surface  workers  253  239  188 
Ancillary plants  53  55  53 
Administrative  personnel 
(underground and surface)  98  104  96 
Total  1,053  1,035  825 
Total excluding ancillary workers  1,000  980  772 
At the end of 1961  Community coalmines employed 825,000 persons. The 
fall in numbers has been very sharp since 1958 : 25% in three years, i.e. about 
8% per annum.  This  is  mainly due  to  a  steep  rise  in productivity owing to 
stationary markets. 
As regards the future two basic factors require consideration. Firstly, coal 
will he competing with forms of energy whose prices, after settling down to 
the long-term level below which they stand at the moment, will remain fairly 
stable  or will  only  increase  slowly.  Community  coal  will  then  only  he  able 
to  maintain  its  competitive  position  by  increasing  productivity  sufficiently 
to  offset wage  rises.  The immediate result will he that even at this  constant 
production  level  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  labour  force  to  shrink  fairly 
sharply at an average rate of about 3.5-5% per annum. Thus even assuming 
that in 1975 the production level will he the same as to-day (and also assuming 
the same level of employment in ancillary industries), the total labour force 
cannot exceed 500,000 (as against 825,000 at the end of 1961). 
The preceding chapters (particularly Chapter 15) have nevertheless shown 
that even with an increase of about 70% in underground output between 1960 
and 1975 the competitive level for coal production would only slightly exceed 
half the present output, in which case the labour force would have to drop to 
about 280,000 (ancillary workers included). 
191 The above  two figures  are based on maximum and m1n1mum  hypotheses; 
the  actual figure  would  lie  somewhere between the  two.  Thus  with  a  Com-
munity output of about 160-170 million metric tons  the  1975  labour force 
would be between 350,000 and 400,000. 
The transition from the present level to this figure would entail reducing 
the labour force at an average rate of some 6% per annum, which is  a  very 
high figure. 
The  reduction  over  the  last  three  years  has  of  course  been  very  steep 
(89"o  per annum)  and the main difficulty now is to find labour.  Nevertheless 
contractions in the labour force as severe as those mentioned above are likely 
to raise three serious types of problem : 
(i)  the  human  problem  of  occupationally  re-training  a  large  number 
of workers; 
(ii)  regional problems which may given rise to  acute difficulties at some 
pits if the necessary steps to foster the development of new industries 
are not taken in time; 
(iii)  problems within the coalmines themselves arising from the unfavour-
able trend in the  age  structure, in that it is  mainly  young workers 
who  leave the  mines  and rapid reductions in labour  forces  make  it 
difficult to recruit apprentices. This means that the general age level 
rises,  which  may  lead  to  serious  difficulties  in  filling  certain  jobs 
and cause the output trend to react unfavourably. 
However  difficult  they  may  be,  these  problems  can  be  solved  provided 
that all the necessary steps are taken sufficiently in advance, particularly as 
regards occupational re-training and regional development. 
Section 2 - Energy imports and the balance of payments 
In view  of  the  anticipated  heavy  increase  in  the  proportion  of  energy 
requirements covered by imports, we must ask ourselves whether such a  trend 
is not likely to upset the equilibrium in the balance-of-payments position. 
A  comprehensive answer to  this question can only be  given on the basis 
of a detailed analysis of Community import and export prospects for the next 
ten to fifteen years. At the present time the economic outlook for 1970 (see 
Part One)  only  provides  indications  as  to  the  next external  trade  position, 
which  must,  moreover,  be  regarded  as  an  aim  rather  than  a  forecast.  The 
following  remarks  will  thus  be  limited  to  giving  approximations  and  quali-
tative judgements. 
192 In 1960 the  Community's total imports from  the  rest  of the world  were 
$19,400  million,  with net energy imports  accounting  for  $1,300  million  and 
thus  representing  7%  of the  total  (obviously  the  figures  vary  considerably 
from one country to another - Italy 16%, France 13% and Germany 4.5%  ). 
In  the  future  the  Community's  energy  requirements  will  increase  less 
rapidly  than  the  gross  national  product  ( 4.1%  per  annum  as  against  4.6% 
between 1960 and 1970), but energy imports are likely to increase considerably 
more sharply (between 10% and 12%  ). As regards the total volume of external 
trade with the  rest of the  world,  arguments  can he put forward  to  support 
both  a  quicker  and  a  slower  growth  than  in  the  gross  national  product;  a 
reasonable  course  in  the  light  of  our  present  knowledge  is  to  assume  an 
identical growth rate for both. 
On this  basis the  Community's  total imports from  the  rest of the  world 
would  amount  to  $31,000  million  in  1970  and  $39,000  million  in  1975.  It 
seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  imported  energy  will  be  carried  by  Com-
munity-flag vessels; the average cost of imported energy in foreign  currency 
would then be $9.00-10.00 per metric ton hard-coal equivalent and the total 
cost would he between $3,500  and 4,500 million in 1970 and between $4,600 
and 5,600 million in 1975. To sum up, energy imports would represent between 
11  and 14.5% of total imports in 1970 and between 12 and 14% in 1975. 
Although much higher than the present percentages, these figures are still 
modest and,  as  regards  the  Community,  slightly below the present rates  for 
France and Italy. 
Insofar  as  there  is  a  risk  of imports  being  concentrated in  a  small part 
of  the  world,  difficulties  may  arise  in  paying  for  them  with  exports.  This 
calls for two remarks : 
(i)  firstly, the f.o.b. cost of crude oil includes prospection and extraction 
expenditure, a  substantial portion of which is  for purchases of equip-
ment in Europe and for salaries of European technicians; part of the 
imports are therefore automatically covered by exports; 
(ii)  secondly, exporting countries will obviously want to use their foreign 
currency; it is highly likely that they will not use it all on purchases 
within the Community, and the other countries in which  they spend 
their foreign currency will themselves then he in possession of foreign 
currency which they will try to spend; either directly or by multi-lateral 
trading there is  a  tendency for Community exports to enable imports 
to be covered. True, the more roundabout the process, the greater the 
risks of temporary malfunctioning;  this  does  not,  however,  apply  to 
energy  only.  We  must  also  remember  that  the  balance  of  payments 
equilibrium  necessitates  correct  rates  of  exchange.  This  point  was 
touched on at the  beginning of Part Three,  where  provisionally  the 
conclusion  was  reached  that  the  hypothesis  of  maintaining  present 
exchange rates was acceptable subject to additional analyses. 
193 The portion of energy imports  capable of being modified by the  energy 
policy represents some 100 million metric tons hard-coal equivalent, a  fairly 
high figure in absolute terms ($1,000 million in 1970), although it only repre-
sents 3% of the total imports from the rest of the  world,  i.e.  less  than one 
year's growth under steady expansion conditions. Marginal currencies are, of 
CO"!Jrse,  always the most difficult to acquire, but the question of saving foreign 
currency must be viewed as an overall problem by reference to the comparative 
competitiveness  of  all  export  industries,  and  the  discussion  in  Part  Four 
enables us to measure the real cost of the foreign currency saved by raising 
Community output. If  we propose to avoid importing one metric ton hard-coal 
equivalent which would cost $13.00 by producing one metric ton H.C.E. costing 
the equivalent of $17.00-18.00 in Community currencies, we must investigate 
the saving in foreign currency to see whether it is really beneficial and whether 
the production factors- capital and labour- required to provide this metric 
ton H.C.E. would not be utilised to better advantage in producing exportable 
items to offset the additional imports of energy. 
Section 3 - The effect of cyclical fluctuations 
All  the  remarks  contained  in  the  foregoing  chapters  are  based  on  the 
concept of steady trends (either expansion or contraction) in supply channels, 
substitution processes, market apportionment etc. The figures  for  1970 must 
be looked at far more as landmarks in a  general trend than as specific values 
for a privileged year. 
Economic  development,  however,  does  not  exhibit  such  a  steady  trend. 
Even though the  implementation  of policies  designed  to  counteract  cyclical 
fluctuations  may limit the latters' extent, it cannot entirely  eliminate  them. 
We  must  now  see  whether  these  fluctuations  are  capable  of  upsetting  the 
harmonious pattern of the trend and the state of equilibrium forecast for 1970. 
A  - Cyclical  fluctuations  affect  different  energy  products  in  different 
ways owing not only  to  disparities  in  cost  sensitivity  and  to  inequalities in 
the  financial  standing  enjoyed  by  different  undertakings  but  also  to  the 
existence of more than one energy product. 
(a)  Disparities in cost sensitivity 
Owing to the large share of labour costs in overall coal production costs 
and to the need for a  stable labour force - not only from the worker's point 
of view but also from that of the employer, who would find it very difficult 
194 to  recruit labour during  a  boom  after having  laid it off when  there  was  a 
slump - the cost per ton extracted is extremely inflexible and even tends to 
rise during slumps. The result is that for reasons of solvency colliery under-
takings cannot really lower their prices when markets contract. 
Oil  product  costs,  on  the  other  hand,  include  a  substantial  amount  of 
depreciation, which on a  temporary basis can he deferred to  a  later period. 
In addition prospection accounts for a  large proportion of the annual expen-
diture and can be slowed down from time to time. As a result it is much easier 
to vary oil product prices over a period of time. 
With imported products,  a  substantial part of the  c.i.f.  price  (20-35% 
under  average  business  conditions)  consists  of  the  freight  rate,  which  is 
especially sensitive to cyclical fluctuations  and is  likely to  collapse  during a 
slump,  thus  entailing  a  possible  reduction of 10-15% in  the  c.i.f.  price  of 
imported energy products. 
(h)  Inequalities in financial standing 
Community  collieries  are  organised  on  a  national  basis  and  all  their 
activities  are therefore  influenced by the  economic  situation in the country 
concerned, even if they have financial links with customer undertakings. 
The major oil  companies,  on the  other hand,  are  international  concerns 
and can thus make balancing adjustments which allow prices to be temporarily 
reduced in a given market which is particularly affected by slump conditions. 
(c)  Existence of more than one energy product 
In  some  cases  the  existence  of  a  number  of  energy  products  enables 
temporary price reductions on one product to be offset by income on another 
product when different markets do not react in the same way to a  change in 
economic conditions. 
In this respect the oil industry is more flexible than the collieries. One of 
its products - motor fuel - is  not subject to  competition from  any  other 
industry, whereas all colliery products face  competition either from  fuel  oil 
and imported coal for steam-raising or else  from  the latter only for  coking 
purposes. 
195 B  - Because of the disparity in sensitivity and varying degree of capacity 
to ride out economic fluctuations examined above, cyclical fluctuations  could 
upset ec.onomic  trends considered desirable  from  a  long-term point of view. 
This will especially apply where the market is  divided between coal and 
oil on the one hand and between Community and imported products on the 
other.  To  be  more  specific,  marketing  difficulties  arising  from  economic 
fluctuations  and  aggravated  by  temporarily  fiercer  competition  may  reduce 
some collieries to such an awkward financial position that they are forced to 
close,  despite  the  fact  that  long-term  prospects  require  them  to  remain  in 
business. In addition the policy of diversifying sources of supply for oil could 
be hempered if prospection programmes have to be slowed down in particular 
areas. 
C  - The last difficulty is that cyclical fluctuations prevent demand from 
developing regularly. At this point we must ask to what extent such irregularity 
can be contained by stockbuilding or production measures, and in the latter 
case  what  steps  should  have  priority  (this  raises  the  question  of  dual-fired 
equipment). 
Section 4 - Special problems between now and 19  7 0 
The  energy positions forecast  for  1970 and beyond have been  calculated 
on  the  basis  of probable  1970  prices  and  the  probable  trend  around  1970, 
but - as pointed out earlier, particularly in Chapters 7  and 9  - the current 
prices of imported coal and  oil products  are  below the  level  anticipated in 
the future. The gap varies from product to product - over $1.00 per metric 
ton hard-coal equivalent for American coal and considerably more for fuel oil. 
In all probability this situation will persist for several years yet. 
The  result  is  that  the  play  of  forces  expected  to  produce  the  state  of 
equilibrium outlined by about 1970 might, in the years between now and then, 
give  rise  to  two unpleasant consequences :  firstly  pits might be  closed  down 
in too great a  number or too quickly, and secondly the policy of diversifying 
crude oil supply sources might be hampered. Both these consequences would 
be very serious : the first because closing down a  pit is usually an irreversible 
step and the second because a  thorough-going geographical diversification of 
crude origins can only be achieved by sustained effort over a number of years. 
Temporary measures will thus need to be worked out and put into  force  to 
supplement the long-term energy policy. 
196 Conclusions 
Each margin of error and source of uncertainty has been carefully noted, 
and as far as  possible evaluated, at the various stages of these studies. Many 
of the figures arrived at must be regarded as  approximations rather than  as 
definite values. 
This circumspection is essential in a study involving highly complex and in 
many cases chancy factors. Far from weakening the conclusions, however, it 
gives  added weight to  some of the findings,  in the light of which it is  now 
possible  to  isolate  the  problems  on  which  energy  policy  must  he  primarily 
concentrated, and to gauge the effects of the measures which that policy might 
comprise. 
(1)  Given the rapid growth forecast for  the  Community  economy  (4.6% 
per annum in G.N.P.), total energy requirements may be expected to increase 
by about 4% per annum, from 460 million tons hard-coal equivalent in 1960 
to 700 million in 1970 and almost 850 million in 1975. 
(2)  By 1970 barely one-third of the requirements will be met by coal. The 
share of Community coal, therefore, will shrink, even if the present volume 
of production is  maintained,  from  45o/o  today to  33%  in  1970  and  27%  in 
1975. 
(3)  Even with Community production of other energy sources expanding, 
more and more of the requirements will have to be covered by imports, mainlJ 
of crude oil. These imports will increase in amount (hence the need to secure 
a supply potential of an adequate scale), and also in proportion to requirements 
as  a  whole,  from  one-third  today  to  over half in  1970 :  this  will  make  the 
question of security and stability of supply  (tonnages and prices)  even more 
important. 
(4)  )The competitive capacity of Community collieries is much diminished 
even today, with the prices of the rival products, imported coal and fuel oil, 
at their present level. 
Admittedly  they  can  be  said  to  be  competing  under  disadvantageous 
conditions, owing in part, very definitely, to the disparate rules of competition 
in the respective markets, and  also  doubtless  to  the industry's  own  costs  of 
197 regression. Moreover, some of the ultra-low prices quoted in the last few years 
for imported fuels may be regarded as exceptional. 
Nevertheless, even should these inequalities be corrected and should  mor,~ 
normal market conditions  return, with  a  certain hardening of the  prices  of 
the imported products there seems no prospect of a long-term improvement in 
the competitive position of Community coal, since even on the assumption of 
a  rapid rise  (70% over 15 years)  in underground O.M.S.  the expected move-
ment of wages is bound to drive up costs. 
Given the divergent trend in the  c.i.f.  prices of imported  fuels  and  the 
production costs of Community coal, notwithstanding the increase in energy 
requirements,  the  tonnage  of  Community  coal  which  will  be  competitive 
without assistance of any kind will amount to not much more than half present 
production. 
This calculation - a rough but reasonable estimate - could be discounted 
only 
(i)  if it were possible to scrap the already optimistic hypothesis as to the 
productivity trend in favour of one assuming revolutionary innovations 
in coal-winning techniques; 
(ii)  if  the  Community  were  to  adopt  no  policy  at  all  concerning  oil 
prospecting and supply, and thereby leave oil prices wide open to the 
long-term political risks. 
(5)  In view, then, of all that is  involved - the security factors, the social 
and regional considerations, and the hazards inherent in a  market comprising 
such uncertain political elements - it is  felt to be right and proper that the 
collieries should be given assista,nce in order to  enable them to produce and 
sell more  coal than they could  do  competitively in strictly  economic  terms. 
Without wishing to anticipate the conclusions on energy policy, an economic 
analysis of this report thus raises three main problems : 
(a) Measures  must be  worked  out  to  enable  the  volume  of  coal  production 
considered  desirable  in  the  Community to  be marketed. These  measures 
must be  capable  of  stimulating  rationalisation  in  Community  coalmines. 
In the  light  of the  foregoing  remarks,  they  should  aim  at  retaining the 
essential nucleus of Community coal production. 
(b) An imported  energy supply  policy  must  be  formulated,  particularly for 
crude oil. The principle of lowest-cost Community supplies must be looked 
at from  a  fairly long-term point of view  and  conditions  aimed at which 
will prevent prices rising artificially whilst relying mainly on production 
regions where technical costs  are lowest. 
198 (c) A  study  must  be  made  of the  most  suitable  rate  for  expanding  nuclear 
installations. In fifteen to twenty years' time the atom will be the source 
of energy which will improve the Community's security of energy supplies. 
On the basis of the iniormation available, there is every reason to believe 
that  large-scale  nuclear  power  stations  will  be  competitive  from  1970 
onwards  in  meeting  the  base  of  the  load  curve.  Owing  to  its  novelty, 
however, the nuclear industry raises a  large number of problems for many 
suppliers,  especially  in  the  mechanical  engineering,  chemicals  and  civil 
engineering  industries.  Rapid  expansion  in  the  provision  of  industrial 
power  reactors  may  thus  meet  with  bottlenecks,  especially  as  regards 
trained personnel, if the rate of development is not adequately anticipated. 
A  decision to  accelerate the rate of expansion will not show full  results 
until several years have elapsed. This means that the outlook considered 
desirable between now and 1975 must be decided on without further delay. 
A solution to any one of these problems leaves a certain amount of latitude 
in dealing with the others. It should nevertheless be realised that the growing 
share of imports in the Community's energy supplies (which places the Com-
munity in a very different position from that occupied by other major econo-
mic units) makes it necessary to keep the market wide open to products from 
all sources so  as  to reduce the cost of supplies as  much as possible; and the 
necessary corollary to this approach is then to adopt a  common energy policy 
which  safeguards  security  of  supplies,  without  which  the  aim  of  low-cost 
supplies cannot be achieved. 
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